Dilip Mookherjee

Dilip Mookherjee

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Dilip Mookherjee

Boston University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

36Years (1991-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2012 in Econometrica
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Journal Article
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ULUlf Von Lilienfeld-Toal
Ulf Von Lilienfeld-Toal
DMDilip Mookherjee
Dilip Mookherjee
SVSujata Visaria
Sujata Visaria
It is generally presumed that stronger legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers because it expands the set of incentive compatible loan contracts. This result relies on an assumption that the supply of credit is infinitely elastic. In contrast, with inelastic supply, stronger enforcement generates general equilibrium effects that may reduce credit access for small borrowers and expand it for wealthy borrowers. In a firm-level panel, we find evidence that an Indian judicial reform that increased banks' ability to recover nonperforming loans had such an adverse distributive impact

1 March 2021 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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Journal Article
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RDRuochen Dai
Ruochen Dai
DMDilip Mookherjee
Dilip Mookherjee
YQYingyue Quan
Yingyue Quan
XZXiaobo Zhang
Xiaobo Zhang

1 September 2004 in International Tax and Public Finance
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Journal Article
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ADArindam Das-Gupta
Arindam Das-Gupta
SGShanto Ghosh
Shanto Ghosh
DMDilip Mookherjee
Dilip Mookherjee

1 March 1997 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
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NMNahum Melumad
Nahum Melumad
DMDilip Mookherjee
Dilip Mookherjee
SRStefan Reichelstein
Stefan Reichelstein

1 October 2022 in Review of Economic Dynamics
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DRDebraj Ray
Debraj Ray
DMDilip Mookherjee
Dilip Mookherjee

30 April 2001 in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
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Journal Article
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DMDilip Mookherjee
Dilip Mookherjee
SRStefan Reichelstein
Stefan Reichelstein
The internal organization of large firms as well as procurement and regulation contexts frequently involve a hierarchical nexus of contracts, with substantial delegation of decision making across layers. Such hierarchical delegation of decision making creates problems of aligning incentives of vertically related agents, and coordinating the actions of different branches of the hierarchy. In a principal-agent setting with private information, it is shown that under certain assumptions (top-down contracting, observability of subcontracting outcomes, absence of limited liability constraints) the hierarchy can implement second-best allocations. Incentive problems are overcome via compensations that are linear in a measure of performance of the concerned department, defined as the difference between a measure of imputed revenues and procurement costs. The coordination problem is overcome by conditioning output targets and payments on cost reports submitted by other branches; despite this, agents' strategies are dominant with respect to the behavior of members of other branches. The result provides conditions for the lack of a `control loss' from hierarchical decentralization of decision making, owing to incentive or coordination problems.