David Gray Widder

David Gray Widder

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David Gray Widder

University of Texas at Austin

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2023 in Big Data & Society
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
DWDavid Gray Widder
David Gray Widder
DNDawn Nafus
Dawn Nafus
Responsible artificial intelligence guidelines ask engineers to consider how their systems might harm. However, contemporary artificial intelligence systems are built by composing many preexisting software modules that pass through many hands before becoming a finished product or service. How does this shape responsible artificial intelligence practice? In interviews with 27 artificial intelligence engineers across industry, open source, and academia, our participants often did not see the questions posed in responsible artificial intelligence guidelines to be within their agency, capability, or responsibility to address. We use Suchman's “located accountability” to show how responsible artificial intelligence labor is currently organized and to explore how it could be done differently. We identify cross-cutting social logics, like modularizability, scale, reputation, and customer orientation, that organize which responsible artificial intelligence actions do take place and which are relegated to low status staff or believed to be the work of the next or previous person in the imagined “supply chain.” We argue that current responsible artificial intelligence interventions, like ethics checklists and guidelines that assume panoptical knowledge and control over systems, could be improved by taking a located accountability approach, recognizing where relations and obligations might intertwine inside and outside of this supply chain.

27 November 2024 in Nature
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DWDavid Gray Widder
David Gray Widder
MWMeredith Whittaker
Meredith Whittaker
SWSarah Myers West
Sarah Myers West
This paper examines ‘open’ artificial intelligence (AI). Claims about ‘open’ AI often lack precision, frequently eliding scrutiny of substantial industry concentration in large-scale AI development and deployment, and often incorrectly applying understandings of ‘open’ imported from free and open-source software to AI systems. At present, powerful actors are seeking to shape policy using claims that ‘open’ AI is either beneficial to innovation and democracy, on the one hand, or detrimental to safety, on the other. When policy is being shaped, definitions matter. To add clarity to this debate, we examine the basis for claims of openness in AI, and offer a material analysis of what AI is and what ‘openness’ in AI can and cannot provide: examining models, data, labour, frameworks, and computational power. We highlight three main affordances of ‘open’ AI, namely transparency, reusability, and extensibility, and we observe that maximally ‘open’ AI allows some forms of oversight and experimentation on top of existing models. However, we find that openness alone does not perturb the concentration of power in AI. Just as many traditional open-source software projects were co-opted in various ways by large technology companies, we show how rhetoric around ‘open’ AI is frequently wielded in ways that exacerbate rather than reduce concentration of power in the AI sector.

12 June 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DWDavid Gray Widder
David Gray Widder
DZDerrick Zhen
Derrick Zhen
LDLaura Dabbish
Laura Dabbish
JHJames Herbsleb
James Herbsleb
How do software engineers identify and act on their ethical concerns? Past work examines how software practitioners navigate specific ethical principles such as “fairness”, but this narrows the scope of concerns to implementing pre-specified principles. In contrast, we report self-identified ethical concerns of 115 survey respondents and 21 interviewees across five continents and in non-profit, contractor, and non-tech firms. We enumerate their concerns – military, privacy, advertising, surveillance, and the scope of their concerns – from simple bugs to questioning their industry’s entire existence. We illustrate how attempts to resolve concerns are limited by factors such as personal precarity and organizational incentives. We discuss how even relatively powerful software engineers often lacked the power to resolve their ethical concerns. Our results suggest that ethics interventions must expand from helping practitioners merely identify issues to instead helping them build their (collective) power to resolve them, and that tech ethics discussions may consider broadening beyond foci on AI or Big Tech.

1 January 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
SGSireesh Gururaja
Sireesh Gururaja
ABAmanda Bertsch
Amanda Bertsch
CNClara Na
Clara Na
DWDavid Widder
David Widder
ESEmma Strubell
Emma Strubell
Sireesh Gururaja, Amanda Bertsch, Clara Na, David Widder, Emma Strubell. Proceedings of the 2023 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing. 2023.

7 November 2024 in Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
DWDavid Gray Widder
David Gray Widder
LDLaura Dabbish
Laura Dabbish
JHJames D. Herbsleb
James D. Herbsleb
NMNikolas Martelaro
Nikolas Martelaro
Past work has sought to design AI ethics interventions--such as checklists or toolkits--to help practitioners design more ethical AI systems. However, other work demonstrates how these interventions may instead serve to limit critique to that addressed within the intervention, while rendering broader concerns illegitimate. In this paper, drawing on work examining how standards enact discursive closure and how power relations affect whether and how people raise critique, we recruit three corporate teams, and one activist team, each with prior context working with one another, to play a game designed to trigger broad discussion around AI ethics. We use this as a point of contrast to trigger reflection on their teams' past discussions, examining factors which may affect their ''license to critique'' in AI ethics discussions. We then report on how particular affordances of this game may influence discussion, and find that the hypothetical context created in the game is unlikely to be a viable mechanism for real world change. We discuss how power dynamics within a group and notions of ''scope'' affect whether people may be willing to raise critique in AI ethics discussions, and discuss our finding that games are unlikely to enable direct changes to products or practice, but may be more likely to allow members to find critically-aligned allies for future collective action.

3 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DWDavid Gray Widder
David Gray Widder
What counts as legitimate AI ethics labor, and consequently, what are the epistemic terms on which AI ethics claims are rendered legitimate? Based on 75 interviews with technologists including researchers, developers, open source contributors, and activists, this paper explores the various epistemic bases from which AI ethics is discussed and practiced. In the context of outside attacks on AI ethics as an impediment to “progress,” I show how some AI ethics practices have reached toward authority from automation and quantification, and achieved some legitimacy as a result, while those based on richly embodied and situated lived experience have not. This paper draws together the work of feminist Anthropology and Science and Technology Studies scholars Diana Forsythe and Lucy Suchman with the works of postcolonial feminist theorist Sara Ahmed and Black feminist theorist Kristie Dotson to examine the implications of dominant AI ethics practices. By entrenching the epistemic power of quantification, dominant AI ethics practices—employing Model Cards and similar interventions—risk legitimizing AI ethics as a project in equal and opposite measure to which they marginalize lived experience as a legitimate part of the same project. In response, I propose humble technical practices: quantified or technical practices which specifically seek to make their epistemic limits clear in order to flatten hierarchies of epistemic power.