This article examines policy change in the EU’s financial assistance regime through a collective learning perspective. By defining a financial assistance regime as the set of rules governing the disbursement and withdrawal of funding to the member states in the context of crisis management, the article seeks to address the following research question: How can we explain the exact form of change in the EU’s financial assistance regime between the euro crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic? The article finds that financial assistance in the EU moved from “intergovernmental coordination” with the European Stability Mechanism to a form of “limited supranational delegation” with the Recovery and Resilience Facility and argues that such a change is due to a collective policy-learning process. This finding suggests that the EU tends to learn from past crisis experiences, freeing itself from established institutional constraints, only when the next crisis becomes a concrete cause for concern. However, when the next crisis strikes, the EU is indeed able to radically alter its practices based on previous policy failures.
This article examines how major EU-wide media discursively framed European integration in terms of prevalent actors, narratives and policy areas in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Based on the combination of theoretical insights from discursive institutionalism and the grand theories of European integration, the article performs a qualitative analysis of textual content in six of the most influential EU-wide media sources as of 2023, taking the form of a competitive theory testing. Challenging the established literature on EU-related national media coverage, it finds that, consistently with discursive neo-functionalism, the Russian military aggression of Ukraine has led to the discursive empowerment of EU supranational actors, most notably the European Commission, and to an increased salience of more European integration and transnational solidarity narratives. This has happened despite the fact that the conflict was mainly framed as falling within the realm of intergovernmental policy areas, such as energy policy, security and defence.
This article examines the links between legitimacy, politicisation and the rise of political dissensus in the context of the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). In particular, it assesses democratic, technocratic and procedural legitimacy against the vertical, inter-level relations between EU institutions and national authorities in the elaboration of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs), with a particular focus on the case of Italy. The article shows that the implementation of the RRF tends to centralise powers in national executives and their technical-administrative structures to the detriment of national legislatures. This gives rise to a “legitimacy disequilibrium” in the implementation of the RRF characterised by a strong technocratic and a weak democratic legitimacy. Challenging the coordinative Europeanisation literature, the article thus argues that the implementation of the RRF is potentially subject to dynamics of politicisation. As a matter of fact, the observed legitimacy disequilibrium resulting from the implementation of the RRF is open to politicisation from party actors in the member states, thus assuming salience in national public debates. Finally, the article illustrates how the politicisation of NRRPs can become a factor in the wider process of political dissensus in the EU, involving contestation by different types of actors (EU institutions, member state governments and national parties), operating at different levels (EU and national), and with different aims.
Despite receiving much attention in the literature, existing analyses on the impact of Covid-19 on European societies and politics do not investigate the consequences for party competition over the European Union (EU) dimension. To this end, this article asks whether the pandemic affected the salience of the EU issue and the related party positions in Italy during the ‘first wave’ of the crisis. The analysis relies on an original CrowdTangle dataset comprising around 24000 posts from parties’ official Facebook pages, which are thematically coded and subsequently employed in time-series cross-section regression models. The findings show that the pandemic caused a significant increase in salience and polarisation of the EU issue in the Italian party system.
14 November 2024 in Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica
This paper analyses Italian party positions on the EU's response to the Russo-Ukrainian war, singling out the adoption of sanctions against Russia, the provision of military support to Kiev, enlargement to Ukraine and the welcoming of Ukrainian refugees into the Union's territory as the four main dimension of such a response. The paper draws on the literatures on cleavage politics, the inverted U curve and the differentiated forms of politicisation, thereby testing theory-driven research hypotheses through a qualitative content analysis of Italian parties' Facebook posts in the three months following the outbreak of the conflict, combining an inductive and a deductive approach. The findings show that party families are a good explanatory factor behind Italian party positions vis-à-vis the EU's response to the war outbreak as parties belonging to the same family shared a similar stance on the four dimensions of such a response. On the contrary, the Europeanism/Euroscepticism divide does not explain Italian party positions on the EU's reaction to the Ukrainian conflict as Europeanist parties split over the EU's provision of weapons to Ukraine about as much as Eurosceptic partis split over the adoption of sanctions against Moscow. Finally, the paper shows that policy issues in the EU's response to the war (such as sanctions and arms delivery) were much more salient for and contested by Italian political parties than constitutive issues (such as enlargement and asylum).