Raphael Hiesgen

Raphael Hiesgen

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Raphael Hiesgen

HAW Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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7 August 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RHRaphael Hiesgen
Raphael Hiesgen
MNMarcin Nawrocki
Marcin Nawrocki
TSThomas C. Schmidt
Thomas C. Schmidt
MWMatthias Wählisch
Matthias Wählisch
On December 10, 2021, Log4Shell was disclosed to the public and was quickly recognized as a most severe vulnerability. It exploits a bug in the wide-spread Log4j library that allows for critical remote-code-execution (RCE). Any service that uses this library and exposes an interface to the Internet is potentially vulnerable. In this paper, we report about a measurement study starting with the day of disclosure. We follow the rush of scanners during the first two months after the disclosure and observe the development of the Log4Shell scans in the subsequent year. Based on traffic data collected at several vantage points we analyze the payloads sent by researchers and attackers. We find that the initial rush of scanners ebbed quickly, but continued in waves throughout 2022. Benign scanners showed interest only in the first days after the disclosure, whereas malicious scanners continue to target the vulnerability. During both periods, a single entity appears responsible for the majority of the malicious activities.

30 November 2022
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MNMarcin Nawrocki
Marcin Nawrocki
PTPouyan Fotouhi Tehrani
Pouyan Fotouhi Tehrani
RHRaphael Hiesgen
Raphael Hiesgen
JMJonas Mücke
Jonas Mücke
TSThomas C. Schmidt
Thomas C. Schmidt
MWMatthias Wählisch
Matthias Wählisch
In this paper, we revisit the performance of the QUIC connection setup and relate the design choices for fast and secure connections to common Web deployments. We analyze over 1M Web domains with 272k QUIC-enabled services and find two worrying results. First, current practices of creating, providing, and fetching Web certificates undermine reduced round trip times during the connection setup since sizes of 35% of server certificates exceed the amplification limit. Second, non-standard server implementations lead to larger amplification factors than QUIC permits, which increase even further in IP spoofing scenarios. We present guidance for all involved stakeholders to improve the situation.

4 November 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
RHRaphael Hiesgen
Raphael Hiesgen
MNMarcin Nawrocki
Marcin Nawrocki
MBMarinho Barcellos
Marinho Barcellos
DKDaniel Kopp
Daniel Kopp
OHOliver Hohlfeld
Oliver Hohlfeld
KCKc Claffy
Kc Claffy
Motivated by the impressive but diffuse scope of DDoS research and reporting, we undertake a multistakeholder (joint industry-academic) analysis to seek convergence across the best available macroscopic views of the relative trends in two dominant classes of attacks - direct-path attacks and reflection-amplification attacks. We first analyze 24 industry reports to extract trends and (in)consistencies across observations by commercial stakeholders in 2022. We then analyze ten data sets spanning industry and academic sources, across four years (2019-2023), to find and explain discrepancies based on data sources, vantage points, methods, and parameters. Our method includes a new approach: we share an aggregated list of DDoS targets with industry players who return the results of joining this list with their proprietary data sources to reveal gaps in visibility of the academic data sources. We use academic data sources to explore an industry-reported relative drop in spoofed reflection-amplification attacks in 2021-2022. Our study illustrates the value, but also the challenge, in independent validation of security-related properties of Internet infrastructure. Finally, we reflect on opportunities to facilitate greater common understanding of the DDoS landscape. We hope our results inform not only future academic and industry pursuits but also emerging policy efforts to reduce systemic Internet security vulnerabilities.

3 September 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
IEIsabell Egloff
Isabell Egloff
RHRaphael Hiesgen
Raphael Hiesgen
MKMaynard Koch
Maynard Koch
TSThomas C. Schmidt
Thomas C. Schmidt
MWMatthias Wählisch
Matthias Wählisch
Scanners are daily visitors of public IPv4 hosts. Scanning IPv6 nodes successfully is still a challenge, which an increasing crowd of actors tries to master. In this paper, we analyze IPv6 scanning under various network conditions to disclose the impact on scanning. We deploy four IPv6 network telescopes, including a reactive /48 telescope and a proactive /32 telescope that is periodically reconfigured by changing BGP announcements. We provide a longitudinal study of eleven months and classify the observed scanners w.r.t. their temporal behavior, their target and network selection strategies, as well as their individual tools, fingerprints, and correlations across categories. We find that silent subnets of larger covering prefixes remain mainly invisible, whereas BGP prefix announcements quickly attract attention by scanners. Based on our findings, we derive operational guidance on how to deploy network telescopes to increase visibility for IPv6 scanners and understand corresponding biases.

7 June 2022 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
RHRaphael Hiesgen
Raphael Hiesgen
MNMarcin Nawrocki
Marcin Nawrocki
TSThomas C. Schmidt
Thomas C. Schmidt
MWMatthias Wählisch
Matthias Wählisch
The critical remote-code-execution (RCE) Log4Shell is a severe vulnerability that was disclosed to the public on December 10, 2021. It exploits a bug in the wide-spread Log4j library. Any service that uses the library and exposes an interface to the Internet is potentially vulnerable. In this paper, we measure the rush of scanners during the two months after the disclosure. We use several vantage points to observe both researchers and attackers. For this purpose, we collect and analyze payloads sent by benign and malicious communication parties, their origins, and churn. We find that the initial rush of scanners quickly ebbed. Especially non-malicious scanners were only interested in the days after the disclosure. In contrast, malicious scanners continue targeting the vulnerability.

24 November 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JMJonas Mücke
Jonas Mücke
MNMarcin Nawrocki
Marcin Nawrocki
RHRaphael Hiesgen
Raphael Hiesgen
PSPatrick Sattler
Patrick Sattler
JZJohannes Zirngibl
Johannes Zirngibl
MWMatthias Wählisch
Matthias Wählisch
QUIC experiences a rapid adoption since its standardization in 2021, and hypergiants configure their infrastructure to optimize for QUIC performance. In this paper, we introduce a passive measurement method to study both the progressive rollout and individual hypergiant configurations during the last five years. By analyzing backscatter traffic of the UCSD network telescope, we are able to make the following observations. First, Meta, Google, and Cloudflare configure significantly different maximal retransmission numbers and timeouts. Second, we can identify different off-net deployments of hypergiants, using packet features, such as QUIC connection IDs, packet coalescence, and packet lengths. Third, we observe changing hypergiant deployment configurations during our different measurement periods. Fourth, connection IDs can allow further insights into load balancer deployments, such as the number of servers. We bolster our results using two orthogonal measurements: passive recording of QUIC flows and active probing.