Ming Wei

Ming Wei

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Ming Wei

School of Mathematical Sciences, Beihang University 1 , Beijing 100191

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

2Years (2025-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 April 2025 in Journal of The Royal Society Interface
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MWMing Wei
Ming Wei
XWXin Wang
Xin Wang
LLLongzhao Liu
Longzhao Liu
HZHongwei Zheng
Hongwei Zheng
YJYishen Jiang
Yishen Jiang
STShaoting Tang
Shaoting Tang
Indirect reciprocity unveils how social cooperation is founded upon moral systems. Within the frame of dyadic games based on individual reputations, the ‘leading-eight’ strategies distinguish themselves in promoting and sustaining cooperation. However, in real-world societies, there are widespread interactions at the group level, where individuals need to make a singular action choice when facing multiple individuals with different reputations. Here, through introducing the assessment of collective reputations, we develop a framework that embeds group-level reputation structure into public goods games to study the evolution of group-level indirect reciprocity. We show that changing the criteria of group assessment destabilizes the reputation dynamics of leading-eight strategies. In a particular range of social assessment criteria, all leading-eight strategies can break the social dilemma in public goods games and sustain cooperation. Specifically, there exists an optimal, moderately set assessment criterion that is most conducive to promoting cooperation. Moreover, in the evolution of assessment criteria, the preference of the leading-eight strategies for social strictness is inversely correlated with the payoff level. Our work reveals the impact of social strictness on prosocial behaviour, highlighting the importance of group-level interactions in the analysis of evolutionary games and complex social dynamics.

18 February 2026 in Applied Mathematical Modelling
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YJYishen Jiang
Yishen Jiang
XWXin Wang
Xin Wang
WZWenqiang Zhu
Wenqiang Zhu
MWMing Wei
Ming Wei
LLLongzhao Liu
Longzhao Liu
HZHongwei Zheng
Hongwei Zheng

1 April 2026 in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YJYishen Jiang
Yishen Jiang
XWXin Wang
Xin Wang
MWMing Wei
Ming Wei
WZWenqiang Zhu
Wenqiang Zhu
LLLongzhao Liu
Longzhao Liu
STShaoting Tang
Shaoting Tang
Indirect reciprocity maintains cooperation in stranger societies by mapping individual behaviors onto reputation signals via social norms. Existing theoretical frameworks assume static environments with constant resources and fixed payoff structures. However, in real-world systems, individuals’ strategic behaviors not only shape their reputation but also induce collective-level resource changes in ecological, economic, or other external environments, which, in turn, reshape the incentives governing future individual actions. To overcome this limitation, we establish a co-evolutionary framework that couples moral assessment, strategy updating, and environmental dynamics, allowing the payoff structure to dynamically adjust in response to the ecological consequences of collective actions. We find that this environmental feedback mechanism helps lower the threshold for the emergence of cooperation, enabling the system to spontaneously transition from a low-cooperation state to a stable high-cooperation regime, thereby reducing the dependence on specific initial conditions. Furthermore, while lenient norms demonstrate adaptability in static environments, norms with strict discrimination are shown to be crucial for curbing opportunism and maintaining evolutionary resilience in dynamic settings. Our results reveal the evolutionary dynamics of coupled systems involving reputation institutions and environmental constraints, offering a new theoretical perspective for understanding collective cooperation and social governance in complex environments.