Ramji Balakrishnan

Ramji Balakrishnan

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Ramji Balakrishnan

The University of Iowa

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

37Years (1990-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 2008 in Contemporary Accounting Research
Verified
Journal Article
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RBRamji Balakrishnan
Ramji Balakrishnan
TGThomas S. Gruca
Thomas S. Gruca

1 July 2004 in Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RBRamji Balakrishnan
Ramji Balakrishnan
MPMichael J. Petersen
Michael J. Petersen
NSNaomi S. Soderstrom
Naomi S. Soderstrom

1 June 2014 in Journal of Management Accounting Research
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Journal Article
Closed access
RBRamji Balakrishnan
Ramji Balakrishnan
ELEva Labro
Eva Labro
NSNaomi S. Soderstrom
Naomi S. Soderstrom
Beginning with Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman (2003), a rapidly growing body of literature attributes the short-run asymmetric cost response to activity changes (i.e., sticky costs) resulting from short-run managerial choices. In this paper, we are agnostic on the theory of sticky costs. Rather, we focus on empirical tests of cost stickiness. We show that past decisions on cost structure, which determine the magnitude of costs controllable in the short-term, induce non-stationarity in the elasticity of Sales, General, and Administrative costs, affecting the interpretation of estimates from the standard specification used in the literature. We develop suggestions for how future research might control for the effects of cost structure. Empirically, we find that cost structure confounds results usually interpreted as cost stickiness reflecting short-run managerial actions. After adjusting for the effects of fixed costs, we find that the results are unstable across alternate subsamples. Our results provide evidence that long-run cost structure decisions impact our ability to detect short-term cost management decisions. JEL Classifications: M41; L42

1 July 2011 in The Accounting Review
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Journal Article
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RBRamji Balakrishnan
Ramji Balakrishnan
GSGeoffrey B. Sprinkle
Geoffrey B. Sprinkle
MWMichael G. Williamson
Michael G. Williamson
We use a laboratory experiment to examine whether corporate giving to charity motivates employees. We find a strong altruism effect. Even when employees cannot be remunerated for their actions, employee contributions to employers significantly increase as the level of corporate giving increases. We also find a signaling effect. When employees can be remunerated for their actions, employee contributions initially increase as the level of corporate giving increases. Thus, even though corporate giving to charity decreases the amount that can be shared between employees and employers, employees behave as if more charitable employers will return proportionally more to employees. It is not until relatively high levels of corporate giving that employee contributions to employers eventually decrease. Collectively, our results suggest that corporate giving is an effective lever for motivating employee effort and contributions to organizational endeavors. Corporate giving can increase the efficacy of implicit (relational) contracts and reduce the need for formal accounting-based reward systems and controls.

1 May 2010 in European Journal of Operational Research
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Journal Article
Closed access
RBRamji Balakrishnan
Ramji Balakrishnan
XQXin Ying Qiu
Xin Ying Qiu
PSPadmini Srinivasan
Padmini Srinivasan

1 January 2019 in The Journal of Hand Surgery
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Journal Article
Closed access
DKDaniel M. Koehler
Daniel M. Koehler
RBRamji Balakrishnan
Ramji Balakrishnan
ELEricka A. Lawler
Ericka A. Lawler
ASApurva S. Shah
Apurva S. Shah