Dudi Nassi

Dudi Nassi

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Dudi Nassi

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Be'er Sheva, Israel

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15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
BNBen Nassi
Ben Nassi
OVOfek Vayner
Ofek Vayner
EIEtay Iluz
Etay Iluz
DNDudi Nassi
Dudi Nassi
JJJan Jancar
Jan Jancar
YEYuval Elovici
Yuval Elovici
Although power LEDs have been integrated in various devices that perform cryptographic operations for decades, the cryptanalysis risk they pose has not yet been investigated. In this paper, we present optical cryptanalysis, a new form of cryptanalytic side-channel attack, in which secret keys are extracted by using a photodiode to measure the light emitted by a device's power LED and analyzing subtle fluctuations in the light intensity during cryptographic operations. We analyze the optical leakage of power LEDs of various consumer devices and the factors that affect the optical SNR. We then demonstrate end-to-end optical cryptanalytic attacks against a range of consumer devices (smartphone, smartcard, and Raspberry Pi, along with their USB peripherals) and recover secret keys (RSA, ECDSA, SIKE) from prior and recent versions of popular cryptographic libraries (GnuPG, Libgcrypt, PQCrypto-SIDH) from a maximum distance of 25 meters.