Although economic theory suggests that markets may “tip” toward a dominant platform or standard, there are many prominent examples of persistent incompatibility, interplatform competition, and standards proliferation. This paper examines the phenomena of forking, fragmentation, and splintering in markets with network effects. We illustrate several causes of miscoordination, as well as the tools that firms and industries use to fight it, through short cases of standardization in railroad gauges, modems, operating systems, instant messaging, and internet browsers. We conclude by discussing managerial implications and directions for future research.
This article describes the economics of standardization, and the costs and benefits of alternative ways to achieve compatibility. Four paths to compatibility, namely standards wars, negotiations, dictators, and converters, are explained. These four paths to compatibility have different costs and benefits. Standard setting organizations are a heterogeneous set of institutions connected by their use of the consensus process. Government involvement may be appropriate when private control of an interface would result in utmost market power. Converters are attractive because they preserve flexibility for implementers. Compatibility standards can emerge through market competition, negotiated consensus, converters, or the actions of a dominant firm. Developing a better understanding of how a particular path is selected shows a crucial first step toward measuring the cost-benefit tradeoffs across paths, and adjudicating debates over the efficiency of the selection process.
We study the role of vertical differentiation in the adoption of LEED (Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design), a multitier environmental building certification system. Our identification strategy relies on the timing of adoption and shows that builders seek to differentiate from each other by choosing a different certification level from previously certified buildings. A common concern in this framework is that mean-reverting behavior could be mistaken for differentiation. We develop a new method for establishing the importance of strategic interactions based on simulating from a model with independent choice and unobserved heterogeneity, and showing that such a model cannot generate the level of interaction that we observe. Finally, we estimate a model that incorporates both differentiation incentives and correlated market-level unobservables and use our estimates from this model to simulate the impact of reducing the number of LEED tiers from four to two. The simulations indicate that environmental investments depend on the location of the threshold between tiers. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.
Motivated by several examples, including Internet of Things patent licensing, we develop a tractable model of multi-product ecosystems, where one or more platforms provide inputs to a set of devices linked through demand-side externalities. Prices depend on each device's Katz-Bonacich centrality in a network dened by the externalities, and we show how the relevant network diers for an ecosystem monop- olist, a social planner, or a group of complementary platforms. We use the model to revisit Cournot's analysis of complementary monopolies in a platform setting, and to analyze a partial (one-sided) merger of complementary platforms.