Ricard Gil

Ricard Gil

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Ricard Gil

Queen's University (Canada) - Smith School of Business

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 February 2004 in Journal of Economic Perspectives
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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CMCasey B. Mulligan
Casey B. Mulligan
RGRicard Gil
Ricard Gil
XSXavier Sala-I-Martin
Xavier Sala-I-Martin
Estimates of democracy's effect on the public sector are obtained from comparisons of 142 countries over the years 1960–90. Based on three tenets of voting theory – that voting mutes policy preference intensity, political power is equally distributed in democracies, and the form of voting processes is important—we expect democracy to affect policies that redistribute, or economically favor the political leadership, or enhance efficiency. We do not find such differences. Instead democracy is correlated with policies that limit competition for public office. Alternative modeling approaches emphasize the degree of competition, and deemphasize the form or even existence of voting processes.

1 January 2020 in Marketing Science
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Journal Article
Open access
JCJoan Calzada
Joan Calzada
RGRicard Gil
Ricard Gil
This paper shows the existence of a net market expansion effect of news aggregators through which news outlets increase their number of visits.

1 August 2010 in Economics of Education Review
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Journal Article
Closed access
CDCarlos Dobkin
Carlos Dobkin
RGRicard Gil
Ricard Gil
JMJustin Marion
Justin Marion

17 January 2012 in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
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Journal Article
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RGRicard Gil
Ricard Gil
JMJustin Marion
Justin Marion
We empirically examine the impact of relationships between contractors and subcontractors on firm pricing and entry decisions in the California highway procurement market using data from auctions conducted by the California Department of Transportation. Relationships in this market are valuable if they mitigate potential hold-up problems and incentives for ex post renegotiation arising from contractual incompleteness. An important characteristic of informal contracts is that they must be self-enforcing, so the value of relationships between firms and suppliers depend on the extent of possibilities for future interaction. We construct measures of the stock of contractors' prior interactions with relevant subcontractors and, most importantly, an exogenous instrument to measure the future value of ongoing relationships that is orthogonal to contractor–subcontractor match-specific productivity. We find that a larger stock of relationships leads to a greater likelihood of entry and to lower bids. Importantly, this relationship does not hold in periods of time and areas with little future contract volume, suggesting that the value of the future is crucial in providing value for informal contracts.

11 April 2008 in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
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Journal Article
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RGRicard Gil
Ricard Gil
I analyze how variation in firm boundaries affect economic outcomes in the movie industry. Specifically, I focus on movie distributors and their contracts with exhibitors to show their movies on their screens. I argue that vertical integration solves the distortion on movie run length created by the revenue sharing contracts used in the industry. Since I observe the same movie showing in the same period under different organizational forms in the Spanish market, I use a difference on different approach to exploit this variation and study differences in outcomes across organizational forms. I show that integrated theaters run their own movies longer than other movies, and longer than nonintegrated theaters do. This effect is stronger for movies of more uncertain demand due to higher contractual complexity. I also find that integrated distributors specialize in the movies of higher demand uncertainty. (JEL L14, L22, L82)

13 October 2017 in Annual Review of Law and Social Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
RGRicard Gil
Ricard Gil
GZGiorgio Zanarone
Giorgio Zanarone
In this article, we review the emerging economic literature on formal and informal contracting. Two patterns emerge from this literature. First, the use of informal contracts to complement formal ones is widespread, both within and between firms. Second, informal contracts are limited by the expectation of future collaborations between the parties. Our review suggests that there are significant opportunities for further integrated research in economics, law, and social sciences to enhance our understanding of the interaction between formal and informal contracting within firms, as well as in nonfirm organizations.