7 January 2010 in Journal of International Business Studies
11 May 2021 in Journal of International Business Studies
7 July 2009 in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
Choi (2009) offers a useful demonstration that Li and Resnick’s (2003) analysis of the effect of regime type on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows is vulnerable to the impact of outliers. However, his first remedial method of controlling for outliers with a dummy variable leads to qualitatively the same findings of Li and Resnick. His second remedial method, a robust regression estimator, drops 80 observations and its result on democracy contradicts the finding from median regression. Choi claims that the origin of the outlier problem in Li and Resnick is the inappropriate operationalization of the concept: FDI inflows. Analysts should choose FDI/GDP over net FDI inflows. This research demonstrates how scholars often conflate the two measures conceptually and empirically. Fundamentally, FDI/GDP reflects a country’s openness to or reliance on foreign capital whereas net FDI inflows indicate the amount of investment. Based on FDI/GDP, scholars cannot draw correct inferences about the impact of democracy on the amount of foreign investment. Hence, conclusions in several published studies have to be revised and corrected. One promising solution for outliers in FDI data is to log-transform net FDI inflows. This research has important implications not only for resolving the democracy-FDI controversy but also for studies of other causes of FDI flows.
24 September 2015 in Review of International Political Economy
Many developing countries use tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment, sacrificing immediate revenue from foreign capital, even though the effects of tax incentives on investment, growth, and revenue are empirically dubious. This leads to the puzzle of why states adopt tax incentives. Extant studies of tax incentive adoption overlook the fact that many countries have decentralized fiscal authority, allowing subnational governments to offer tax incentives. Public finance scholars argue that fiscal federalism intensifies tax competition among regions. Hence, drawing on the public finance scholarship, one may ask: Does fiscal decentralization lead to a race to the top among subnational governments and an oversupply of tax incentives in a country? This article argues that fiscal decentralization affects tax incentives in complex ways. When subnational governments are authorized to set tax policies, their politicians have economic and political incentives to engage in tax competition for mobile capital, providing more tax incentives in a country. However, the politicians are less likely to do so if they are held accountable and have to fund most expenditures through own-source tax revenues. An empirical analysis of over 50 developing countries in early 2000s produces robust supporting evidence. This research challenges both the view that fiscal decentralization is always beneficial and the view that horizontal competition invariably produces inefficiently low tax rates. The impact of fiscal decentralization on tax incentives and by implication, revenue mobilization depends on the design of the central–local government relations.
1 January 2012 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Chinese outbound direct investment (ODI) has been a controversial phenomenon and an increasingly important research topic. We argue that ignoring the role of in