1 December 2003 in Agricultural Economics
31 December 2023 in Journal of Environmental Science International
30 April 2023 in Journal of Environmental Science International
16 September 2026 in Industrial Relations Journal
Gender differences in access to workplace training have narrowed in many countries, and training participation rates are commonly used to assess equality in skill development. However, participation rates alone do not capture how much training employees receive. Using linked employer–employee data covering 779 Korean manufacturing firms between 2007 and 2023, this study examines gender differences in the intensity of employer‐provided training. We find that, conditional on firm, year, and worker characteristics, female employees who participate in training receive approximately 12% fewer training days than comparable male employees within the same firm. This disparity remains stable over time and is robust to alternative specifications and estimators. The participation gap is most pronounced in mentoring programs, while the intensity gap is largest among sales and service occupations, suggesting that managerial discretion plays an important role in the allocation of training opportunities. Wage regressions indicate that training duration is positively associated with earnings and that women receive returns to training that are at least as large as those of men. The findings suggest that evaluating gender equality in workplace skill investment requires attention not only to training participation but also to the intensity of training provided.
22 July 2025 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Patenting an intermediate research innovation can lead to competition for the development of a final commercial innovation and potentially induce wasteful duplicative R&D efforts. This study examines the effects of different protection strategies and patent life on the incentives to protect an intermediate innovation by considering a two‐stage sequential innovation model. In this model, the success of a patentable final innovation depends on information about prior intermediate innovations and on complementary inspiration received by innovators. Protecting an intermediate innovation through secrecy can be socially superior if the final innovation involves a high cost and the idea essential to its implementation is common. Acquisition of specialized assets under patenting may increase duplication of resources, and secrecy can act as a social control to limit the entry by many firms. If the idea for the final innovation is scarce, on the other hand, patenting can be optimal for both the innovator of an intermediate innovation and society, and the innovator's incentive is well aligned with social welfare. A broad patent scope can facilitate the adjustment of patent life to align private incentives with the social optimum when the idea for the final innovation is scarce.