Sazzadur Rahaman

Sazzadur Rahaman

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Sazzadur Rahaman

University of Arizona, Tucson, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 November 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
SRSazzadur Rahaman
Sazzadur Rahaman
GWGang Wang
Gang Wang
DYDanfeng (Daphne) Yao
Danfeng (Daphne) Yao
The massive payment card industry (PCI) involves various entities such as merchants, issuer banks, acquirer banks, and card brands. Ensuring security for all entities that process payment card information is a challenging task. The PCI Security Standards Council requires all entities to be compliant with the PCI Data Security Standard (DSS), which specifies a series of security requirements. However, little is known regarding how well PCI DSS is enforced in practice. In this paper, we take a measurement approach to systematically evaluate the PCI DSS certification process for e-commerce websites. We develop an e-commerce web application testbed, Bug-gyCart, which can flexibly add or remove 35 PCI DSS related vulnerabilities. Then we use the testbed to examine the capability and limitations of PCI scanners and the rigor of the certification process. We find that there is an alarming gap between the security standard and its real-world enforcement. None of the 6 PCI scanners we tested are fully compliant with the PCI scanning guidelines, issuing certificates to merchants that still have major vulnerabilities. To further examine the compliance status of real-world e-commerce websites, we build a new lightweight scanning tool named Pci-CheckerLite and scan 1,203 e-commerce websites across various business sectors. The results confirm that 86% of the websites have at least one PCI DSS violation that should have disqualified them as non-compliant. Our in-depth accuracy analysis also shows that PciCheckerLite's output is more precise than w3af. We reached out to the PCI Security Council to share our research results to improve the enforcement in practice.

2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
EKEaston Kelso
Easton Kelso
ASAnanta Soneji
Ananta Soneji
SRSazzadur Rahaman
Sazzadur Rahaman
YSYan Shoshitaishvili
Yan Shoshitaishvili
RHRakibul Hasan
Rakibul Hasan
The education technology (EdTech) landscape is expanding rapidly in higher education institutes (HEIs). This growth brings enormous complexity. Protecting the extensive data collected by these tools is crucial for HEIs as data breaches and misuses can have dire security and privacy consequences for the data subjects, particularly students, who are often compelled to use these tools. This urges an in-depth understanding of HEI and EdTech vendor dynamics, which is largely understudied. To address this gap, we conducted a semi-structured interview study with 13 participants who are in EdTech leadership roles at seven HEIs. Our study uncovers the EdTech acquisition process in the HEI context, the consideration of security and privacy issues throughout that process, the pain points of HEI personnel in establishing adequate protection mechanisms in service contracts, and their struggle in holding vendors accountable due to a lack of visibility into their system and power-asymmetry, among other reasons. We discuss certain observations about the status quo and conclude with recommendations for HEIs, researchers, and regulatory bodies to improve the situation.

27 August 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SRSazzadur Rahaman
Sazzadur Rahaman
HCHaipeng Cai
Haipeng Cai
OCOmar Haider Chowdhury
Omar Haider Chowdhury
DYDanfeng Daphne Yao
Danfeng Daphne Yao
Cryptographic protocols are often expected to be provably secure. However, this security guarantee often falls short in practice due to various implementation flaws. We propose a new paradigm called cryptographic program analysis (CPA) which prescribes the use of program analysis to detect these implementation flaws at compile time. The principal insight of the CPA is that many of these flaws in cryptographic implementations can be mapped to the violation of meta-level properties of implementations. A program property that is necessary to realize a cryptographic property is referred to as meta-level property. We show that violations of these meta-level properties can be identified at compile-time that can serve as sufficient evidence of the encompassing flaws. We investigated existing literature on cryptographic implementation flaws and derived 25 corresponding meta-level properties. We develop a specification language based on deterministic finite automaton (DFA) and show that most of the meta-level properties can be expressed in our language. We also develop a tool called TAINTCRYPT which uses static taint analysis to identify meta-level property violations of C/C++ cryptographic implementations at compile-time. We demonstrate the efficacy of TAINTCRYPT by analyzing various open-source applications and libraries. Our experimental analysis generated new security insights and also indicates the scalability of our approach.

12 July 2024 in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JCJesse Chen
Jesse Chen
DADharun Anandayuvaraj
Dharun Anandayuvaraj
JDJames C. Davis
James C. Davis
SRSazzadur Rahaman
Sazzadur Rahaman
Cybersecurity concerns of Internet of Things (IoT) devices and infrastructure are growing each year. In response, organizations worldwide have published IoT security guidelines to protect their citizens and customers by providing recommendations on the development and operation of IoT systems. While these guidelines are being adopted, e.g . by US federal contractors, their content and merits have not been critically examined. Specifically, we do not know what topics and recommendations they cover and their effectiveness at preventing real-world IoT failures. In this paper, we address these gaps through a qualitative study of guidelines. We collect 142 IoT cybersecurity guidelines and sample them for recommendations until reaching saturation at 25 guidelines. From the resulting 958 unique recommendations, we iteratively develop a hierarchical taxonomy following grounded theory coding principles and study the guidelines’ comprehensiveness. In addition, we evaluate the actionability and specificity of each recommendation and match recommendations to CVEs and security failures in the news they can prevent. We report that: (1) Each guideline has gaps in its topic coverage and comprehensiveness; (2) 87.2% recommendations are actionable and 38.7% recommendations can prevent specific threats; and (3) although the union of the guidelines mitigates all 17 of the failures from our news stories corpus, 21% of the CVEs evade the guidelines. In summary, we report shortcomings in each guideline’s depth and breadth, but as a whole they address major security issues.

25 April 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
EKEaston Kelso
Easton Kelso
ASAnanta Soneji
Ananta Soneji
SNSyed Zami-Ul-Haque Navid
Syed Zami-Ul-Haque Navid
YSYan Shoshitaishvili
Yan Shoshitaishvili
SRSazzadur Rahaman
Sazzadur Rahaman
RHRakibul Hasan
Rakibul Hasan

19 June 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TFTanner Finken
Tanner Finken
JCJesse Chen
Jesse Chen
SRSazzadur Rahaman
Sazzadur Rahaman
Protests are public expressions of personal or collective discontent with the current state of affairs. Although traditional protests involve in-person events, the ubiquity of computers and software opened up a new avenue for activism: protestware. While news and media heavily report individual protestware as discovered, an in-depth understanding of how they impact the open-source software supply chain is largely missing. In particular, we do not have a detailed understanding of their characteristics and impact on the open-source community who rely on free contributions. To address this gap, we first collect 163 samples of libraries that are either modified (protestware) or created (which we call protestware enablers ) with a clear intention to protest. In addition, we analyze the aftermath of the protestware, which has the potential to affect the software supply chain in terms of community sentiment and usage. We report that: (1) protestware has three notable characteristics, namely, i) the way protests are induced is diverse, ii) the altered functionality can be discriminatory, and iii) the transparency ( i.e. reporting the change for protest) is not always respected; (2) disruptive protestware may cause a substantial adverse impact on downstream users; (3) developers of protestware may not shift their beliefs even with pushback; (4) the usage of protestware from JavaScript libraries has been seen to generally increase over time. [Content Warning: This paper contains aggressive and derogatory language in the form of examples from GitHub user comments, which some might find unsettling.]