Tristan Andres Bekinschtein

Tristan Andres Bekinschtein

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Tristan Andres Bekinschtein

Consciousness and Cognition Lab, Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
3 February 2009 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
TBTristan A. Bekinschtein
Tristan A. Bekinschtein
SDStanislas Dehaene
Stanislas Dehaene
BRBenjamin Rohaut
Benjamin Rohaut
FTFrançois Tadel
François Tadel
LCLaurent Cohen
Laurent Cohen
LNLionel Naccache
Lionel Naccache
Can conscious processing be inferred from neurophysiological measurements? Some models stipulate that the active maintenance of perceptual representations across time requires consciousness. Capitalizing on this assumption, we designed an auditory paradigm that evaluates cerebral responses to violations of temporal regularities that are either local in time or global across several seconds. Local violations led to an early response in auditory cortex, independent of attention or the presence of a concurrent visual task, whereas global violations led to a late and spatially distributed response that was only present when subjects were attentive and aware of the violations. We could detect the global effect in individual subjects using functional MRI and both scalp and intracerebral event-related potentials. Recordings from 8 noncommunicating patients with disorders of consciousness confirmed that only conscious individuals presented a global effect. Taken together these observations suggest that the presence of the global effect is a signature of conscious processing, although it can be absent in conscious subjects who are not aware of the global auditory regularities. This simple electrophysiological marker could thus serve as a useful clinical tool.

6 December 2011 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CWCatherine Wacongne
Catherine Wacongne
ELEtienne Labyt
Etienne Labyt
VWVirginie van Wassenhove
Virginie van Wassenhove
TBTristan Bekinschtein
Tristan Bekinschtein
LNLionel Naccache
Lionel Naccache
SDStanislas Dehaene
Stanislas Dehaene
According to hierarchical predictive coding models, the cortex constantly generates predictions of incoming stimuli at multiple levels of processing. Responses to auditory mismatches and omissions are interpreted as reflecting the prediction error when these predictions are violated. An alternative interpretation, however, is that neurons passively adapt to repeated stimuli. We separated these alternative interpretations by designing a hierarchical auditory novelty paradigm and recording human EEG and magnetoencephalographic (MEG) responses to mismatching or omitted stimuli. In the crucial condition, participants listened to frequent series of four identical tones followed by a fifth different tone, which generates a mismatch response. Because this response itself is frequent and expected, the hierarchical predictive coding hypothesis suggests that it should be cancelled out by a higher-order prediction. Three consequences ensue. First, the mismatch response should be larger when it is unexpected than when it is expected. Second, a perfectly monotonic sequence of five identical tones should now elicit a higher-order novelty response. Third, omitting the fifth tone should reveal the brain's hierarchical predictions. The rationale here is that, when a deviant tone is expected, its omission represents a violation of two expectations: a local prediction of a tone plus a hierarchically higher expectation of its deviancy. Thus, such an omission should induce a greater prediction error than when a standard tone is expected. Simultaneous EEE- magnetoencephalographic recordings verify those predictions and thus strongly support the predictive coding hypothesis. Higher-order predictions appear to be generated in multiple areas of frontal and associative cortices.

3 July 2013 in The Journal of Neuroscience
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SCSrivas Chennu
Srivas Chennu
VNValdas Noreika
Valdas Noreika
DGDavid Gueorguiev
David Gueorguiev
ABAlejandro Blenkmann
Alejandro Blenkmann
SKSilvia Kochen
Silvia Kochen
TBTristan A. Bekinschtein
Tristan A. Bekinschtein
Hierarchical predictive coding suggests that attention in humans emerges from increased precision in probabilistic inference, whereas expectation biases attention in favor of contextually anticipated stimuli. We test these notions within auditory perception by independently manipulating top-down expectation and attentional precision alongside bottom-up stimulus predictability. Our findings support an integrative interpretation of commonly observed electrophysiological signatures of neurodynamics, namely mismatch negativity (MMN), P300, and contingent negative variation (CNV), as manifestations along successive levels of predictive complexity. Early first-level processing indexed by the MMN was sensitive to stimulus predictability: here, attentional precision enhanced early responses, but explicit top-down expectation diminished it. This pattern was in contrast to later, second-level processing indexed by the P300: although sensitive to the degree of predictability, responses at this level were contingent on attentional engagement and in fact sharpened by top-down expectation. At the highest level, the drift of the CNV was a fine-grained marker of top-down expectation itself. Source reconstruction of high-density EEG, supported by intracranial recordings, implicated temporal and frontal regions differentially active at early and late levels. The cortical generators of the CNV suggested that it might be involved in facilitating the consolidation of context-salient stimuli into conscious perception. These results provide convergent empirical support to promising recent accounts of attention and expectation in predictive coding.

16 October 2014 in PLOS Computational Biology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SCSrivas Chennu
Srivas Chennu
PFPaola Finoia
Paola Finoia
EKEvelyn Kamau
Evelyn Kamau
JAJudith Allanson
Judith Allanson
GWGuy B. Williams
Guy B. Williams
TBTristan A. Bekinschtein
Tristan A. Bekinschtein
Theoretical advances in the science of consciousness have proposed that it is concomitant with balanced cortical integration and differentiation, enabled by efficient networks of information transfer across multiple scales. Here, we apply graph theory to compare key signatures of such networks in high-density electroencephalographic data from 32 patients with chronic disorders of consciousness, against normative data from healthy controls. Based on connectivity within canonical frequency bands, we found that patient networks had reduced local and global efficiency, and fewer hubs in the alpha band. We devised a novel topographical metric, termed modular span, which showed that the alpha network modules in patients were also spatially circumscribed, lacking the structured long-distance interactions commonly observed in the healthy controls. Importantly however, these differences between graph-theoretic metrics were partially reversed in delta and theta band networks, which were also significantly more similar to each other in patients than controls. Going further, we found that metrics of alpha network efficiency also correlated with the degree of behavioural awareness. Intriguingly, some patients in behaviourally unresponsive vegetative states who demonstrated evidence of covert awareness with functional neuroimaging stood out from this trend: they had alpha networks that were remarkably well preserved and similar to those observed in the controls. Taken together, our findings inform current understanding of disorders of consciousness by highlighting the distinctive brain networks that characterise them. In the significant minority of vegetative patients who follow commands in neuroimaging tests, they point to putative network mechanisms that could support cognitive function and consciousness despite profound behavioural impairment. What are the neural signatures of consciousness? This is an elusive yet fascinating challenge to current cognitive neuroscience, but it takes on an immediate clinical and societal significance in patients diagnosed as vegetative and minimally conscious. In these patients, it leads us to ask whether we can test for the presence of these signatures in the absence of any external signs of awareness. Recent conceptual advances suggest that consciousness requires a dynamic balance between integrated and differentiated networks of information exchange between brain regions. Here we apply this insight to study such networks in patients and compare them to healthy adults. Using the science of graph theory, we show that the rich and diversely connected networks that support awareness are characteristically impaired in patients, lacking the ability to efficiently integrate information across disparate regions via well-connected hubs. We find that the quality of patients' networks also correlates well with their degree of behavioural responsiveness, and some vegetative patients who show signs of hidden awareness have remarkably well-preserved networks similar to healthy adults. Overall, our research highlights distinctive network signatures of pathological unconsciousness, which could improve clinical assessment and help identify patients who are aware despite being uncommunicative.

31 March 2009 in Brain
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
TTTeresa Torralva
Teresa Torralva
MRMaría Roca
María Roca
EGEzequiel Gleichgerrcht
Ezequiel Gleichgerrcht
TBTristán Bekinschtein
Tristán Bekinschtein
FMFacundo Manes
Facundo Manes
Traditional cognitive tests may not be sensitive for the early detection of executive and social cognitive impairments in the behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia. The aim of this study was to detect specific executive and social cognitive deficits in patients with early behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia using a battery of tests previously shown to be sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction. Behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia patients and paired controls were assessed with a complete standard neuropsychological battery evaluating attention, memory, visuospatial abilities, language and executive functions. All participants were then assessed with our Executive and Social Cognition Battery, which included Theory of Mind tests (Mind in the Eyes, Faux Pas), the Hotel Task, Multiple Errands Task-hospital version and the Iowa Gambling Task for complex decision-making. Patients were divided into two groups according to their Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination scores, a measure of general cognitive status. Low Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination patients differed from controls on most tasks of the standard battery and the Executive and Social Cognition Battery. While high Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination patients did not differ from controls on most traditional neuropsychological tests, significant differences were found between this high-functioning behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia group and controls on most measures of our Executive and Social Cognition Battery. Our results suggest that the Executive and Social Cognition Battery used in this study is more sensitive in detecting executive and social cognitive impairment deficits in early behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia than the classical cognitive measures.

1 January 2011 in NeuroImage
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DFDavinia Fernández-Espejo
Davinia Fernández-Espejo
TBTristan Bekinschtein
Tristan Bekinschtein
MMMartin M Monti
Martin M Monti
JPJohn D. Pickard
John D. Pickard
CJCarme Junque
Carme Junque
AOAdrian M. Owen
Adrian M. Owen