Marco Ottaviani

Marco Ottaviani

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Marco Ottaviani

Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

29Years (1998-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2007 in Journal of Economic Theory
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NKNavin Kartik
Navin Kartik
MOMarco Ottaviani
Marco Ottaviani
FSFrancesco Squintani
Francesco Squintani

16 May 2008 in Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
KAKenneth J. Arrow
Kenneth J. Arrow
RFRobert Forsythe
Robert Forsythe
MGMichael Gorham
Michael Gorham
RHRobert Hahn
Robert Hahn
RHRobin Hanson
Robin Hanson
EZEric Zitzewitz
Eric Zitzewitz
The ability of groups of people to make predictions is a potent research tool that should be freed of unnecessary government restrictions.

1 May 2009 in American Economic Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RIRoman Inderst
Roman Inderst
MOMarco Ottaviani
Marco Ottaviani
This paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents: prospecting for customers and advising on the product's “suitability” for the specific needs of customers. When structuring salesforce compensation, firms trade off the expected losses from “misselling” unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing marketing incentives. We characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling (and thus the scope of policy intervention) depends on features of the agency problem including: the internal organization of a firm's sales process, the transparency of its commission structure, and the steepness of its agents' sales incentives. (JEL M31, M37, M52)

1 April 2012 in American Economic Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RIRoman Inderst
Roman Inderst
MOMarco Ottaviani
Marco Ottaviani
In markets for retail financial products and health services, consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs. Product providers, in turn, compete to influence the intermediaries' advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions. Motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices, we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint. The model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply-side incentives. We characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences. (JEL D21, D82, D83, G21, L15, L25)

1 March 2006 in The RAND Journal of Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
MOMarco Ottaviani
Marco Ottaviani
PSPeter Norman Sørensen
Peter Norman Sørensen

1 August 2006 in Journal of Financial Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MOM Ottaviani
M Ottaviani
PSP Sorensen
P Sorensen