Shuai Hao

Shuai Hao

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Shuai Hao

University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 November 2019 in ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RBRui Bian
Rui Bian
SHShuai Hao
Shuai Hao
HWHaining Wang
Haining Wang
ADAmogh Dhamdere
Amogh Dhamdere
ADAlberto Dainotti
Alberto Dainotti
CCChase Cotton
Chase Cotton
Anycast has been widely adopted by today's Internet services, including DNS, CDN, and DDoS protection, in which the same IP address is announced from distributed locations and clients are directed to the topologically-nearest service replica. Prior research has focused on various aspects of anycast, either its usage in particular services such as DNS or characterizing its adoption by Internet-wide active probing methods. In this paper, we first explore an alternative approach to characterize anycast based on previously collected global BGP routing information. Leveraging state-of-the-art active measurement results as near-ground-truth, our passive method without requiring any Internet-wide probes can achieve 90% accuracy in detecting anycast prefixes. More importantly, our approach uncovers anycast prefixes that have been missed by prior datasets based on active measurements. While investigating the root causes of inaccuracy, we reveal that anycast routing has been entangled with the increased adoption of remote peering, a type of layer-2 interconnection where an IP network may peer at an IXP remotely without being physically present at the IXP. The invisibility of remote peering from layer-3 breaks the assumption of the shortest AS paths on BGP and causes an unintended impact on anycast performance. We identify such cases from BGP routing information and observe that at least 19.2% of anycast prefixes have been potentially impacted by remote peering.

1 April 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
HXHaitao Xu
Haitao Xu
SHShuai Hao
Shuai Hao
ASAlparslan Sari
Alparslan Sari
HWHaining Wang
Haining Wang
Today's online marketing industry has widely employed email tracking techniques, such as embedding a tiny tracking pixel, to track email opens of potential customers and measure marketing effectiveness. However, email tracking could allow miscreants to collect metadata information associated with email reading without user awareness and then leverage the information for stealthy surveillance, which has raised serious privacy concerns. In this paper, we present an in-depth and comprehensive study on the privacy implications of email tracking. First, we develop an email tracking system and perform realworld tracking on hundreds of solicited crowdsourcing participants. We estimate the amount of privacy-sensitive information available from email reading, assess privacy risks of information leakage, and demonstrate how easy it is to launch a long-term targeted surveillance attack in real scenarios by simply sending an email with tracking capability. Second, we investigate the prevalence of email tracking through a large-scale measurement, which includes more than 44,000 email samples obtained over a period of seven years. Third, we conduct a user study to understand users' perception of privacy infringement caused by email tracking. Finally, we evaluate existing countermeasures against email tracking and propose guidelines for developing more comprehensive and fine-grained prevention solutions.

1 June 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
LJLin Jin
Lin Jin
SHShuai Hao
Shuai Hao
HWHaining Wang
Haining Wang
CCChase Cotton
Chase Cotton
The increasing prevalence of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on the Internet has led to the wide adoption of DDoS Protection Service (DPS), which is typically provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and is integrated with CDN's security extensions. The effectiveness of DPS mainly relies on hiding the IP address of an origin server and rerouting the traffic to the DPS provider's distributed infrastructure, where malicious traffic can be blocked. In this paper, we perform a measurement study on the usage dynamics of DPS customers and reveal a new vulnerability in DPS platforms, called residual resolution, by which a DPS provider may leak origin IP addresses when its customers terminate the service or switch to other platforms, resulting in the failure of protection from future DPS providers as adversaries are able to discover the origin IP addresses and launch the DDoS attack directly to the origin servers. We identify that two major DPS/CDN providers, Cloudflare and Incapsula, are vulnerable to such residual resolution exposure, and we then assess the magnitude of the problem in the wild. Finally, we discuss the root causes of residual resolution and the practical countermeasures to address this security vulnerability.

18 December 2018 in Mobile Information Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Jeongyeup PaekJeongyeup Paek
Jeongyeup Paek
AGAndrea Gaglione
Andrea Gaglione
OGOmprakash Gnawali
Omprakash Gnawali
MVMarcos A. M. Vieira
Marcos A. M. Vieira
SHShuai Hao
Shuai Hao

24 May 2017 in Mobile Information Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Jeongyeup PaekJeongyeup Paek
Jeongyeup Paek
OGOmprakash Gnawali
Omprakash Gnawali
MVMarcos A. M. Vieira
Marcos A. M. Vieira
SHShuai Hao
Shuai Hao