22 June 2023 in International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction
12 March 2019 in Structure and Infrastructure Engineering
In large infrastructure projects, the government frequently delegates the execution and management to a private through Public–Private Partnerships (PPP) type contract. However, both parties often have conflicting interests; i.e. while the private wants to maximise the profit, the government aims at maintaining a high-performance level. This paper presents a model to define a set of contract parameters that maximise the utility of both entities in the long term, and at the same time optimise the system performance. Moreover, it proposes a strategy for the private to decide the optimal maintenance frequencies and achieve its target revenue. It also describes the complex interactions between the public, the private and nature (i.e. all environmental aspects that influence the system’s performance). The model combines the advantages game theory, simulation, optimisation and agent-based modeling. A set of 72 types of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts are simulated, with a sensitivity analysis on the main contract variables (i.e. minimum level of performance required, mean frequency of government inspections, and penalty fee in case of noncompliance). The results show the importance of flexibility in decisions when facing different sources of uncertainty, and in reducing information asymmetry between the parties to improve maintenance decisions.
16 April 2020 in Reliability Engineering & System Safety
25 August 2023 in Geomatics, Natural Hazards and Risk
12 May 2020 in International Journal of Construction Management
PPPs are a compelling mechanism for infrastructure procurement but are vulnerable to the principal-agent problem due to the divergence in the parties’ utility functions. This research considers PPPs in infrastructure maintenance problems, in which the principal pursues high performance levels, whereas the agent pursues cost-efficiency. This paper proposes an optimization model that describes infrastructure performance as a result of deterioration and maintenance processes, and computes the associated benefits and costs for the principal and the agent, combining game theoretical notions with life-cycle analysis. Illustrative examples show how the organizational conditions surrounding PPPs shape the parties’ decisions and outcomes by running the model under different scenarios. For instance, the model can anticipate the agent’s optimal reaction to specific contractual conditions; i.e., what maintenance plan can be expected from a contractor depending on whether certain performance-related constraints or incentives are in place. Finally, the model can find the optimal maintenance plan for one party conditioned on respecting the other party’s optimum within a specified tolerance. This allows to explore a variety of middle-ground solutions and choose an alternative in which one party’s gain exceeds the other’s loss, providing evidence for incentive design. This research provides a quantitative tool to support decisions and policy on PPPs by integrating physical, financial, and organizational aspects of infrastructure management.
8 August 2024 in Earthquake Spectra