10 June 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
We consider the problem of computing parameters of player cost functionals such that given state and control trajectories constitute an open-loop Nash equilibrium for a noncooperative differential game. We propose two methods for solving this inverse differential game problem and novel conditions under which our methods compute unique cost-functional parameters. Our conditions are analogous to persistence of excitation conditions in adaptive control and parameter estimation. The efficacy of our methods is illustrated in simulations.
27 May 2019 in IEEE Control Systems Letters
This paper addresses the inverse problem of differential games, where the aim is to compute cost functions which lead to observed Nash equilibrium trajectories. The solution of this problem allows the generation of a model for inferring the intent of several agents interacting with each other. We present a method to find all cost functions which lead to the same Nash equilibrium in an infinite-horizon LQ differential game. The approach relies on a reformulation of the coupled matrix Riccati equations which arise out of necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash equilibria. Furthermore, based on our findings, we present an approach to compute a solution given a set of observed state and control trajectories. Our results highlight properties of feedback Nash equilibria in LQ differential games and provide an efficient approach for the estimation of cost function matrices in such a scenario.
1 February 2018 in at - Automatisierungstechnik
In the near future, drivers of automated cars will still have to take over from time to time at short notice. Current control systems implement a hard switch, disabling the automation all at once. However, studies show that the driver’s ability to take over depends on his last activity. We therefore propose a system that uses camera based observation of the driver to assess the situation and to predict transition times. We combine this with a control system that uses a cooperative shared control method to support the driver in takeover situations and allows him to adjust safely to the current situation. We present our first steps towards this goal and show both how the behavior of the driver in the interior can be assessed and how a cooperative control transfer can be implemented. We further point out the necessary steps to implement the proposed system and give a first impression of the performance via simulation.