Ricarda Ines Schubotz

Ricarda Ines Schubotz

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Ricarda Ines Schubotz

Department of Psychology, University of Münster, Fliednerstraße 21, 48149 Münster, Germany; Otto Creutzfeldt Center for Cognitive and Behavioural Neuroscience, University of Münster, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

34Years (1993-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2010 in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
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Journal Article
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ABAndreja Bubic
Andreja Bubic
DCD Yves von Cramon
D Yves von Cramon
RSRicarda I Schubotz
Ricarda I Schubotz
The term “predictive brain” depicts one of the most relevant concepts in cognitive neuroscience which emphasizes the importance of “looking into the future”, namely prediction, preparation, anticipation, prospection or expectations in various cognitive domains. Analogously, it has been suggested that predictive processing represents one of the fundamental principles of neural computations and that errors of prediction may be crucial for driving neural and cognitive processes as well as behavior. This review discusses research areas which have recognized the importance of prediction and introduces the relevant terminology and leading theories in the field in an attempt to abstract some generative mechanisms of predictive processing. Furthermore, we discuss the process of testing the validity of postulated expectations by matching these to the realized events and compare the subsequent processing of events which confirm to those which violate the initial predictions. We conclude by suggesting that, although a lot is known about this type of processing, there are still many open issues which need to be resolved before a unified theory of predictive processing can be postulated with regard to both cognitive and neural functioning.

24 June 2014 in Frontiers in Psychology
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RSRicarda I. Schubotz
Ricarda I. Schubotz
MWMoritz F. Wurm
Moritz F. Wurm
MWMarco K. Wittmann
Marco K. Wittmann
DCD. Yves von Cramon
D. Yves von Cramon
Objects are reminiscent of actions often performed with them: knife and apple remind us on peeling the apple or cutting it. Mnemonic representations of object-related actions (action codes) evoked by the sight of an object may constrain and hence facilitate recognition of unrolling actions. The present fMRI study investigated if and how action codes influence brain activation during action observation. The average number of action codes (NAC) of 51 sets of objects was rated by a group of n=24 participants. In an fMRI study, different volunteers were asked to recognize actions performed with the same objects presented in short videos. To disentangle areas reflecting the storage of action codes from those exploiting them, we showed object-compatible and object-incompatible (pantomime) actions. Areas storing action codes were considered to positively co-vary with NAC in both object-compatible and object-incompatible action; due to its role in tool-related tasks, we here hypothesized left anterior inferior parietal cortex (aIPL). In contrast, areas exploiting action codes were expected to show this correlation only in object-compatible but not incompatible action, as only object-compatible actions match one of the active action codes. For this interaction, we hypothesized ventrolateral premotor cortex (PMv) to join aIPL due to its role in biasing competition in IPL. We found left anterior intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and left posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG) to co-vary with NAC. In addition to these areas, action codes increased activity in object-compatible action in bilateral PMv, right IPS, and lateral occipital cortex (LO). Findings suggest that during action observation, the brain derives possible actions from perceived objects, and uses this information to shape action recognition. In particular, the number of expectable actions quantifies the activity level at PMv, IPL, and pMTG, but only PMv reflects their biased competition while observed action unfolds.

1 July 2012 in NeuroImage
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Journal Article
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RSRicarda I. Schubotz
Ricarda I. Schubotz
FKFranziska M. Korb
Franziska M. Korb
ASAnne-Marike Schiffer
Anne-Marike Schiffer
WSWaltraud Stadler
Waltraud Stadler
DCD. Yves von Cramon
D. Yves von Cramon

1 January 2006 in Cortex
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Journal Article
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RSRicarda I. Schubotz
Ricarda I. Schubotz
CFChristian J. Fiebach
Christian J. Fiebach

16 March 2012 in Human Brain Mapping
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Journal Article
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ASAnne‐Marike Schiffer
Anne‐Marike Schiffer
CAChristiane Ahlheim
Christiane Ahlheim
KUKirstin Ulrichs
Kirstin Ulrichs
RSRicarda I. Schubotz
Ricarda I. Schubotz
Repeated experiences with an event create the expectation that subsequent events will expose an analog structure. These spontaneous expectations rely on an internal model of the event that results from learning. But what happens when events change? Do experience‐based internal models get adapted instantaneously, or is model adaptation a function of the solidity of, i.e., familiarity with, the corresponding internal model? The present fMRI study investigated the effects of model solidity on model adaptation in an action observation paradigm. Subjects were made acquainted with a set of action movies that displayed an altered script when encountered again in the scanning session. We found model adaptation to result in an attenuation of the premotor‐parietal network for action observation. Model solidity was found to modulate activation in the parahippocampal gyrus and the anterior cerebellar lobules, where increased solidity correlated with activity increase. Finally, the comparison between early and late stages of learning indicated an effect of model solidity on adaptation rate. This contrast revealed the involvement of a fronto‐mesial network of Brodmann area 10 and the ACC in those states of learning that were signified by high model solidity, no matter if the memorized original or the altered action model was the more solid component. Findings suggest that the revision of an internal model is dependent on its familiarity. Unwarranted adaptations, but also perseverations may thus be prevented. Hum Brain Mapp, 2013.

1 October 2015 in Neuropsychologia
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Journal Article
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ASAnna R. Schönberger
Anna R. Schönberger
KHKlara Hagelweide
Klara Hagelweide
EPEsther A. Pelzer
Esther A. Pelzer
GFGereon R. Fink
Gereon R. Fink
RSRicarda I. Schubotz
Ricarda I. Schubotz