27 August 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Cryptographic protocols are often expected to be provably secure. However, this security guarantee often falls short in practice due to various implementation flaws. We propose a new paradigm called cryptographic program analysis (CPA) which prescribes the use of program analysis to detect these implementation flaws at compile time. The principal insight of the CPA is that many of these flaws in cryptographic implementations can be mapped to the violation of meta-level properties of implementations. A program property that is necessary to realize a cryptographic property is referred to as meta-level property. We show that violations of these meta-level properties can be identified at compile-time that can serve as sufficient evidence of the encompassing flaws. We investigated existing literature on cryptographic implementation flaws and derived 25 corresponding meta-level properties. We develop a specification language based on deterministic finite automaton (DFA) and show that most of the meta-level properties can be expressed in our language. We also develop a tool called TAINTCRYPT which uses static taint analysis to identify meta-level property violations of C/C++ cryptographic implementations at compile-time. We demonstrate the efficacy of TAINTCRYPT by analyzing various open-source applications and libraries. Our experimental analysis generated new security insights and also indicates the scalability of our approach.
12 July 2024 in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
Cybersecurity concerns of Internet of Things (IoT) devices and infrastructure are growing each year. In response, organizations worldwide have published IoT security guidelines to protect their citizens and customers by providing recommendations on the development and operation of IoT systems. While these guidelines are being adopted, e.g . by US federal contractors, their content and merits have not been critically examined. Specifically, we do not know what topics and recommendations they cover and their effectiveness at preventing real-world IoT failures. In this paper, we address these gaps through a qualitative study of guidelines. We collect 142 IoT cybersecurity guidelines and sample them for recommendations until reaching saturation at 25 guidelines. From the resulting 958 unique recommendations, we iteratively develop a hierarchical taxonomy following grounded theory coding principles and study the guidelines’ comprehensiveness. In addition, we evaluate the actionability and specificity of each recommendation and match recommendations to CVEs and security failures in the news they can prevent. We report that: (1) Each guideline has gaps in its topic coverage and comprehensiveness; (2) 87.2% recommendations are actionable and 38.7% recommendations can prevent specific threats; and (3) although the union of the guidelines mitigates all 17 of the failures from our news stories corpus, 21% of the CVEs evade the guidelines. In summary, we report shortcomings in each guideline’s depth and breadth, but as a whole they address major security issues.
19 June 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
Protests are public expressions of personal or collective discontent with the current state of affairs. Although traditional protests involve in-person events, the ubiquity of computers and software opened up a new avenue for activism: protestware. While news and media heavily report individual protestware as discovered, an in-depth understanding of how they impact the open-source software supply chain is largely missing. In particular, we do not have a detailed understanding of their characteristics and impact on the open-source community who rely on free contributions. To address this gap, we first collect 163 samples of libraries that are either modified (protestware) or created (which we call protestware enablers ) with a clear intention to protest. In addition, we analyze the aftermath of the protestware, which has the potential to affect the software supply chain in terms of community sentiment and usage. We report that: (1) protestware has three notable characteristics, namely, i) the way protests are induced is diverse, ii) the altered functionality can be discriminatory, and iii) the transparency ( i.e. reporting the change for protest) is not always respected; (2) disruptive protestware may cause a substantial adverse impact on downstream users; (3) developers of protestware may not shift their beliefs even with pushback; (4) the usage of protestware from JavaScript libraries has been seen to generally increase over time. [Content Warning: This paper contains aggressive and derogatory language in the form of examples from GitHub user comments, which some might find unsettling.]