Ramesh Karri
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Ramesh Karri

ECE, New York University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

37Years (1990-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 July 2014 in Proceedings of the IEEE
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Masoud RostamiMasoud Rostami
Masoud Rostami
FKFarinaz Koushanfar
Farinaz Koushanfar
RKRamesh Karri
Ramesh Karri
The multinational, distributed, and multistep nature of integrated circuit (IC) production supply chain has introduced hardware-based vulnerabilities. Existing literature in hardware security assumes ad hoc threat models, defenses, and metrics for evaluation, making it difficult to analyze and compare alternate solutions. This paper systematizes the current knowledge in this emerging field, including a classification of threat models, state-of-the-art defenses, and evaluation metrics for important hardware-based attacks.

1 October 2010 in Computer
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RKRamesh Karri
Ramesh Karri
JRJeyavijayan Rajendran
Jeyavijayan Rajendran
KRKurt Rosenfeld
Kurt Rosenfeld
MTMohammad Tehranipoor
Mohammad Tehranipoor
For reasons of economy, critical systems will inevitably depend on electronics made in untrusted factories. A proposed new hardware Trojan taxonomy provides a first step in better understanding existing and potential threats.

1 October 2013 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JRJeyavijayan Rajendran
Jeyavijayan Rajendran
HZHuan Zhang
Huan Zhang
CZChi Zhang
Chi Zhang
GRGarrett Rose
Garrett Rose
YPYoungok Pino
Youngok Pino
RKRamesh Karri
Ramesh Karri
Globalization of the integrated circuit (IC) design industry is making it easy for rogue elements in the supply chain to pirate ICs, overbuild ICs, and insert hardware Trojans. Due to supply chain attacks, the IC industry is losing approximately $4 billion annually. One way to protect ICs from these attacks is to encrypt the design by inserting additional gates such that correct outputs are produced only when specific inputs are applied to these gates. The state-of-the-art logic encryption technique inserts gates randomly into the design, but does not necessarily ensure that wrong keys corrupt the outputs. Our technique ensures that wrong keys corrupt the outputs. We relate logic encryption to fault propagation analysis in IC testing and develop a fault analysis-based logic encryption technique. This technique enables a designer to controllably corrupt the outputs. Specifically, to maximize the ambiguity for an attacker, this technique targets 50% Hamming distance between the correct and wrong outputs (ideal case) when a wrong key is applied. Furthermore, this 50% Hamming distance target is achieved using a smaller number of additional gates when compared to random logic encryption.

22 April 2024 in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
STShailja Thakur
Shailja Thakur
BABaleegh Ahmad
Baleegh Ahmad
HPHammond Pearce
Hammond Pearce
BTBenjamin Tan
Benjamin Tan
BDBrendan Dolan-Gavitt
Brendan Dolan-Gavitt
SGSiddharth Garg
Siddharth Garg
In this study, we explore the capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to automate hardware design by automatically completing partial Verilog code, a common language for designing and modeling digital systems. We fine-tune pre-existing LLMs on Verilog datasets compiled from GitHub and Verilog textbooks. We evaluate the functional correctness of the generated Verilog code using a specially designed test suite, featuring a custom problem set and testing benches. Here, our fine-tuned open-source CodeGen-16B model outperforms the commercial state-of-the-art GPT-3.5-turbo model with a 1.1% overall increase. Upon testing with a more diverse and complex problem set, we find that the fine-tuned model shows competitive performance against state-of-the-art gpt-3.5-turbo, excelling in certain scenarios. Notably, it demonstrates a 41% improvement in generating syntactically correct Verilog code across various problem categories compared to its pre-trained counterpart, highlighting the potential of smaller, in-house LLMs in hardware design automation. We release our training/evaluation scripts and LLM checkpoints as open-source contributions.

27 May 2016 in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KXK. Xiao
K. Xiao
DFD. Forte
D. Forte
YJY. Jin
Y. Jin
RKR. Karri
R. Karri
SBS. Bhunia
S. Bhunia
MTM. Tehranipoor
M. Tehranipoor
Given the increasing complexity of modern electronics and the cost of fabrication, entities from around the globe have become more heavily involved in all phases of the electronics supply chain. In this environment, hardware Trojans (i.e., malicious modifications or inclusions made by untrusted third parties) pose major security concerns, especially for those integrated circuits (ICs) and systems used in critical applications and cyber infrastructure. While hardware Trojans have been explored significantly in academia over the last decade, there remains room for improvement. In this article, we examine the research on hardware Trojans from the last decade and attempt to capture the lessons learned. A comprehensive adversarial model taxonomy is introduced and used to examine the current state of the art. Then the past countermeasures and publication trends are categorized based on the adversarial model and topic. Through this analysis, we identify what has been covered and the important problems that are underinvestigated. We also identify the most critical lessons for those new to the field and suggest a roadmap for future hardware Trojan research.

3 June 2012
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
JRJeyavijayan Rajendran
Jeyavijayan Rajendran
YPYoungok Pino
Youngok Pino
OSOzgur Sinanoglu
Ozgur Sinanoglu
RKRamesh Karri
Ramesh Karri