Roderick Chapman

Roderick Chapman

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Roderick Chapman

Altran UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

33Years (1994-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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7 August 2002 in IEEE Software
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AHA. Hall
A. Hall
RCR. Chapman
R. Chapman
Praxis Critical Systems recently developed a secure certification authority for smart cards that had to satisfy performance and usability requirements while meeting stringent security constraints. The authors used a systematic process from requirements elicitation through formal specification, user interface prototyping, rigorous design, and coding to ensure these objectives' achievement. They show how a process that achieves normal commercial productivity can deliver a highly reliable system that meets all its throughput and usability goals.

26 December 2024 in Formal Aspects of Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MBMaurice H. ter Beek
Maurice H. ter Beek
RCRod Chapman
Rod Chapman
RCRance Cleaveland
Rance Cleaveland
HGHubert Garavel
Hubert Garavel
RGRong Gu
Rong Gu
LZLijun Zhang
Lijun Zhang
Formal methods encompass a wide choice of techniques and tools for the specification, development, analysis, and verification of software and hardware systems. Formal methods are widely applied in industry, in activities ranging from the elicitation of requirements and the early design phases all the way to the deployment, configuration, and runtime monitoring of actual systems. Formal methods allow one to precisely specify the environment in which a system operates, the requirements and properties that the system should satisfy, the models of the system used during the various design steps, and the code embedded in the final implementation, as well as to express conformance relations between these specifications. We present a broad scope of successful applications of formal methods in industry, not limited to the well-known success stories from the safety-critical domain, like railways and other transportation systems, but also covering other areas such as lithography manufacturing and cloud security in e-commerce, to name but a few. We also report testimonies from a number of representatives from industry who, either directly or indirectly, use or have used formal methods in their industrial project endeavours. These persons are spread geographically, including Europe, Asia, North and South America, and the involved projects witness the large coverage of applications of formal methods, not limited to the safety-critical domain. We thus make a case for the importance of formal methods, and in particular of the capacity to abstract and mathematical reasoning that are taught as part of any formal methods course. These are fundamental Computer Science skills that graduates should profit from when working as computer scientists in industry, as confirmed by industry representatives.

1 January 2000 in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
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Journal Article
Closed access
SKS. King
S. King
JHJ. Hammond
J. Hammond
RCR. Chapman
R. Chapman
APA. Pryor
A. Pryor
This paper describes the use of formal development methods on an industrial safety-critical application. The Z notation was used for documenting the system specification and part of the design, and the SPARK1 subset of Ada was used for coding.However, perhaps the most distinctive nature of the project lies in the amount of proof that was carried out: proofs were carried out both at the Z level驴approximately 150 proofs in 500 pages驴and at the SPARK code level驴approximately 9,000 verification conditions generated and discharged. The project was carried out under UK Interim Defence Standards 00-55 and 00-56, which require the use of formal methods on safety-critical applications. It is believed to be the first to be completed against the rigorous demands of the 1991 version of these standards. The paper includes comparisons of proof with the various types of testing employed, in terms of their efficiency at finding faults. The most striking result is that the Z proof appears to be substantially more efficient at finding faults than the most efficient testing phase. Given the importance of early fault detection, we believe this helps to show the significant benefit and practicality of large-scale proof on projects of this kind.

1 September 1996 in Real-Time Systems
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Journal Article
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PDF file
RCRoderick Chapman
Roderick Chapman
ABAlan Burns
Alan Burns
AWAndy Wellings
Andy Wellings

28 October 2014 in International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
DHDuc Hoang
Duc Hoang
YMYannick Moy
Yannick Moy
AWAngela Wallenburg
Angela Wallenburg
RCRoderick Chapman
Roderick Chapman

14 November 2004 in ACM SIGAda Ada Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
RCRoderick Chapman
Roderick Chapman
AHAdrian Hilton
Adrian Hilton
Existing security models require that information of a given security level be prevented from ``leaking'' into lower-security information. High-security applications must be demonstrably free of such leaks, but such demonstration may require substantial manual analysis. Other authors have argued that the natural way to enforce these models automatically is with information-flow analysis, but have not shown this to be practicable for general purpose programming languages in current use. Modern safety-critical systems can contain software components with differing safety integrity levels, potentially operating in the same address space. This case poses problems similar to systems with differing security levels; failure to show separation of data may require the entire system to be validated at the higher integrity level. In this paper we show how the information flow model enforced by the SPARK Examiner provides support for enforcing these security and safety models. We describe an extension to the SPARK variable annotations which allows the specification of a security or safety level for each state variable, and an extension to the SPARK analysis which automatically enforces a given information flow policy on a SPARK program.