Every year at the United Nations (UN), member states deliver statements during the General Debate (GD) discussing major issues in world politics. These speeches provide invaluable information on governments’ perspectives and preferences on a wide range of issues, but have largely been overlooked in the study of international politics. This paper introduces a new dataset consisting of over 7300 country statements from 1970–2014. We demonstrate how the UN GD corpus (UNGDC) can be used as a resource from which country positions on different policy dimensions can be derived using text analytic methods. The article provides applications of these estimates, demonstrating the contribution the UNGDC can make to the study of international politics.
When do elected incumbent leaders accept democratic rules, and when are they willing to manipulate these rules raising the specter—and in some cases creating the reality—of dictatorship? Many ambitious presidents throughout the world attempt to circumvent restrictions on the executive...
Topic models have been widely used by researchers across disciplines to automatically analyze large textual data. However, they often fail to automate content analysis, because the algorithms cannot accurately classify individual sentences into pre-defined topics. Aiming to make topic classification more theoretically grounded and content analysis in general more topic-specific, we have developed Seeded Sequential Latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA), extending the existing LDA algorithm, and implementing it in a widely accessible open-source package. Taking a large corpus of speeches delivered by delegates at the United Nations General Assembly as an example, we explain how our algorithm differs from the original algorithm; why it can classify sentences more accurately; how it accepts pre-defined topics in deductive or semi-deductive analysis; how such ex-ante topic mapping differs from ex-post topic mapping; how it enables topic-specific framing analysis in applied research. We also offer practical guidance on how to determine the optimal number of topics and select seed words for the algorithm.
Many comparative scholars classify personalist regimes as a distinct category of nondemocratic rule. To measure the process of regime personalization, and to distinguish such a process from overall authoritarian reversal, is difficult in comparative context. Using the Russian political regime in 1999 – 2014 as a case study, we examine the dynamics of regime personalization over time. Relying on original data on patron –client networks and expert surveys assessing the policy influence of the key members of the ruling coalition, we argue that having more clients, or clients who are more powerful, increases the power of patrons – and that where the patron is the ruler, the resulting measure is an indication of the level of personalization of the regime. We trace regime personalization from the changes in political influence of the president’s associates in his patron –client network versus that of other elite patron –client networks. We find that as early as 2004, the Russian regime can be regarded as personalist, and is strongly so from 2006 onwar
1 April 2010 in British Journal of Political Science
Some presidents facing term limits attempt – often successfully – to scrap tenure restrictions, while others step down when constitutionally required. Whether democratic, partly democratic or non-democratic, there is considerable variation among electoral regimes as to whether presidents respect term limits. This article focuses on what is at stake for a president required to leave the highest political office. It argues that for a given level of executive constraints, the value of holding political office in polities with large public sectors and prevalent corruption, combined with the probability of retaining assets and immunity after leaving office, influences whether presidents attempt to overstay their tenure.
Politics in democracy and dictatorship is markedly different; democracy and dictatorship are also associated with distinct policy outcomes. Do political regimes also select different leaders, i.e., do democratic leaders have distinct personal backgrounds to those of their peers in dictatorships, do they tend to hold different prior careers and posts while climbing the “greasy pole” of politics? The aim of this paper is to introduce the new data on leaders’ careers in democracy and dictatorship and compare their personal background, experience in politics, careers and significant posts prior to their tenure, and details about their time in office, inter alia. In general, democratic leaders differ from nondemocratic ones in terms of their educational, social and career background. The paper also finds significant differences among leaders in different nondemocratic regimes, and suggests possible venues for further research.