31 October 2015 in Strategic Management Journal
JSJan‐Benedict E. M. Steenkamp
Jan‐Benedict E. M. Steenkamp
27 November 2020 in Administrative Science Quarterly
Recent research on start-up accelerators has drawn attention to the central importance of social resource exchange among peers for entrepreneurial success. But such peer relationships contain both cooperative and competitive elements, making accelerators a prime example of a mixed-motive context in which successful generalized exchange—unilateral giving without expectations of direct reciprocity—is not a given. In our ethnographic study of a Silicon Valley accelerator, we sought to explore how generalized exchange emerges and evolves over time. Employing an abductive, sequential mixed-methods approach, we develop a process model that helps explain how a system of generalized exchange may or may not emerge. At the core of this model are the interaction rituals within social events that come to create distinct exchange expectations, which are either aligned or incompatible with generalized exchange, resulting in fulfilled or failed exchanges in subsequent encounters. Whereas fulfilled exchanges can kickstart virtuous exchange dynamics and a thriving generalized exchange system, failed exchanges trigger vicious exchange dynamics and an unstable social order. These findings bring clarity to the puzzle of how some generalized exchange systems overcome the social dilemma in mixed-motive contexts by highlighting the central role of alignment between structure and process.
1 July 2021 in Resources, Conservation and Recycling
26 March 2026 in Organization Studies
Trust has been recognized as a foundational pillar underpinning the functioning of organizations and society. However, contemporary developments have unleashed unprecedented uncertainty, challenging established notions of social order and raising urgent questions about how trust will operate in the years to come. A deeper understanding of the interface between uncertainty and trust is needed, elaborating how institutions and advanced technologies offer pathways for building and maintaining trust. Our analysis identifies three core paradoxes: trust–uncertainty, trust–institution, and trust–technology. These paradoxes highlight that trust proves indispensable where it is hardest to build, that trusted institutions falter when uncertainty is high and they are needed most, and that technologies designed to reduce uncertainty can in fact increase it. This special issue curates five studies that illuminate these paradoxes. A qualitative study of whistleblowing reveals tensions in how organizations signal ability, benevolence, integrity, transparency, and identification across stakeholders and over time (trust–uncertainty). A mixed‑methods study of a high court theorizes fidelity mechanisms—recognition, selection, socialization—that stabilize the production of “trust objects” (trust–institution). A multilevel network analysis of a corporate top‑management team shows that shared organizational vocabularies foster trust; when those words align with organizational identity, trust ties traverse unit boundaries (trust–institution). A study of a Covid‑19 mutual‑aid platform shows how digital affordances catalyze institution‑based trust that seeds emotional trust among strangers (trust–technology). Finally, a study of a peer‑to‑peer market shows that accreditation (technology verification) and reputation have opposite effects as cultural distance grows—accreditation narrows trust gaps while reputation can widen them—with implications for inequality (trust–technology). Building on these insights, our editorial articulates across the piece a forward-looking research agenda emphasizing the recursive interplay between trust and uncertainty and calling for research to illuminate the emergent, paradoxical, and often nonlinear patterns of trust development.
29 April 2009 in Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences / Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l'Administration
1 September 2022 in Strategy Science
This paper asks what motivates new chief executive officers (CEOs) to engage in an acquisition spree despite the considerable risk it entails to themselves and their firms. Building on status theory and performance feedback theory, we theorized that status distance between new CEOs and their predecessors explains the empire-building behavior of new CEOs early in their tenure. Because of the uncertainty surrounding a CEO’s quality early in the individual’s tenure, status serves as a signal of quality for the new CEO. Hence, CEOs had to rely on status signals to maintain or close the status gap between them and their predecessors. Drawing on performance feedback theory, we theorized that new CEOs’ status contrast relative to their predecessor influences their acquisitive behavior. Our examination of the acquisition behavior of 429 new CEOs of S&P 500 firms in the United States revealed that relatively low-status CEOs engaged in risk-taking to improve their status, but relatively high-status new CEOs engaged in risk-taking to maintain their lead. It also revealed that new CEOs changed their risk-taking behavior when direct evidence of their quality or that of their predecessors deviated from the underlying quality expectations indicated by their relative status position.