Anna Bogomolnaia

Anna Bogomolnaia

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Anna Bogomolnaia

Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, United Kingdom; and Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 75647 Paris, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

22Years (2005-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2015 in Journal of Economic Theory
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Journal Article
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ABAnna Bogomolnaia
Anna Bogomolnaia

1 February 2022 in Management Science
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ABAnna Bogomolnaia
Anna Bogomolnaia
HMHervé Moulin
Hervé Moulin
FSFedor Sandomirskiy
Fedor Sandomirskiy
Ann likes oranges much more than apples; Bob likes apples much more than oranges. Tomorrow they will receive one fruit that will be an orange or an apple with equal probability. Giving one half to each agent is fair for each realization of the fruit. However, agreeing that whatever fruit appears will go to the agent who likes it more gives a higher expected utility to each agent and is fair in the average sense: in expectation, each agent prefers the allocation to the equal division of the fruit; that is, the agent gets a fair share. We turn this familiar observation into an economic design problem: upon drawing a random object (the fruit), we learn the realized utility of each agent and can compare it to the mean of the agent’s distribution of utilities; no other statistical information about the distribution is available. We fully characterize the division rules using only this sparse information in the most efficient possible way while giving everyone a fair share. Although the probability distribution of individual utilities is arbitrary and mostly unknown to the manager, these rules perform in the same range as the best rule when the manager has full access to this distribution. This paper was accepted by Ilia Tsetlin, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

1 February 2023 in Mathematics of Operations Research
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ABAnna Bogomolnaia
Anna Bogomolnaia
HMHervé Moulin
Hervé Moulin
When dividing a “manna” Ω of private items (commodities, workloads, land, time slots) between n agents, the individual guarantee is the welfare each agent can secure in the worst case of other agents’ preferences and actions. If the manna is nonatomic and utilities are continuous (not necessarily monotone or convex) the minmax utility, that of our agent’s best share in the agent’s worst partition of the manna, is guaranteed by Kuhn’s generalization of divide and choose. The larger maxmin utility—of the agent’s worst share in the agent’s best partition—cannot be guaranteed even for two agents. If, for all agents, more manna is better than less (or less is better than more), the new bid and choose rules offer guarantees between minmax and maxmin by letting agents bid for the smallest (or largest) size of a share they find acceptable. Funding: A. Bogomolnaia and H. Moulin acknowledge the support from the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics. H. Moulin’s research was also supported by a Chaire Blaise Pascal of the Region Ile-de-France, 2020-21.

14 February 2005 in Journal of Public Economic Theory
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ABAnna Bogomolnaia
Anna Bogomolnaia
ANAntonio Nicolò
Antonio Nicolò

20 June 2017 in Journal of Public Economic Theory
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ABAnna Bogomolnaia
Anna Bogomolnaia

22 September 2025 in Games and Economic Behavior
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ABAnna Bogomolnaia
Anna Bogomolnaia
ABArtem Baklanov
Artem Baklanov
EVElizaveta Victorova
Elizaveta Victorova