1 August 2002 in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
1 November 2014 in Global Environmental Change
HTHeather Barnes Truelove
1 May 2010 in Wires Climate Change
1 January 2011 in American Psychologist
This article considers scientific and public understandings of climate change and addresses the following question: Why is it that while scientific evidence has accumulated to document global climate change and scientific opinion has solidified about its existence and causes, U.S. public opinion has not and has instead become more polarized? Our review supports a constructivist account of human judgment. Public understanding is affected by the inherent difficulty of understanding climate change, the mismatch between people's usual modes of understanding and the task, and, particularly in the United States, a continuing societal struggle to shape the frames and mental models people use to understand the phenomena. We conclude by discussing ways in which psychology can help to improve public understanding of climate change and link a better understanding to action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).
1 January 2009 in Annual Review of Psychology
A full range of psychological processes has been put into play to explain judgment and choice phenomena. Complementing work on attention, information integration, and learning, decision research over the past 10 years has also examined the effects of goals, mental representation, and memory processes. In addition to deliberative processes, automatic processes have gotten closer attention, and the emotions revolution has put affective processes on a footing equal to cognitive ones. Psychological process models provide natural predictions about individual differences and lifespan changes and integrate across judgment and decision making (JDM) phenomena. “Mindful” JDM research leverages our knowledge about psychological processes into causal explanations for important judgment and choice regularities, emphasizing the adaptive use of an abundance of processing alternatives. Such explanations supplement and support existing mathematical descriptions of phenomena such as loss aversion or hyperbolic discounting. Unlike such descriptions, they also provide entry points for interventions designed to help people overcome judgments or choices considered undesirable.
1 January 2004 in Psychological Review
This article examines the statistical determinants of risk preference. In a meta-analysis of animal risk preference (foraging birds and insects), the coefficient of variation (CV), a measure of risk per unit of return, predicts choices far better than outcome variance, the risk measure of normative models. In a meta-analysis of human risk preference, the superiority of the CV over variance in predicting risk taking is not as strong. Two experiments show that people's risk sensitivity becomes strongly proportional to the CV when they learn about choice alternatives like other animals, by experiential sampling over time. Experience-based choices differ from choices when outcomes and probabilities are numerically described. Zipf's law as an ecological regularity and Weber's law as a psychological regularity may give rise to the CV as a measure of risk.