1 August 2016 in EURO Journal on Transportation and Logistics
Bike-sharing systems are becoming important for urban transportation. In these systems, users arrive at a station, pick up a bike, use it for a while, and then return it to another station of their choice. Each station has a finite capacity: it cannot host more bikes than its capacity. We propose a stochastic model of an homogeneous bike-sharing system and study the effect of the randomness of user choices on the number of problematic stations, i.e., stations that, at a given time, have no bikes available or no available spots for bikes to be returned to. We quantify the influence of the station capacities, and we compute the fleet size that is optimal in terms of minimizing the proportion of problematic stations. Even in a homogeneous city, the system exhibits a poor performance: the minimal proportion of problematic stations is of the order of the inverse of the capacity. We show that simple incentives, such as suggesting users to return to the least loaded station among two stations, improve the situation by an exponential factor. We also compute the rate at which bikes have to be redistributed by trucks for a given quality of service. This rate is of the order of the inverse of the station capacity. For all cases considered, the fleet size that corresponds to the best performance is half of the total number of spots plus a few more, the value of the few more can be computed in closed-form as a function of the system parameters. It corresponds to the average number of bikes in circulation.
1 January 2019 in Journal of Dynamics and Games
We consider mean field games with discrete state spaces (called discrete mean field games in the following) and we analyze these games in continuous and discrete time, over finite as well as infinite time horizons. We prove the existence of a mean field equilibrium assuming continuity of the cost and of the drift. These conditions are more general than the existing papers studying finite state space mean field games. Besides, we also study the convergence of the equilibria of N -player games to mean field equilibria in our four settings. On the one hand, we define a class of strategies in which any sequence of equilibria of the finite games converges weakly to a mean field equilibrium when the number of players goes to infinity. On the other hand, we exhibit equilibria outside this class that do not converge to mean field equilibria and for which the value of the game does not converge. In discrete time this non- convergence phenomenon implies that the Folk theorem does not scale to the mean field limit.
13 November 2020 in Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences
We analyze a mean field game model of SIR dynamics (Susceptible, Infected, and Recovered) where players choose when to vaccinate. We show that this game admits a unique mean field equilibrium (MFE) that consists in vaccinating at a maximal rate until a given time and then not vaccinating. The vaccination strategy that minimizes the total cost has the same structure as the MFE. We prove that the vaccination period of the MFE is always smaller than the one minimizing the total cost. This implies that, to encourage optimal vaccination behavior, vaccination should always be subsidized. Finally, we provide numerical experiments to study the convergence of the equilibrium when the system is composed by a finite number of agents ( $N$ ) to the MFE. These experiments show that the convergence rate of the cost is $1/N$ and the convergence of the switching curve is monotone.
1 January 2022 in Artificial Intelligence
13 June 2023 in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
19 July 2018 in Performance Evaluation