Craig N. Thornley

Craig N. Thornley

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Craig N. Thornley

Auckland Regional Public Health Service, Auckland District Health Board, Auckland, New Zealand

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

36Years (1991-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
27 August 2009 in Eurosurveillance
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MBMichael Baker
Michael Baker
NWN Wilson
N Wilson
QHQ S Huang
Q S Huang
SPS Paine
S Paine
LLL Lopez
L Lopez
CMC McArthur
C McArthur
Binary file ES_Abstracts_Final_ECDC.txt matches

1 August 2003 in Epidemiology and Infection
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LCL. Calder
L. Calder
GSG. Simmons
G. Simmons
CTC. Thornley
C. Thornley
PTP. Taylor
P. Taylor
KPK. Pritchard
K. Pritchard
JBJ. Bishop
J. Bishop
This report describes the epidemiology, investigation and control of a hepatitis A (HAV) outbreak in New Zealand. Descriptive and analytical epidemiology, virology, product traceback and an orchard investigation were carried out. A case–control study revealed that 56% of 39 cases had consumed raw blueberries, compared with 14% of 71 controls (odds ratio 7·6; 95% confidence intervals 2·6–22·4). Traceback of product through retailers and wholesalers implicated a single commercial orchard. Hepatitis A virus was detected by reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction in faecal specimens from cases as well as a blueberry product from the orchard. Presence of hepatitis A virus was confirmed by DNA hybridization and sequencing of PCR products. Sanitary audit of the orchard revealed multiple opportunities for contamination of blueberries by pickers. This outbreak highlights the need for food safety programmes in the berry fruit industry.

1 February 2002 in Epidemiology and Infection
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CTC. N. Thornley
C. N. Thornley
MBM. G. Baker
M. G. Baker
PWPhilip Weinstein
Philip Weinstein
EME. W. Maas
E. W. Maas
The objective was to describe the current epidemiology and trends in New Zealand human leptospirosis, using descriptive epidemiology of laboratory surveillance and disease notification data, 1990–8. The annual incidence of human leptospirosis in New Zealand 1990–8 was 4·4 per 100000. Incidence was highest among meat processing workers (163·5/100000), livestock farm workers (91·7), and forestry-related workers (24·1). The most commonly detected serovars were Leptospira borgpetersenii serovar (sv.) hardjo (hardjobovis) (46·1%), L. interrogans sv. pomona (24·4%) and L. borgpetersenii sv. ballum (11·9%). The annual incidence of leptospirosis declined from 5·7/100000 in 1990–2 to 2·9/100000 in 1996–8. Incidence of L. borgpetersenii sv. hardjo and L. interrogans sv. pomona infection declined, while incidence of L. borgpetersenii sv. ballum infection increased. The incidence of human leptospirosis in New Zealand remains high for a temperate developed country. Increasing L. borgpetersenii sv. ballum case numbers suggest changing transmission patterns via direct or indirect exposure to contaminated surface water. Targeted and evaluated disease control programmes should be renewed.

21 May 2010 in BMJ
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MBMichael Baker
Michael Baker
CTCraig N Thornley
Craig N Thornley
CMClair Mills
Clair Mills
SRSally Roberts
Sally Roberts
SPShanika Perera
Shanika Perera
NWNick Wilson
Nick Wilson
Objectives To assess the risk of transmission of pandemic A/H1N1 2009 influenza (pandemic A/H1N1) from an infected high school group to other passengers on an airline flight and the effectiveness of screening and follow-up of exposed passengers. Design Retrospective cohort investigation using a questionnaire administered to passengers and laboratory investigation of those with symptoms. Setting Auckland, New Zealand, with national and international follow-up of passengers. Participants Passengers seated in the rear section of a Boeing 747-400 long haul flight that arrived on 25 April 2009, including a group of 24 students and teachers and 97 (out of 102) other passengers in the same section of the plane who agreed to be interviewed. Main outcome measures Incidence of in-flight infection with pandemic A/H1N1; sensitivity and specificity of influenza symptoms for confirmed infection; and completeness and timeliness of contact tracing. Results Nine members of the school group were laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic A/H1N1 infection and had symptoms during the flight. Two other passengers developed confirmed pandemic A/H1N1 infection, 12 and 48 hours after the flight. They reported no other potential sources of infection. Their seating was within two rows of infected passengers, implying a risk of infection of about 3.5% for the 57 passengers in those rows. All but one of the confirmed pandemic A/H1N1 infected travellers reported cough, but more complex definitions of influenza cases had relatively low sensitivity. Rigorous follow-up by public health workers located 93% of passengers, but only 52% were contacted within 72 hours of arrival. Conclusions A low but measurable risk of transmission of pandemic A/H1N1 exists during modern commercial air travel. This risk is concentrated close to infected passengers with symptoms. Follow-up and screening of exposed passengers is slow and difficult once they have left the airport.

11 August 2011 in Clinical Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
CTCraig N. Thornley
Craig N. Thornley
NENicola A. Emslie
Nicola A. Emslie
TSTim W. Sprott
Tim W. Sprott
GGGail E. Greening
Gail E. Greening
JRJackie P. Rapana
Jackie P. Rapana
(See the Editorial Commentary by Lopman, on pages 521–22.)

1 March 2008 in Water Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GSGreg Simmons
Greg Simmons
SJSheryl Jury
Sheryl Jury
CTCraig Thornley
Craig Thornley
DHDavid Harte
David Harte
JMJasmine Mohiuddin
Jasmine Mohiuddin
MTMichael Taylor
Michael Taylor