Ronald van Den Berg

Ronald van Den Berg

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Ronald van Den Berg

Department of Psychology, Stockholm University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

21Years (2006-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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11 May 2012 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
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RBRonald van Den Berg
Ronald van Den Berg
HSHongsup Shin
Hongsup Shin
WCWen-Chuang Chou
Wen-Chuang Chou
RGRyan George
Ryan George
WMWei Ji Ma
Wei Ji Ma
It is commonly believed that visual short-term memory (VSTM) consists of a fixed number of “slots” in which items can be stored. An alternative theory in which memory resource is a continuous quantity distributed over all items seems to be refuted by the appearance of guessing in human responses. Here, we introduce a model in which resource is not only continuous but also variable across items and trials, causing random fluctuations in encoding precision. We tested this model against previous models using two VSTM paradigms and two feature dimensions. Our model accurately accounts for all aspects of the data, including apparent guessing, and outperforms slot models in formal model comparison. At the neural level, variability in precision might correspond to variability in neural population gain and doubly stochastic stimulus representation. Our results suggest that VSTM resource is continuous and variable rather than discrete and fixed and might explain why subjective experience of VSTM is not all or none.

1 January 2014 in Psychological Review
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Journal Article
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RBRonald van Den Berg
Ronald van Den Berg
EAEdward Awh
Edward Awh
WMWei Ji Ma
Wei Ji Ma
Three questions have been prominent in the study of visual working memory limitations: (a) What is the nature of mnemonic precision (e.g., quantized or continuous)? (b) How many items are remembered? (c) To what extent do spatial binding errors account for working memory failures? Modeling studies have typically focused on comparing possible answers to a single one of these questions, even though the result of such a comparison might depend on the assumed answers to both others. Here, we consider every possible combination of previously proposed answers to the individual questions. Each model is then a point in a 3-factor model space containing a total of 32 models, of which only 6 have been tested previously. We compare all models on data from 10 delayed-estimation experiments from 6 laboratories (for a total of 164 subjects and 131,452 trials). Consistently across experiments, we find that (a) mnemonic precision is not quantized but continuous and not equal but variable across items and trials; (b) the number of remembered items is likely to be variable across trials, with a mean of 6.4 in the best model (median across subjects); (c) spatial binding errors occur but explain only a small fraction of responses (16.5% at set size 8 in the best model). We find strong evidence against all 6 documented models. Our results demonstrate the value of factorial model comparison in working memory.

1 February 2016 in eLife
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Journal Article
Open access
RBRonald van Den Berg
Ronald van Den Berg
KAKavitha Anandalingam
Kavitha Anandalingam
AZAriel Zylberberg
Ariel Zylberberg
RKRoozbeh Kiani
Roozbeh Kiani
MSMichael N Shadlen
Michael N Shadlen
DWDaniel M Wolpert
Daniel M Wolpert
Decisions are accompanied by a degree of confidence that a selected option is correct. A sequential sampling framework explains the speed and accuracy of decisions and extends naturally to the confidence that the decision rendered is likely to be correct. However, discrepancies between confidence and accuracy suggest that confidence might be supported by mechanisms dissociated from the decision process. Here we show that this discrepancy can arise naturally because of simple processing delays. When participants were asked to report choice and confidence simultaneously, their confidence, reaction time and a perceptual decision about motion were explained by bounded evidence accumulation. However, we also observed revisions of the initial choice and/or confidence. These changes of mind were explained by a continuation of the mechanism that led to the initial choice. Our findings extend the sequential sampling framework to vacillation about confidence and invites caution in interpreting dissociations between confidence and accuracy.

1 December 2016 in Current Biology
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Journal Article
Open access
RBRonald van Den Berg
Ronald van Den Berg
AZAriel Zylberberg
Ariel Zylberberg
RKRoozbeh Kiani
Roozbeh Kiani
MSMichael N. Shadlen
Michael N. Shadlen
DWDaniel M. Wolpert
Daniel M. Wolpert
Demanding tasks often require a series of decisions to reach a goal. Recent progress in perceptual decision-making has served to unite decision accuracy, speed, and confidence in a common framework of bounded evidence accumulation, furnishing a platform for the study of such multi-stage decisions. In many instances, the strategy applied to each decision, such as the speed-accuracy trade-off, ought to depend on the accuracy of the previous decisions. However, as the accuracy of each decision is often unknown to the decision maker, we hypothesized that subjects may carry forward a level of confidence in previous decisions to affect subsequent decisions. Subjects made two perceptual decisions sequentially and were rewarded only if they made both correctly. The speed and accuracy of individual decisions were explained by noisy evidence accumulation to a terminating bound. We found that subjects adjusted their speed-accuracy setting by elevating the termination bound on the second decision in proportion to their confidence in the first. The findings reveal a novel role for confidence and a degree of flexibility, hitherto unknown, in the brain's ability to rapidly and precisely modify the mechanisms that control the termination of a decision.

8 May 2011 in Nature Neuroscience
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Journal Article
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WMWei Ji Ma
Wei Ji Ma
VNVidhya Navalpakkam
Vidhya Navalpakkam
JBJeffrey M Beck
Jeffrey M Beck
RBRonald van Den Berg
Ronald van Den Berg
APAlexandre Pouget
Alexandre Pouget

28 February 2013 in PLOS Computational Biology
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SKShaiyan Keshvari
Shaiyan Keshvari
RBRonald van Den Berg
Ronald van Den Berg
WMWei Ji Ma
Wei Ji Ma
Change detection is a classic paradigm that has been used for decades to argue that working memory can hold no more than a fixed number of items (“item-limit models”). Recent findings force us to consider the alternative view that working memory is limited by the precision in stimulus encoding, with mean precision decreasing with increasing set size (“continuous-resource models”). Most previous studies that used the change detection paradigm have ignored effects of limited encoding precision by using highly discriminable stimuli and only large changes. We conducted two change detection experiments (orientation and color) in which change magnitudes were drawn from a wide range, including small changes. In a rigorous comparison of five models, we found no evidence of an item limit. Instead, human change detection performance was best explained by a continuous-resource model in which encoding precision is variable across items and trials even at a given set size. This model accounts for comparison errors in a principled, probabilistic manner. Our findings sharply challenge the theoretical basis for most neural studies of working memory capacity. Working memory is a fundamental aspect of human cognition. It allows us to remember bits of information over short periods of time and make split-second decisions about what to do next. Working memory is often tested using a change detection task: subjects report whether a change occurred between two subsequent visual images that both contain multiple objects (items). The more items are present in the images, the worse they do. The precise origin of this phenomenon is not agreed on. The classic theory asserts that working memory consists of a small number of slots, each of which can store one item; when there are more items than slots, the extra items are discarded. A modern model postulates that working memory is fundamentally limited in the quality rather than the quantity of memories. In a metaphor: instead of watering only a few plants in our garden, we water all of them, but the more plants we have, the less water each will receive on average. We show that this new model does much better in accounting for human change detection responses. This has consequences for the entire field of working memory research.