12 January 2021 in Complexity
With the implementation of national carbon emission reduction policies and the development of online shopping, manufacturers are making low‐carbon efforts and selling products through dual channels. This paper constructs a dual‐channel supply chain decision‐making model composed of low‐carbon emission reduction manufacturers and retailers and studies the optimal decision‐making problem of the supply chain under subsidies by the government based on emission reduction R&D and per unit product emission reduction. The research results show the following: (1) when the government subsidizes emission reduction R&D, the emission reduction will have an impact on retailers’ optimal prices, manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices, and optimal direct sales channel sales prices. The profit of the manufacturer increases with the increase in carbon emissions, and the profit of the manufacturer increases to a certain level and then appears to decline. (2) When the government adopts a subsidy method based on the emission reduction per unit product, the manufacturer’s wholesale price and the selling price of direct sales channels, as well as the retailer’s own optimal price, will increase with the increase in emission reductions. Retailers’ profits will increase linearly with the increase in carbon emissions. Manufacturers’ profits will first increase in a straight line and then increase in a curve.
10 June 2021 in Frontiers in Environmental Science
As a weapon for economic development, green finance plays an important supporting and promoting role in the economic recovery and transformation of enterprises in the post-epidemic era. By constructing a dual-channel supply chain model, this paper considers two situations in which manufacturers participate in carbon trading and green finance loans, and uses Stackelberg game to study the impact of different situations on participants’ profits and emission reduction decisions. The results show that: under the carbon trading mechanism, the carbon emission reduction level of the manufacturer is inversely proportional to the relevant price, and the demand and profit of the two channels increase with the increase in emission reduction; when carbon trading and green financial loans are carried out at the same time, participants have lower profits, but with the increase in emission reductions, it is still a growing trend.
13 January 2021 in Complexity
The development of information technology has changed the pricing strategy of retailers, and consumers have also made strategic consumption behaviours accordingly. At the same time, changes in the environment have caused changes in the retailer’s products and raised consumers’ environmental awareness. This paper uses a two‐stage pricing model to study the low‐carbon product pricing decisions of retailers based on strategic consumers with low‐carbon preferences in two situations. Through the analysis of low‐carbon and ordinary products in two situations, the following conclusions can be drawn: (1) In a market where retailers only sell low‐carbon products, product prices and profits increase as consumers’ green preference θ increases. (2) In the low‐carbon product and ordinary product markets, the price and profit of low‐carbon products increase with regard to consumers’ green preference θ. (3) In the second stage, when consumers’ intertemporal discount factor β for ordinary products is larger than that of low‐carbon products, the retailer’s total profit is smaller. The research conclusion comprehensively analyses the impact of customer strategic behaviour on the two‐stage pricing decision of green differentiated products, which provides a very important reference for retailers to make pricing optimization decisions.
15 June 2021 in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
The occurrence of major public health events usually leads to interruptions in the supply chain. This article studies the supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one manufacturer. In the case of supply interruptions, the manufacturer adopts two models of unit cost subsidies and proportional subsidies. The reliability of the supplier’s supply is incentivized and ensured. A Stackelberg game model is established in which the manufacturer is the leader and the supplier is the follower. The research results show that the optimal order quantity of the supplier manufacturer and the optimal wholesale price of the supplier will be affected by the reliability level, and the optimal supply chain profits of the two models under different parameters are compared.
5 July 2022 in Scientific Programming
With the rapid development of intelligent technology, the construction of smart cities with the goal of creating a harmonious human life has become a new hot spot in the world. A new round of information technology revolution, represented by the Internet, big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), and fifth-generation mobile communications (5G), is driving profound changes in the automotive industry. Smart vehicles (also known as intelligent connected vehicles) that integrate many high-tech technologies to provide safer, more convenient, and low-carbon comprehensive travel solutions have become an inevitable form of future vehicles. This paper constructs a three-level supply chain consisting of high-performance chip suppliers, smart car manufacturers, and retailers. On the basis of considering the level of product innovation and sales effort, Stackelberg game method is used to study the influence of each player in the supply chain on each parameter and the profit of each player under three scenarios: centralized decision making, nonsharing of innovation cost, and sharing of innovation cost. The results show that: when the level of sales effort has nothing to do with the level of innovation, the level of product innovation and the total profit of the supply chain increase with the improvement of the retailers sales ability; when the level of sales effort is related to the level of innovation, the level of product innovation under the cost-sharing decision model is greater than the case of no cost sharing, but the total profit of the supply chain is less than the case of no cost sharing.