Shixiong Jiang

Shixiong Jiang

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Shixiong Jiang

University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
6 November 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SJShixiong Jiang
Shixiong Jiang
MLMengyu Liu
Mengyu Liu
FKFanxin Kong
Fanxin Kong
Safe reinforcement learning (RL) aims to derive a control policy that navigates a safety-critical system while avoiding unsafe explorations and adhering to safety constraints. While safe RL has been extensively studied, its vulnerabilities during the policy training have barely been explored in an adversarial setting. This article bridges this gap and investigates the training time vulnerability of formal language-guided safe RL. Such vulnerability allows a malicious adversary to inject backdoor behavior into the learned control policy. First, we formally define backdoor attacks for safe RL and divide them into active and passive ones depending on whether to manipulate the observation. Second, we propose two novel algorithms to synthesize the two kinds of attacks, respectively. Both algorithms generate backdoor behaviors that may go unnoticed after deployment but can be triggered when specific states are reached, leading to safety violations. Finally, we conduct both theoretical analysis and extensive experiments to show the effectiveness and stealthiness of our methods.

4 September 2024 in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MLMengyu Liu
Mengyu Liu
LZLin Zhang
Lin Zhang
WXWeizhe Xu
Weizhe Xu
SJShixiong Jiang
Shixiong Jiang
FKFanxin Kong
Fanxin Kong
There are various applications of Cyber-Physical systems (CPSs) that are life-critical where failure or malfunction can result in significant harm to human life, the environment, or substantial economic loss. Therefore, it is important to ensure their reliability, security, and robustness to the attacks. However, there is no widely used toolbox to simulate CPS and target security problems, especially the simulation of sensor attacks and defense strategies against them. In this work, we introduce our toolbox CPSim, a user-friendly simulation toolbox for security problems in CPS. CPSim aims to simulate common sensor attacks and countermeasures to these sensor attacks. We have implemented bias attacks, delay attacks, and replay attacks. Additionally, we have implemented various recovery-based methods against sensor attacks. The sensor attacks and recovery methods configurations can be customized with the given APIs. CPSim has built-in numerical simulators and various implemented benchmarks. Moreover, CPSim is compatible with other external simulators and can be deployed on a real testbed for control purposes. 1

21 April 2026 in ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SJShixiong Jiang
Shixiong Jiang
MLMengyu Liu
Mengyu Liu
FKFanxin Kong
Fanxin Kong
Safe Reinforcement Learning (RL) has been applied to synthesize control policies that maximize task rewards while adhering to safety constraints within simulated secure cyber-physical systems. However, the vulnerability of safe RL to adversarial attacks remains largely unexplored. We argue that understanding the safety vulnerabilities of learned control policies is crucial for ensuring true safety in real-world scenarios. To address this gap, we first formally define the safe RL problem with formal language (signal temporal logic) and demonstrate that even optimal policies are susceptible to observation perturbations. We then introduce novel safety violation attacks that exploit adversarial models trained with reversed safety constraints to induce unsafe behaviors. Lastly, through both theoretical analysis and experimental results, we demonstrate that our approach is more effective at violating safety constraints than existing adversarial RL methods, which primarily focus on reducing task rewards rather than compromising safety.

13 May 2026 in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MLMengyu Liu
Mengyu Liu
PLPengyuan Lu
Pengyuan Lu
SJShixiong Jiang
Shixiong Jiang
XCXin Chen
Xin Chen
OSOleg Sokolsky
Oleg Sokolsky
FKFanxin Kong
Fanxin Kong
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) play a pivotal role in industrial automation, transportation, and critical infrastructure, where meeting stringent timing constraints is essential to ensure operational safety and efficiency. While reinforcement learning (RL) has shown promise in synthesizing controllers for time-critical applications, existing approaches often prioritize speed (as soon as possible, or ASAP) without explicitly addressing deadline compliance. This misalignment can lead to unsafe or suboptimal behaviors, which are unacceptable in industrial contexts requiring both safety and reliability under hard deadlines. For example, with inappropriate rewards, a control policy for a industrial robot can be encouraged to be less safe but fast instead of being steady and meeting the deadlines. To address this challenge, we investigate the relationship between ASAP behavior and deadline-safe behavior, introducing a novel Markov decision process formulation (R-MDP) that includes time-awareness while preserving the Markov property. We propose a reward design method that systematically encourages deadline compliance and guarantees safety in reach-avoid tasks. Our approach is validated on multiple benchmarks, including linear and nonlinear systems representative of industrial applications, such as DC motor control and real-time attitude control. Experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of our method in achieving deadline-safe control while maintaining system safety, offering a reliable solution for industrial CPS where failure to meet deadlines can have severe consequences.