The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is clearly aimed at international development, and designed to jointly build a regional economic cooperation framework that is open, inclusive and balanced. Financial integration is the cornerstone of the BRI, and development finance is the most widely used mode of cooperation in financing. Development finance with Chinese characteristics is concessional and development-oriented, differing from Official Development Finance (ODF) defined by the OECD. Based on its development experiences, China applies development finance with Chinese characteristics to the BRI projects. This benefits countries along the Belt and Road by facilitating their sustainable development.
China’s attitude towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has evolved from resistance to acceptance with reservations. Having endorsed R2P, China reinterpreted the emerging norm and put forward four principles of implementing R2P, namely target state consent, regional consensus, non-coercive means or coercive means authorized by the UN Security Council, and no precedent-setting, which are followed when implementing R2P. This article explores China’s change in attitude towards R2P and its different attitude on different R2P-related issues in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as the key target area of R2P, arguing that the combination of socialization mechanism and localization mechanism explains a series of China’s behaviours including its change of attitude towards R2P, reinterpretation of R2P and stance on implementing R2P on specific issues. Through examining the Darfur issue, the Libyan crisis and the Syrian crisis, the article demonstrates how China supports or opposes the implementation of R2P under the combined influence of socialization and localization.
3 November 2025 in Japanese Journal of Political Science
China’s growing development finance gives rise to the speculation that Beijing is creating a new model of foreign aid. There are also efforts to socialise China and change Chinese-led development finance institutions (DFIs) from within. Are Chinese DFIs convergent with/divergent from traditional DFIs? What are the mechanisms that drive their convergence/divergence? This article answers the questions with the three mechanisms of isomorphism, namely the coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms. We focus on the prominent Chinese DFIs of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and the two policy banks (the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China), examine their isomorphic pressures, and compare their resemblance to the traditional donors. We find that the AIIB, subject to high pressures from all of the three mechanisms, displays a strong resemblance to its Western counterparts; the NDB, subject to medium pressures, shows a less significant resemblance; the two Chinese policy banks, not subject to significant pressures, demonstrates a faint resemblance.
The deteriorating physical and mental health of the rural elderly has become a common problem in developing countries and demands immediate attention. This article investigates the overall impact of China’s policy of community-based home care on rural elderly’s health, reveals the underlying mechanisms, and examines specific types of elderly care services. Based on the theoretical analysis of the mechanisms, we carried out an empirical analysis using the PSMDID method with data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) for 2013, 2015, and 2018. We find that community-based home care not only reduces the scores of Activities of Daily Living (ADL) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL) among the rural elderly but lowers their scores of negative emotions and levels of depression, therefore enhancing their physical and mental health. These effects remain robust against sensitivity analyses, regression by year, and interferences of previous policies. Distinguishing different types of services, we find that daily care reduces individuals’ scores of ADL and negative emotions, and therefore enhances physical and mental health; while regular medical and recreational services lower ADL or IADL scores and thus improve physical health, their impact on mental health is not significant. This article concludes that community-based home care significantly improves the physical and mental health of rural elderly, and hence advises rural pension policy-making.
Italy became the only G7 member to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019. Yet, 5 years later, Rome announced its withdrawal, a rare reversal among BRI participants. This article examines Italy’s abrupt policy shift. We argue that Italy’s decision to join and subsequently exit the BRI reflects a strategy of institutional hedging, in which states calibrate their institutional engagements based on evolving assessments of institutions’ relative capacities, relevance and risks. Initially, Italy perceived the BRI as an unparalleled opportunity in the absence of viable Western alternatives, with anticipated risks deemed limited. As rival institutions emerged, Italy’s relevance in them increased, and the risks of participation in the BRI grew, Rome recalibrated its stance at different stages from institutional hedging to balancing. By examining this case, we demonstrate how small and middle powers navigate institutional rivalry between great powers. Theoretically, this article contributes to the literature by developing an analytical framework of institutional hedging, an existing yet insufficiently elaborated concept, to account for small and middle powers’ behavior regarding international institutions.
14 May 2024 in Chinese Journal of International Review
“Public diplomacy” in Taiwan is led by the Taiwan authorities and joined by multiple actors. Due to the Taiwan authorities’ limited international engagement, they seek assistance from think tanks in expanding “public diplomacy”, as a complement to their “diplomatic” efforts or as a substitute when their intervention is deemed inappropriate. In this case, think tanks assume an active “diplomatic role”. Their main functions are to provide policy advice and decision-making counsel to the Taiwan authorities; cooperate with the Taiwan authorities in “Track II diplomacy”; disseminate Taiwan’s values and build a network of cooperative relations. Their fundamental purpose is to enhance Taiwan’s international influence through exchanges and dialogues, to tilt the international public opinion towards Taiwan, and ultimately to build a network of “diplomatic” relations.