23 April 2014 in Heredity
The epigenetic phenomenon of genomic imprinting has motivated the development of numerous theories for its evolutionary origins and genomic distribution. In this review, we examine the three theories that have best withstood theoretical and empirical scrutiny. These are: Haig and colleagues’ kinship theory; Day and Bonduriansky’s sexual antagonism theory; and Wolf and Hager’s maternal–offspring coadaptation theory. These theories have fundamentally different perspectives on the adaptive significance of imprinting. The kinship theory views imprinting as a mechanism to change gene dosage, with imprinting evolving because of the differential effect that gene dosage has on the fitness of matrilineal and patrilineal relatives. The sexual antagonism and maternal–offspring coadaptation theories view genomic imprinting as a mechanism to modify the resemblance of an individual to its two parents, with imprinting evolving to increase the probability of expressing the fitter of the two alleles at a locus. In an effort to stimulate further empirical work on the topic, we carefully detail the logic and assumptions of all three theories, clarify the specific predictions of each and suggest tests to discriminate between these alternative theories for why particular genes are imprinted.
8 August 2015 in Molecular Ecology
29 January 2018 in Molecular Ecology
19 December 2019 in Evolution
12 November 2018 in Evolution
19 May 2023 in Biological Reviews
The paradox of the organism refers to the observation that organisms appear to function as coherent purposeful entities, despite the potential for within‐organismal components like selfish genetic elements and cancer cells to erode them from within. While it is commonly accepted that organisms may pursue fitness maximisation and can be thought to hold particular agendas, there is a growing recognition that genes and cells do so as well. This can lead to evolutionary conflicts between an organism and the parts that reside within it. Here, we revisit the paradox of the organism. We first outline its conception and relationship to debates about adaptation in evolutionary biology. Second, we review the ways selfish elements may exploit organisms, and the extent to which this threatens organismal integrity. To this end, we introduce a novel classification scheme that distinguishes between selfish elements that seek to distort transmission versus those that seek to distort phenotypic traits. Our classification scheme also highlights how some selfish elements elude a multi‐level selection decomposition using the Price equation. Third, we discuss how the organism can retain its status as the primary fitness‐maximising agent in the face of selfish elements. The success of selfish elements is often constrained by their strategy and further limited by a combination of fitness alignment and enforcement mechanisms controlled by the organism. Finally, we argue for the need for quantitative measures of both internal conflicts and organismality.