Research has shown a correlation between votes for populist parties and the belief that vaccines are not important or effective. More recent investigations in the United States and France have similarly shown that attitudes toward the COVID‐19 vaccine have been politicized. In this article, we show a similar pattern analyzing survey data from Norway, a country relatively mildly hit by the pandemic and characterized by high trust and a consensual political culture. We find that refusal to vaccinate is associated with right‐wing ideological constraint, even when considering a wide array of control variables (e.g., lack of confidence, complacency), and sociodemographic characteristics. The results imply that vaccine refusal latch onto established political cleavages, particularly among the most ideologically consistent. Thus, polarization in the form of increasing ideological constraint may represent a mounting challenge for vaccine uptake, suggesting that vaccine communication should go beyond “explaining the science” and factor in ideology.
Acts of terror lead to both a rise of an extended sense of fear that goes beyond the physical location of the attacks and to increased expressions of online hate. In this longitudinal study, we analyzed dynamics between the exposure to online hate and the fear of terrorism after the Paris attacks in November 13, 2015. We hypothesized that exposure to online hate is connected to a perceived Zeitgeist of fear (i.e., collective fear). In turn, the perceived Zeitgeist of fear is related to higher personal fear of terrorism both immediately after the attacks and a year later. Hypotheses were tested using path modeling and panel data (N = 2325) from Norway, Finland, Spain, France, and the United States a few weeks after the Paris attacks in November 2015 and again a year later in January 2017. With the exception of Norway, exposure to online hate had a positive association with the perceived Zeitgeist of fear in all our samples. The Zeitgeist of fear was correlated with higher personal fear of terrorism immediately after the attacks and one year later. We conclude that online hate content can contribute to the extended sense of fear after the terrorist attacks by skewing perceptions of social climate.
12 May 2023 in Journal of Information Technology & Politics
This study examines the role of digital media in civic and political engagement, specifically the respective roles of websites vs. social media in relation to volunteering. The study uses four-country (United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada) survey data collected in 2019 and 2021 (n = 12,359). For both types of volunteering, we find that organizations’ websites are more strongly correlated with volunteering compared to following organizations on social media. We replicate this finding across multiple countries, two types of analysis, and volunteering for civic and political organizations. Our findings suggest that the informational role of websites is of greater importance than the creation of quasi-membership ties inherent to social media when it comes to mobilizing volunteers. However, engaging in both online activities has the strongest relationship with volunteering, suggesting a need for multi-method communication strategy. This finding is important with respect to developing communication strategies in civic and political groups.
1 January 2009 in International Journal of Sports Marketing and Sponsorship
This article analyses how different configurations of stakeholders create opportunities for the production of popular TV sports contests. Based on qualitative methodologies, biathlon and cross-country skiing are used as contrasting cases. The paper concludes that the relative success of the International Biathlon Union is due to a favourable network position in relation to stakeholders. By comparison, the International Ski Federation suffers from a weak position within a dense stakeholder network.
7 November 2019 in International Journal of Public Opinion Research
Using Norwegian survey experiments (N = 1,541), we examined the relationship between Islamist terrorist threats and trust in out-groups, focusing on how this relationship was conditioned by the “motivation to control prejudice” (MCP) and emotions of anxiety. After exposure to a news story describing an Islamist threat scenario, the treatment group reported higher levels of trust in out-groups than the control group. High levels of MCP were linked to higher levels of trust; anxiety played an ambiguous role. Although anxiety had a strong negative effect on trust in out-groups, the positive effect of MCP increased with rising anxiety levels, thus making the people who were most scared also more trusting. Activation of social norms may, thus, bolster distrust.
In this article, we explore the often-overlooked concept of autonomy among influencers. We define influencer autonomy as the sense of control and self-governing freedom that influencers perceive in their everyday life and work. Based on in-depth interviews with 28 Norwegian influencers, influencer managers, and legacy media experts working with influencers, our research uncovers a complex interplay between influencers’ sense of autonomy and restraints emanating from their social environment. We argue that influencer autonomy is at the same time enabled and restricted by three structures: cultural norms, technological algorithms, and economic management. Understanding the space for autonomy within these structures is, we contend, crucial for deciphering power within the influencer industry. Our findings reveal that while influencer autonomy is always limited and partial, it remains a compelling narrative.