Mashari Alatawi

Mashari Alatawi

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Mashari Alatawi

Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
29 May 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MAMashari Alatawi
Mashari Alatawi
NSNitesh Saxena
Nitesh Saxena
Instant-messaging (IM) and voice over IP (VoIP) applications like WhatsApp, Zoom, and Skype have made people extremely reliant on online communications for their audio, video, and text conversations. Since more people are using these platforms to talk to each other and share sensitive information, many ongoing concerns have been raised about how the government and law enforcement monitor these platforms. Due to these concerns, the need for a method to secure confidential messages and electronic conversations has grown. This solution could be achieved by implementing an end-to-end encryption (E2EE) system without relying on any first or third parties, such as an online service or a centralized infrastructure like a public key infrastructure (PKI), which may be attacked, malicious, or coerced by law enforcement and government surveillance programs. In this systematization of knowledge paper, we first introduce the most popular E2EE apps, including their underlying E2EE messaging protocols. Then, based on the existing research literature, we investigate and systematize their E2EE features, including their underlying authentication ceremonies. Even though many research studies have examined some messaging services, we analyze and evaluate a broader set of the most popular E2EE apps and their underlying authentication ceremonies. Based on our evaluation, we have determined that all current E2EE apps, particularly when operating in opportunistic E2EE mode, are incapable of repelling active man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. In addition, we find that none of the current E2EE apps provide better and more usable authentication ceremonies, resulting in insecure E2EE communications against active MitM attacks. The conclusions of this systematization paper could influence future research in the field, including any improvements to the implementation of E2EE systems and authentication ceremonies that provide powerful protections against eavesdropping and MitM attacks.


7 July 2023 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
MAMashari Alatawi
Mashari Alatawi
NSNitesh Saxena
Nitesh Saxena
End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) aims to make all messages impossible to read by anyone except you and your intended recipient(s). Many well-known and widely used Instant-Messaging (IM) applications (such as Signal, WhatsApp, and Apple's iMessage) claim to provide E2EE. However, a recent technique called client-side scanning (CSS) makes these E2EE claims grandiose and hollow promises. The CSS is a technology that scans all sending and receiving messages from one end to the other. Some in industry and government now advocate this CSS technology to combat the growth of malicious child pornography, terrorism, and other illicit communication. Even though combating the spread of illegal and morally objectionable content is a laudable effort, it may open further backdoors that impact the user's privacy and security. Therefore, it is not E2EE when there are censorship mechanisms and backdoors in end-to-end encrypted applications. In this paper, we introduce an encrypted keyboard that functions as a system keyboard, enabling users to employ it across all applications on their phones when entering data. By utilizing this encrypted keyboard, users can locally encrypt and decrypt messages, effectively bypassing the CSS system. We first design and implement our encrypted keyboard as a custom keyboard application, and then we evaluate the effectiveness and security of our encrypted keyboard. Our study results show that our encrypted keyboard can successfully encrypt and decrypt all sending and receiving messages through IM applications, and therefore, it can successfully defeat the CSS technology in end-to-end encrypted systems. We also show that our encrypted keyboard can be used to add another layer of E2EE functionality on top of the existing E2EE functionality implemented by many end-to-end encrypted applications.

19 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MAMashari Alatawi
Mashari Alatawi
NSNitesh Saxena
Nitesh Saxena
End-to-end encryption (E2EE) is a critical security feature in mobile messaging apps like Signal, WhatsApp, and Skype, protecting private conversations from unauthorized access, even by service providers. However, this security heavily relies on users participating in an authentication ceremony to verify encryption key fingerprints, thwarting potential man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. This authentication ceremony involves comparing QR codes or readable/exchangeable codes (e.g., numeric or hexadecimal) to ensure a match. Failure to match these codes due to human errors or click-through behavior makes users vulnerable to MitM attacks, as recent research highlights users' inability to perform this crucial comparison task in current E2EE applications. This paper presents an innovative automated approach integrated into the Signal application to simplify the authentication ceremony by automating the safety number comparison task. The new approach streamlines the comparison process by removing the manual burden from users. It prompts users to share the safety number through two out-of-band (OOB) channels: an SMS message and orally during a phone call with the other party. Simultaneously, the approach automatically performs a comparison between the shared safety number and the locally generated safety number on the recipient's phone. This automated comparison ensures accuracy, reduces human error, and enhances security by making it doubly difficult for attackers, as both channels must be compromised simultaneously. The approach demonstrates improved effectiveness, eliminating human errors and resisting MitM attacks, making it more robust than the current implementation in the Signal application. The results show a 0% false acceptance and 0% false rejection rate, significantly enhancing security and usability in this critical authentication process.