Alejandro Fábregas-Tejeda

Alejandro Fábregas-Tejeda

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Alejandro Fábregas-Tejeda

Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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10 February 2020 in Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution
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Journal Article
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JBJan Baedke
Jan Baedke
AFAlejandro Fábregas‐Tejeda
Alejandro Fábregas‐Tejeda
ADAbigail Nieves Delgado
Abigail Nieves Delgado
In recent years, Lynn Margulis has been credited in various articles as the person who introduced the concept of holobiont into biology in the early 1990s. Today, the origin of evolutionary studies on holobionts is closely linked to her name. However, Margulis was not the first person to use this concept in its current context. That honor goes to the German theoretical biologist Adolf Meyer‐Abich, who introduced the holobiont concept nearly 50 years before her (in 1943). Although nearly completely forgotten today, in the 1940–60s he developed a comprehensive theory of evolutionary change through “holobiosis.” It had a surprisingly modern outlook, as it not only addressed tenets of today's evolutionary developmental biology (evo‐devo), like the origin of form and production of variation, but also anticipated key elements of Margulis' later endosymbiotic theory. As the holobiont concept has become an important guiding concept for organizing research, labeling conferences, and publishing articles on host‐microbiota collectives and hologenomes, the field should become aware of the independent origin of this concept in the context of holistic biology of the 1940s.

20 September 2021 in Biology & Philosophy
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JBJan Baedke
Jan Baedke
AFAlejandro Fábregas-Tejeda
Alejandro Fábregas-Tejeda
GPGuido I. Prieto
Guido I. Prieto
In recent years, biologists and philosophers of science have argued that evolutionary theory should incorporate more seriously the idea of ‘reciprocal causation.’ This notion refers to feedback loops whereby organisms change their experiences of the environment or alter the physical properties of their surroundings. In these loops, in particular niche constructing activities are central, since they may alter selection pressures acting on organisms, and thus affect their evolutionary trajectories. This paper discusses long-standing problems that emerge when studying such reciprocal causal processes between organisms and environments. By comparing past approaches to reciprocal causation from the early twentieth century with contemporary ones in niche construction theory, we identify two central reoccurring problems: All of these approaches have not been able to provide a conceptual framework that allows (i) maintaining meaningful boundaries between organisms and environments, instead of merging the two, and (ii) integrating experiential and physical kinds of reciprocal causation. By building on case studies of niche construction research, we provide a model that is able to solve these two problems. It allows distinguishing between mutually interacting organisms and environments in complex scenarios, as well as integrating various forms of experiential and physical niche construction.

23 January 2020 in Biology & Philosophy
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JBJan Baedke
Jan Baedke
AFAlejandro Fábregas-Tejeda
Alejandro Fábregas-Tejeda
FVFrancisco Vergara-Silva
Francisco Vergara-Silva
Biologists and philosophers of science have recently called for an extension of evolutionary theory. This so-called ‘extended evolutionary synthesis’ (EES) seeks to integrate developmental processes, extra-genetic forms of inheritance, and niche construction into evolutionary theory in a central way. While there is often agreement in evolutionary biology over the existence of these phenomena, their explanatory relevance is questioned. Advocates of EES posit that their perspective offers better explanations than those provided by ‘standard evolutionary theory’ (SET). Still, why this would be the case is unclear. Usually, such claims assume that EES’s superior explanatory status arises from the pluralist structure of EES, its different problem agenda, and a growing body of evidence for the evolutionary relevance of developmental phenomena (including developmental bias, inclusive inheritance, and niche construction). However, what is usually neglected in this debate is a discussion of what the explanatory standards of EES actually are, and how they differ from prevailing standards in SET. In other words, what is considered to be a good explanation in EES versus SET? To answer this question, we present a theoretical framework that evaluates the explanatory power of different evolutionary explanations of the same phenomena. This account is able to identify criteria for why and when evolutionary explanations of EES are better than those of SET. Such evaluations will enable evolutionary biology to find potential grounds for theoretical integration.


21 August 2018 in Theory in Biosciences
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AFAlejandro Fábregas-Tejeda
Alejandro Fábregas-Tejeda
FVFrancisco Vergara-Silva
Francisco Vergara-Silva

9 March 2023
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Book Chapter
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JBJan Baedke
Jan Baedke
AFAlejandro Fábregas-Tejeda
Alejandro Fábregas-Tejeda
In recent years there have been a number of calls for integrating developmental and organismal phenomena into evolutionary theory. This so-called Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) argues that evolutionary theory should not primarily explain certain evolutionary phenomena by highlighting genes and populations but organisms instead, in particular how their development and behavior biases and drives evolutionary change. Here, we offer a new historiography that focuses less on the differences between the EES and the Modern Synthesis but seeks to provide a better understanding about which theoretical and explanatory traditions the organism-centered framework of the EES draws on. This concerns especially three currently resurfacing explanatory roles granted to organisms in evolution: organisms should allow (1) contextualizing parts in development, especially genes, (2) focusing on reciprocal organism-environment relations (in contrast to, e.g., gene-environment interactions), and (3) understand the role of agency in evolution. Through this analysis, we show that the EES advances a revival of older explanatory roles granted to the organism in evolutionary research, which became marginalized in the second half of the twentieth century. This new perspective helps to re-center contemporary theoretical debates towards relevant questions of explanatory standards in evolutionary biology.