10 January 2017 in Global Challenges
The international sharing of virus data is critical for protecting populations against lethal infectious disease outbreaks. Scientists must rapidly share information to assess the nature of the threat and develop new medical countermeasures. Governments need the data to trace the extent of the outbreak, initiate public health responses, and coordinate access to medicines and vaccines. Recent outbreaks suggest, however, that the sharing of such data cannot be taken for granted – making the timely international exchange of virus data a vital global challenge. This article undertakes the first analysis of the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data as an innovative policy effort to promote the international sharing of genetic and associated influenza virus data. Based on more than 20 semi‐structured interviews conducted with key informants in the international community, coupled with analysis of a wide range of primary and secondary sources, the article finds that the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data contributes to global health in at least five ways: (1) collating the most complete repository of high‐quality influenza data in the world; (2) facilitating the rapid sharing of potentially pandemic virus information during recent outbreaks; (3) supporting the World Health Organization's biannual seasonal flu vaccine strain selection process; (4) developing informal mechanisms for conflict resolution around the sharing of virus data; and (5) building greater trust with several countries key to global pandemic preparedness.
13 October 2015 in Bulletin of the World Health Organization
Global governance and market failures mean that it is not possible to ensure access to antimicrobial medicines of sustainable effectiveness. Many people work to overcome these failures, but their institutions and initiatives are insufficiently coordinated, led and financed. Options for promoting global collective action on antimicrobial access and effectiveness include building institutions, crafting incentives and mobilizing interests. No single option is sufficient to tackle all the challenges associated with antimicrobial resistance. Promising institutional options include monitored milestones and an inter-agency task force. A global pooled fund could be used to craft incentives and a special representative nominated as an interest mobilizer. There are three policy components to the problem of antimicrobials--ensuring access, conservation and innovation. To address all three components, the right mix of options needs to be matched with an effective forum and may need to be supported by an international legal framework.
1 October 2002 in International Security
18 October 2010 in Health Policy and Planning
This article analyses how the ‘securitization’ of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) contributed to the rise of a protracted international virus-sharing dispute between developing and developed countries. As fear about the threat of a possible human H5N1 pandemic spread across the world, many governments scrambled to stockpile anti-viral medications and vaccines, albeit in a context where there was insufficient global supply to meet such a rapid surge in demand. Realizing that they were the likely ‘losers’ in this international race, some developing countries began to openly question the benefits of maintaining existing forms of international health cooperation, especially the common practice of sharing national virus samples with the rest of the international community. Given that such virus samples were also crucial to the high-level pandemic preparedness efforts of the West, the Indonesian government in particular felt emboldened to use international access to its H5N1 virus samples as a diplomatic ‘bargaining chip’ for negotiating better access to vaccines and other benefits for developing countries. The securitized global response to H5N1 thus ended up unexpectedly entangling the long-standing international virus-sharing mechanism within a wider set of political disputes, as well as prompting governments to subject existing virus-sharing arrangements to much narrower calculations of national interest. In the years ahead, those risks to international health cooperation must be balanced with the policy attractions of the global health security agenda.
1 December 2005 in International Relations
This article critically engages with recent efforts to frame the global AIDS pandemic as an international security issue. The securitization of HIV/AIDS is significant, the article argues, not just because it is a novel way of conceptualizing the global AIDS pandemic, but also because it marks an important contemporary site for the global dissemination of a biopolitical economy of power revolving around the government of ‘life’. This biopolitical dimension to the securitization of AIDS brings into play a set of potentially racist and normalizing social practices, which, the article argues, international political actors should seek to avoid in their attempts to find appropriate and effective responses to the global AIDS pandemic. Ways of minimizing these dangers are explored in the conclusion of the article.