Guoman She

Guoman She

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Guoman She

National University of Singapore, Singapore 119077

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 November 2021 in The Accounting Review
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GSGuoman She
Guoman She
This paper studies whether and how mandatory nonfinancial disclosure affects firms' real decisions. I exploit a disclosure regulation enacted in California, which mandates that firms disclose how they conduct due diligence to address their suppliers' human rights abuses. I find that treated firms increase their supply chain due diligence, and their suppliers' human rights performance improves following the regulation. The effects are stronger when firms face greater pressure from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and socially conscious shareholders, when customers have greater incentives to use the newly disclosed information, and when the regulation leads to a larger increase in information comparability. Collectively, the results suggest that mandatory nonfinancial disclosure can affect firms' real decisions through market mechanisms and that stakeholder responses play a key role. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G14; G18; G38; J80; K22; K31; K38; L23; M41; M48.

20 February 2020 in Journal of Accounting Research
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TBThomas Bourveau
Thomas Bourveau
GSGuoman She
Guoman She
AŽAlminas Žaldokas
Alminas Žaldokas

20 January 2025 in Review of Accounting Studies
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OEOmri Even-Tov
Omri Even-Tov
GSGuoman She
Guoman She
LWLynn Linghuan Wang
Lynn Linghuan Wang
DYDetian Yang
Detian Yang
This study examines how government procurement impacts firms’ environmental disclosures and whether they have tangible effects. Using a triple-difference research design that exploits the exogenous increase in federal funding allocations to counties based on population census revisions, we find that firms with high exposure to government contracts significantly increase climate disclosure following expanded procurement opportunities. We also document that enhanced disclosure is characterized by a positive tone that emphasizes firms’ green investment and commitment to climate adaptation. The effect is more pronounced in counties with a greater increase in procurement volume and when firms have lower ex ante sustainability performance. Finally, we find firms that increase climate disclosure are more likely to earn government contracts, and they undertake real actions by reducing toxic emissions and enhancing the development of green products. Overall our results suggest government procurement promotes corporate climate responsibility by incentivizing firms to undertake climate mitigation actions.

15 June 2024 in The Accounting Review
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Journal Article
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TBThomas Bourveau
Thomas Bourveau
JKJohn D. Kepler
John D. Kepler
GSGuoman She
Guoman She
LWLynn Linghuan Wang
Lynn Linghuan Wang
We study how vertical integration shapes firms’ public disclosures. Theory suggests that firms can use public disclosure to coordinate with supply chain partners and predicts a substitution between vertical integration and public disclosure of future strategic plans, since the internalization of production reduces the need to publicly coordinate. Using data on the extent of vertical integration, we find that firms that become more vertically integrated reduce their public disclosures about their product strategies and that the reduction is most pronounced for vertically integrated firms with greater internalization of production and those with the largest informational and strategic frictions along the supply chain. JEL Classifications: D83; G14; L14; M41.

11 July 2023 in Journal of Accounting and Economics
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Journal Article
Closed access
YDYiwei Dou
Yiwei Dou
MHMingyi Hung
Mingyi Hung
GSGuoman She
Guoman She
LWLynn Linghuan Wang
Lynn Linghuan Wang

1 November 2025 in Management Science
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XLXuanpu Lin
Xuanpu Lin
GSGuoman She
Guoman She
Regulators have increasingly mandated firms to promptly disclose material cybersecurity incidents upon discovering these incidents. We find suggestive evidence indicating that some firms manipulate the discovery date (“misreport”) of a cybersecurity incident to postpone the disclosure of the incident, as evidenced by a pronounced spike in insider sales before the reported discovery date. We also find that misreporting is more prevalent among firms with weak internal control systems, when firms face low litigation risk, and when firms have greater pressure to meet a disclosure deadline. Further, firms suspected of misreporting tend to disclose their remedial actions and assert the restoration of business, mitigating negative market reactions upon disclosure of incidents. Collectively, our results suggest that firms might strategically misreport information about a cybersecurity incident to delay disclosure to gain additional time for remedial actions, which helps them prevent exposing vulnerabilities to malicious actors and alleviate stakeholder anxiety. This paper was accepted by Eric So, accounting. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01058 .