15 April 2022 in Synthese
The article investigates what happens when philosophy (of science) meets and begins to establish connections with two formal research methods such as game theory and network science. We use citation analysis to identify, among the articles published in Synthese and Philosophy of Science between 1985 and 2021, those that cite the specialistic literature in game theory and network science. Then, we investigate the structure of the two corpora thus identified by bibliographic coupling and divide them into clusters of related papers by automatic community detection. Lastly, we construct by the same bibliometric techniques a reference map of philosophy, on which we overlay our corpora to map the diffusion of game theory and network science in the various sub-areas of recent philosophy. Three main results derive from this study. (i) Philosophers are interested not only in using and investigating game theory as a formal method belonging to applied mathematics and sharing many relevant features with social choice theory, but also in considering its applications in more empirically oriented disciplines such as social psychology, cognitive science, or biology. (ii) Philosophers focus on networks in two research contexts and in two different ways: in the debate on causality and scientific explanation, they consider the results of network science; in social epistemology, they employ network science as a formal tool. (iii) In the reference map, logic—whose use in philosophy dates back to a much earlier period—is distributed in a more uniform way than recently encountered disciplines such as game theory and network science. We conclude by discussing some methodological limitations of our bibliometric approach, especially with reference to the problem of field delineation.
1 November 2021 in Synthese
23 August 2019 in British Journal for the History of Philosophy
There is a rather widespread consensus, among historians of philosophy, concerning the decline of Wittgenstein amid recent analytic philosophy. However, the exact import of such a decline, its chronological development, as well as its causes and several other features, are difficult to ascertain with the traditional methods of the history of philosophy. In this article we applied a distant reading approach, and a variety of other quantitative methods, trying to provide a more reliable and accurate account of Wittgenstein’s decline. We focused on a corpus consisting of the metadata of US PhD dissertations in philosophy from 1981 to 2010 (although other kinds of data are also taken into consideration), and we tried to relate the topic of the dissertation to the success of the candidate in his/her subsequent academic career. The results of this analysis, corroborated by other evidence, allowed us to put forth the more reliable and accurate account just hinted at, and at the same time to suggest – as a contribution to external history of philosophy – a plausible mechanism at the basis of the decline itself, notably a process driven by those who controlled the recruitment policies in the philosophy departments.
19 October 2012 in Philosophia
I found Annalisa Coliva’s book Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense insightful and very rewarding, and I learnt a lot from it. In this paper, however, I focus on points of divergence. Coliva acknowledges that some sets of remarks, especially in On Certainty (see Wittgenstein 1969), appear to support a relativistic interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophical views. According to her, however, if we read these passages more carefully, “the first impression of dealing with an epistemic relativist should be dramatically revised” (2010, 190). Under her interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, Wittgenstein was not an epistemic relativist, either factual or virtual. In this paper, with the aim of testing Coliva’s thesis that Wittgenstein was not a factual epistemic relativist, I explore Wittgenstein’s later remarks on religious belief, especially on credal statements such as “I believe in the Last Judgement”. Preliminarily, I introduce Wittgenstein’