We examine the relation between the cost of debt financing and a governance index that contains various antitakeover and shareholder protection provisions. Using firm-level data from the Investors Research Responsibility Center for the period 1990–2000, we find that antitakeover governance provisions lower the cost of debt financing. Segmenting the data into firms with the strongest management rights (strongest antitakeover provisions) and firms with the strongest shareholder rights (weakest antitakeover provisions), we find that strong antitakeover provisions are associated with a lower cost of debt financing while weak antitakeover provisions are associated with a higher cost of debt financing, with a difference of about 34 basis points between the two groups. Overall, the results suggest that antitakeover governance provisions, although not beneficial to stockholders, are viewed favorably in the bond market.
Using a new measure of shareholder inattention constructed from exogenous industry shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that firms with distracted shareholders are associated with a higher cost of debt. This effect is stronger for firms with more powerful CEOs, firms with higher information asymmetry, and those operating in less competitive product markets. Further testing suggests that the inattention-cost of debt relation is driven primarily by dual holders directly observing shareholder distraction. Our results are robust to controlling for inattention at the retail investor level and to other external monitors, including credit rating agencies, financial analysts, and Big 4 auditors. Overall, our evidence suggests that institutional shareholder inattention has an incrementally negative effect on bond pricing. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4593 .
Financial institutions and academic researchers utilize bank - ruptcy prediction models to assess distress risk. However, predicting default can be problematic since 1) few firms actually experience default in any one year, 2) the lag between practical and actual default can vary significantly, 3) firms can strategically default, 4) firms can rework their obligations outside of bankruptcy, and 5) default frequency varies significantly over economic life cycles. Thus, relying on bankruptcy data alone to calibrate and validate these models can be problematic. In this article, the authors take an alternative approach by relying on the firm’s cost of debt as a market proxy for risk. They assess the validity of four widely used distress measures including two accounting-based models (Altman’s Z-Score and Ohlson’s O-Score), one reduced-form model (by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, CHS), and one structural distance to default model (Merton-DD). The authors find dramatically different assessment of risk based ...
30 January 2025 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
We identify a new mechanism of opportunistic insider trading linked to attention-driven mispricing. Insiders are more likely to sell their company’s stock during periods of heightened retail attention and more inclined to buy when attention diminishes. The results are particularly pronounced for lottery-type stocks and firms with substantial retail ownership. We demonstrate that our findings—which relate to indicators of mispricing, retail order imbalances, and Robinhood herding episodes—extend to seasoned equity issuances and cannot be solely explained by firm fundamentals. Attention-based insider trading is less likely to result in SEC enforcement actions and persists across different regulatory regimes.