7 August 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
On December 10, 2021, Log4Shell was disclosed to the public and was quickly recognized as a most severe vulnerability. It exploits a bug in the wide-spread Log4j library that allows for critical remote-code-execution (RCE). Any service that uses this library and exposes an interface to the Internet is potentially vulnerable. In this paper, we report about a measurement study starting with the day of disclosure. We follow the rush of scanners during the first two months after the disclosure and observe the development of the Log4Shell scans in the subsequent year. Based on traffic data collected at several vantage points we analyze the payloads sent by researchers and attackers. We find that the initial rush of scanners ebbed quickly, but continued in waves throughout 2022. Benign scanners showed interest only in the first days after the disclosure, whereas malicious scanners continue to target the vulnerability. During both periods, a single entity appears responsible for the majority of the malicious activities.
3 September 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
Scanners are daily visitors of public IPv4 hosts. Scanning IPv6 nodes successfully is still a challenge, which an increasing crowd of actors tries to master. In this paper, we analyze IPv6 scanning under various network conditions to disclose the impact on scanning. We deploy four IPv6 network telescopes, including a reactive /48 telescope and a proactive /32 telescope that is periodically reconfigured by changing BGP announcements. We provide a longitudinal study of eleven months and classify the observed scanners w.r.t. their temporal behavior, their target and network selection strategies, as well as their individual tools, fingerprints, and correlations across categories. We find that silent subnets of larger covering prefixes remain mainly invisible, whereas BGP prefix announcements quickly attract attention by scanners. Based on our findings, we derive operational guidance on how to deploy network telescopes to increase visibility for IPv6 scanners and understand corresponding biases.
24 November 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
QUIC experiences a rapid adoption since its standardization in 2021, and hypergiants configure their infrastructure to optimize for QUIC performance. In this paper, we introduce a passive measurement method to study both the progressive rollout and individual hypergiant configurations during the last five years. By analyzing backscatter traffic of the UCSD network telescope, we are able to make the following observations. First, Meta, Google, and Cloudflare configure significantly different maximal retransmission numbers and timeouts. Second, we can identify different off-net deployments of hypergiants, using packet features, such as QUIC connection IDs, packet coalescence, and packet lengths. Third, we observe changing hypergiant deployment configurations during our different measurement periods. Fourth, connection IDs can allow further insights into load balancer deployments, such as the number of servers. We bolster our results using two orthogonal measurements: passive recording of QUIC flows and active probing.