T. Tony Ke

T. Tony Ke

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T. Tony Ke

Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 August 2023 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TKT. Tony Ke
T. Tony Ke
KSK. Sudhir
K. Sudhir
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)—the European Union’s data protection regulation—has two key principles. It recognizes that individuals own and control their personal (but not contractual) data in perpetuity, leading to three critical privacy rights, namely, the rights to (i) explicit consent (data opt-in), (ii) to be forgotten (data erasure), and (iii) portability (data transfer). It also includes data security mandates against privacy breaches through unauthorized access. We study GDPR’s equilibrium impact by including these features in a dynamic two-period model of forward-looking firms and consumers. Firms collect consumer data for personalization and price discrimination. Consumers trade off gains from personalization relative to potential losses from privacy breaches and price discrimination in their purchase, data opt-in, erasure, and transfer decisions. Though data security mandates impose fines on firms for privacy breaches, firms can benefit from higher opt-in given lower breach risk. Surprisingly, data security mandates can hurt consumers. The effect of privacy rights is nuanced. Since the right to opt in separates goods exchange from the provision of personal data, it prevents market failure under high breach risk. But it also reduces consumer opt-in and personal data availability. Erasure and portability rights reduce consumers’ hold-up concerns by disciplining firms to provide ongoing value by limiting price discrimination and not slacking off on data security; but they also reduce the incentive to offer lower initial prices that encourages opt-in. Overall, privacy rights always benefit consumers in competitive markets, but they can surprisingly hurt consumers under monopoly, as monopolists have less incentives to subsidize consumer opt-in. They raise (reduce) firm profit and social welfare when breach risk is high (low). Finally, privacy rights increase firm profit most at moderate levels of data transferability. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing. Funding: T. T. Ke acknowledges financial support from the General Research Fund of the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grant 14500421]. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4614 .

1 March 2019 in Journal of Economic Theory
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TKT. Tony Ke
T. Tony Ke
JVJ. Miguel Villas-Boas
J. Miguel Villas-Boas

1 January 2019 in Marketing Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XCXinyu Cao
Xinyu Cao
TKT. Tony Ke
T. Tony Ke
The authors build a game-theoretic model to investigate how a manufacturer and its retailers should coordinate in search advertising and prescribe the manufacturer’s optimal cooperative search advertising strategy.

1 August 2020 in Management Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
TKT. Tony Ke
T. Tony Ke
SLSong Lin
Song Lin
Many products have similar or common attributes and are thus correlated. We show that, when these attributes are uncertain for consumers, a complementarity effect can arise among competing products in the sense that the lower price of one product may increase the demands for the others. This effect occurs when consumers sequentially search for information about both common and idiosyncratic product attributes before purchase. We characterize the optimal search strategy for the correlated search problem, provide the conditions for the existence of the complementarity effect, and show that the effect is robust under a wide range of alternative assumptions. We further explore the implications of the effect for pricing. When firms compete in price, although product correlation may weaken differentiation between the firms, the complementarity effect owing to correlated search may raise equilibrium price and profit. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.

1 November 2023 in Marketing Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
TKT. Tony Ke
T. Tony Ke
JSJiwoong Shin
Jiwoong Shin
JYJungju Yu
Jungju Yu
The paper proposes a conceptual framework of brand positioning from a product portfolio view and studies its mechanism as an information communication mechanism that guides consumers’ search decisions.

1 September 2021 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TKT. Tony Ke
T. Tony Ke
YZYuting Zhu
Yuting Zhu
We consider a large decentralized freelance platform where buyers with private information about their quality preferences are matched with freelancers that differ in quality. When posting their job requests, buyers can report their quality preferences via cheap talk, which influences freelancers’ application and pricing strategies. By exaggerating one’s quality preference, a buyer attracts not only more applications from freelancers, but also those with higher quality, at the cost of a higher expected price. We find that it is always an equilibrium for the buyers to report their quality preferences truthfully when they cannot renegotiate with freelancers on their asking prices after getting matched. On the other hand, when postmatch renegotiation is allowed and buyers have relatively high bargaining power, low-type buyers may strategically exaggerate their quality preferences, and subsequently after getting matched, costly signal their true type and bargain for lower prices. From a platform design perspective, our analysis implies that the option of renegotiation, designed to facilitate postmatch information transmission, may backfire by giving rise to buyers’ prematch opportunistic behaviors of information distortion. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.