Zeyu Yang

Zeyu Yang

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Zeyu Yang

Singapore University of Technology and Design

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
26 November 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PCPeng Cheng
Peng Cheng
ZYZeyu Yang
Zeyu Yang
JCJiming Chen
Jiming Chen
YQYifei Qi
Yifei Qi
LSLing Shi
Ling Shi
Security issues in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) have gained increasing attention in recent years due to the importance and unavoidable vulnerability of CPSs. This paper focuses on designing an intelligent online attack, which can compromise a sensor, eavesdrop measurements and inject false feedback information, against remote state estimation. From the viewpoint of the attacker, we design an event-based attack strategy to degrade the estimation quality with arbitrary communication rate constraint. The approximate minimum mean-squared error estimation algorithm at the attacker side is derived under a Gaussian assumption. Furthermore, the relation between the attack threshold and the scheduling threshold is obtained in a closed form. We show the mean-squared stability condition of the estimation is weakened under the attack. Two examples are provided to demonstrate the main results.

28 May 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YXYawen Xue
Yawen Xue
JPJie Pan
Jie Pan
GYGeng Yang Yang
Geng Yang Yang
ZYZeyu Yang
Zeyu Yang
MLMengxiang Liu
Mengxiang Liu
RDRuilong Deng
Ruilong Deng
Industrial control systems (ICSs) are becoming increasingly interconnected as the rapid convergence of information technology (IT) and operation technology (OT) networks, and meanwhile massive attack surfaces have been exposed. However, traditional intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are difficult to be directly deployed in ICSs due to the hard real-time requirement and rare patching chance. Besides, the design of effective and practical IDSs is hampered by the lack of benchmarking ICS cybersecurity datasets. To bridge the gaps, this paper makes the first attempt by open-sourcing the developed ICS cybersecurity datasets and proposing a decision fusion based real-time IDS. Firstly, we design a customized cybersecurity dataset in a full-hardware and high-fidelity platform, including 7 types of cyber threats tailored for ICSs. The collected dataset includes network traffic, sensor readings, actuator status, and system parameters, providing the state-of-the-art benchmark dataset for ICSs consisting of cross-layer characteristics. Furthermore, we design an online decision fusion-based IDS by strategically integrating 4 widely-used machine learning models. The proposed IDS is deployed on a real-time running ethanol distillation, surpassing the performance of single detection models in terms of precision and F1-score, which substantially enhances intrusion detection accuracy and cybersecurity of ICS.

4 April 2022 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZYZeyu Yang
Zeyu Yang
LHLiang He
Liang He
HYHua Yu
Hua Yu
CZChengcheng Zhao
Chengcheng Zhao
PCPeng Cheng
Peng Cheng
JCJiming Chen
Jiming Chen
Programmable logic controllers (PLCs), i.e., the core of control systems, are well-known to be vulnerable to a variety of cyber attacks. To mitigate this issue, we design PLC-Sleuth , a novel noninvasive intrusion detection/localization system for PLCs, which is built on a set of control invariants—i.e., the correlations between sensor readings and the concomitantly triggered PLC commands—that exist pervasively in all control systems. Specifically, taking the system’s supervisory control and data acquisition log as input, PLC-Sleuth abstracts/identifies the system’s control invariants as a control graph using data-driven structure learning, and then monitors the weights of graph edges to detect anomalies thereof, which is in turn, a sign of intrusion. We have implemented and evaluated PLC-Sleuth using both a platform of ethanol distillation system (EDS) and a realistically simulated Tennessee Eastman (TE) process. The results show that PLC-Sleuth can: 1) identify control invariants with 100%/98.11% accuracy for EDS/TE; 2) detect PLC intrusions with 98.33%/0.85 ‰ true/false positives (TPs/FPs) for EDS and 100%/0% TP/FP for TE; and 3) localize intrusions with 93.22%/96.76% accuracy for EDS/TE.

4 December 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JMJie Meng
Jie Meng
ZYZeyu Yang
Zeyu Yang
ZZZhenyong Zhang
Zhenyong Zhang
GYGeng Yang Yang
Geng Yang Yang
RDRuilong Deng
Ruilong Deng
JZJianying Zhou
Jianying Zhou
Programmable logic controllers (PLCs), the essential components of critical infrastructure, play a crucial role in various industrial manufacturing processes. Recent attack events show that attackers have a strong interest in tampering with the controller variables, such as the device status and internal program logic. A typical attack strategy is that the attackers just send malicious network traffic of industrial control protocols (ICPs) to change the controller variables of PLCs. To defend against this attack, a lot of countermeasures have been proposed to detect anomalies in network traffic based on the semantic analysis. However, the proprietary nature of ICPs poses a challenge to extracting the required semantics for evaluating the controller variables. In this paper, we propose a novel framework named SePanner to extract the semantics of controller variables from proprietary ICPs based on network traffic. Specifically, SePanner conducts the multi-state comparison to locate the semantic fields directly, then removes the interfering fields by the single-state comparison and filtering criteria. Our experiments demonstrate that SePanner can precisely extract the semantics of controller variables from proprietary ICPs, providing protection for PLCs while remaining compatible with various proprietary binary protocols.

9 April 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZYZeyu Yang
Zeyu Yang
LHLiang He
Liang He
PCPeng Cheng
Peng Cheng
JCJiming Chen
Jiming Chen
Stealthy attacks manipulate the operation of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) without being undetected, allowing persistent manipulation of system operation and thus the potential to cause destructive damage. This paper introduces a new vulnerability of ICS that can be exploited to mount stealthy attacks without requiring any domain knowledge. This vulnerability is caused by a common practice in system monitoring, i.e., the SCADA monitors ICS operation at a much lower frequency than system execution, causing a loss of precision when the SCADA tries to cross-validate the issued control commands using the collected sensory data. Exploiting this vulnerability, an attack called PLC-SAGE is designed to stealthily manipulate the system operation by identifying and injecting malicious control commands that will not be concluded as abnormal by the SCADA. This paper further discusses a preferred ICS engineering practice and an attestation strategy to mitigate the above vulnerability and protect ICS from PLC-SAGE . Both PLC-SAGE and the proposed mitigations have been experimentally validated on two ICS platforms.

30 July 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZYZeyu Yang
Zeyu Yang
LHLiang He
Liang He
YRYucheng Ruan
Yucheng Ruan
PCPeng Cheng
Peng Cheng
JCJiming Chen
Jiming Chen
The security risk of semantic attacks to Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) is increasing. Semantic attacks manipulate targeted system modules by identifying the physical semantics of variables in Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) programs, i.e., the sensing/actuating modules represented by the variables, which is usually and inefficiently achieved via manual examination of system documents and long-term observation of system behavior. In this paper, we design ARES , a method that A utomatically R everse E ngineers the S emantics of variables in PLC programs without requiring any domain knowledge. ARES is built on the fact that the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system monitors the behavior of PLC using a fixed mapping between the variables of program code and data log, and the data log variables are marked with physical semantics. By identifying the mapping between PLC code and SCADA data (i.e., the code-data mapping), ARES reverse engineers the physical semantics of program variables. ARES also sheds light on the preferred defense strategies in implementing control rules that improve the resistance of PLC programs to semantic attacks, as well as in detecting and responding to semantics attacks in real time. We have experimentally evaluated ARES and the recommended defending practices on two ICS platforms.