University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (UTRGV) (Formerly University of Texas-Pan American) - Economics and Finance; Department of Economics and Finance, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
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Jean-Baptiste Tondji
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (UTRGV) (Formerly University of Texas-Pan American) - Economics and Finance; Department of Economics and Finance, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
How does justice affect individual incentives and efficiency in a political economy? We show that elementary principles of distributive justice guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing contract whereby agents non-cooperatively choose their inputs and derive utility from their pay. Chief among these principles is that your pay should not depend on your name, and a more productive individual should not earn less. We generalize our analysis to incorporate inclusivity, ensuring basic pay to unproductive agents, implemented through progressive taxation and redistribution. Our findings show that without redistribution, any self-enforcing agreement may be inefficient, but a minimal level of redistribution guarantees the existence of an efficient agreement. Our model has several applications and interpretations. In addition to highlighting the structure of economies and organizations in which fairness and efficiency are compatible, we develop an application to the formation of rent-seeking political alliances under the threat of fake news.
We develop a model of optimal lockdown policy for a social planner who balances population health with short-term wealth accumulation. The unique solution depends on tolerable infection incidence and social network structure. We then use unique data on nursing home networks in the US to calibrate the model and quantify state-level preference for prioritizing health over wealth. We also empirically validate simulation results derived from comparative statics analyses. Our findings suggest that policies that tolerate more virus spread (laissez-faire) increase state GDP growth and COVID-19 deaths in nursing homes. The detrimental effects of laissez-faire policies are more potent for nursing homes that are more peripheral in networks, nursing homes in poorer counties, and nursing homes that operate on a for-profit basis. We also find that US states with Republican governors have a higher tolerable incidence level, but these policies tend to converge with a high death count.
13 October 2022 in European Journal of Operational Research
We study the Shapley wage function, a wage scheme in which a worker's pay depends both on the number of hours worked and on the output of the firm. We then prov