We provide the first systematic analysis of how attitudes toward workplace automation and artificial intelligence (AI) vary by gender, using survey data from ten countries. Our analyses reveal a significant gender gap in the perceived fairness of automation and AI, similar in magnitude to that of job offshoring. Drawing on the literature on economic shocks, we examine four explanations based on gender differences in (a) economic self-interest, (b) technological knowledge, (c) sociotropic concerns and (d) social status perceptions. Including these variables in our models, however, narrows the observed gender gap by only 40%. To better understand the sources of attitudinal variation by gender, we rely on Kitagawa–Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, which shows that distributional differences in group characteristics, specifically women’s lower levels of technological knowledge and self-reported social status, account for approximately one-third of the gap, while the other two-thirds are explained by differences in how specific variables differentially influence attitudes.
Does providing information about the costs and benefits of automation affect the perceived fairness of a firm's decision to automate or support for government policies addressing automation's labor market consequences? To answer these questions, we use data from vignette and conjoint experiments across four advanced economies (Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US). Our results show that despite people's relatively fixed policy preferences, their evaluation of the fairness of automation—and therefore potentially the issue's political salience—is sensitive to information about its trade-offs, especially information about price changes attributable to automated labor. This suggests that the political impact of automation may depend on how it is framed by the media and political actors.
3 July 2021 in South European Society and Politics
The electoral successes of European far right parties in the 21st century coincided with increased immigration. While some argue these parallel trends suggest immigration sours opinion towards foreigners, a growing literature suggests it is the fluctuation in issue salience which matters. We investigate the overlooked case of Italy, which has long featured anti-immigration parties. Analysing multiple data sources, we find immigration preferences remained stable throughout 2006, 2013, and 2018 – but issue salience varied considerably, tracking the anti-immigration vote. Voters are more likely to opt for anti-immigration parties when immigration is a high salience issue, suggesting that salience, not changing preferences, is associated with far right political success.
Public mask use has emerged as a key tool in response to COVID-19. We develop and document a classification of statewide mask mandates that reveals variation in their scope and timing. Some U.S. states quickly mandated the wearing of face coverings in most public spaces, whereas others issued narrow mandates or no man-date at all. We consider how differences in COVID-19 epidemiological indicators and partisan politics affect when states adopted broad mask mandates, starting with the earliest broad public mask mandates in April 2020 and continuing though the end of 2020. The most important predictor is whether a state is led by a Republican governor. These states adopt statewide indoor mask mandates an estimated 98.0 days slower (95% CI: 88.8 to 107.3), if they did so at all (hazard ratio=7.54, 95% CI: 2.87 to 16.19). COVID-19 indicators such as confirmed cases or deaths per million are much less important predictors of statewide mask mandates. This finding highlights a key challenge to public efforts to increase mask-wearing, one of the most effective tools for preventing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 while restoring economic activity.