Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing threatens resource sustainability and equity. A major challenge with such activity is that most fishing vessels do not broadcast their positions and are “dark” in public monitoring systems. Combining four satellite technologies, we identify widespread illegal fishing by dark fleets in the waters between the Koreas, Japan, and Russia. We find >900 vessels of Chinese origin in 2017 and >700 in 2018 fished illegally in North Korean waters, catching an estimated amount of Todarodes pacificus approximating that of Japan and South Korea combined (>164,000 metric tons worth >$440 million). We further find ~3000 small-scale North Korean vessels fished, mostly illegally, in Russian waters. These results can inform independent oversight of transboundary fisheries and foreshadow a new era in satellite monitoring of fisheries.
While most research has focused on the legality of global industrial fishing, unregulated fishing has largely escaped scrutiny. Here, we evaluate the unregulated nature of global squid fisheries using AIS data and nighttime imagery of the globalized fleet of light-luring squid vessels. We find that this fishery is extensive, fishing 149,000 to 251,000 vessel days annually, and that effort increased 68% over the study period 2017–2020. Most vessels are highly mobile and fish in multiple regions, largely (86%) in unregulated areas. While scientists and policymakers express concerns over the declining abundance of squid stocks globally and regionally, we find a net increase in vessels fishing squid globally and spatial expansion of effort to novel areas. Since fishing effort is static in areas with increasing management, and rising in unmanaged areas, we suggest actors may take advantage of fragmented regulations to maximize resource extraction. Our findings highlight a profitable, but largely unregulated fishery, with strong potential for improved management.
Resource allocation is a fundamental and challenging component of common pool resource governance, particularly transboundary fisheries. We highlight the growing importance of allocation in fisheries governance, comparing approaches of the five tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (tRFMOs). We find all tRFMOs except one have defined resources for allocation and outlined principles to guide allocation based on equity, citizenship, and legitimacy. However, all fall short of applying these principles in assigning fish resources. Most tRFMOs rely on historical catch or effort, while equity principles rarely determine dedicated rights. Further, the current system of annual negotiations reduces certainty, trust, and transparency, counteracting many benefits asserted by rights-based management proponents. We suggest one means of gaining traction may be to shift conversations from allocative rights toward weighting of principles already identified by most tRFMOs. Incorporating principles into resource allocation remains a major opportunity, with important implications for current and future access to fish.