Huming Qiu

Huming Qiu

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Huming Qiu

School of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HMHua Ma
Hua Ma
HQHuming Qiu
Huming Qiu
YGYansong Gao
Yansong Gao
ZZZhi Zhang
Zhi Zhang
SASharif Abuadbba
Sharif Abuadbba
DADerek Abbott
Derek Abbott
Due to their low latency and high privacy preservation, there is currently a burgeoning demand for deploying deep learning (DL) models on ubiquitous edge Internet of Things (IoT) devices. However, DL models are often large in size and require large-scale computation, which prevents them from being placed directly onto IoT devices, where resources are constrained, and 32-bit floating-point (float-32) operations are unavailable. Commercial framework (i.e., a set of toolkits) empowered model quantization is a pragmatic solution that enables DL deployment on mobile devices and embedded systems by effortlessly post-quantizing a large high-precision model (e.g., float-32) into a small low-precision model (e.g., int-8) while retaining the model inference accuracy. However, their usability might be threatened by security vulnerabilities. This work reveals that standard quantization toolkits can be abused to activate a backdoor. We demonstrate that a full-precision backdoored model which does not have any backdoor effect in the presence of a trigger—as the backdoor is dormant—can be activated by (i) TensorFlow-Lite (TFLite) quantization, the only product-ready quantization framework to date, and (ii) the beta released PyTorch Mobile framework. In our experiments, we employ three popular model architectures (VGG16, ResNet18, and ResNet50), and train each across three popular datasets: MNIST, CIFAR10 and GTSRB. We ascertain that all trained float-32 backdoored models exhibit no backdoor effect even in the presence of trigger inputs . Particularly, four influential backdoor defenses are evaluated, and they fail to identify a backdoor in the float-32 models. When each of the float-32 models is converted into an int-8 format model through the standard TFLite or PyTorch Mobile framework's post-training quantization, the backdoor is activated in the quantized model, which shows a stable attack success rate close to 100% upon inputs with the trigger, while it usually behaves upon non-trigger inputs. This work highlights that a stealthy security threat occurs when an end-user utilizes the on-device post-training model quantization frameworks, informing security researchers of a cross-platform overhaul of DL models post-quantization even if these models pass security-aware front-end backdoor inspections. Significantly, we have identified Gaussian noise injection into the malicious full-precision model as an easy-to-use preventative defense against the PQ backdoor. The attack source code is released at https://github.com/quantization-backdoor .

4 January 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HPHuaibing Peng
Huaibing Peng
HQHuming Qiu
Huming Qiu
HMHua Ma
Hua Ma
SWShuo Wang
Shuo Wang
AFAnmin Fu
Anmin Fu
YGYansong Gao
Yansong Gao
Deep learning models with backdoors act maliciously when triggered but seem normal otherwise. This risk, often increased by model outsourcing, challenges their secure use. Although countermeasures exist, their defense against adaptive attacks is under-examined, possibly leading to security misjudgments. This study is the first intricate examination illustrating the difficulty of detecting backdoors in outsourced models, especially when attackers adjust their strategies, even if their capabilities are significantly limited. It is relatively straightforward for attackers to circumvent detection by trivially violating its threat model (e.g., using advanced backdoor types or trigger designs not covered by the detection). However, this research highlights that various leading detection defenses can simultaneously be evaded using simple adaptive strategies, even under their defined threat models and with limited adversary capabilities (e.g., using easily detectable triggers while maintaining a high attack success rate). To be more specific, this study introduces a novel methodology that employs trigger specificity enhancement and training regulation in a symbiotic manner. This approach allows us to evade multiple backdoor detection defenses simultaneously, including Neural Cleanse (Oakland 19’), ABS (CCS 19’), and MNTD (Oakland 21’). These were the detection tools selected for the Evasive Trojans Track of the 2022 NeurIPS Trojan Detection Challenge. Even when applied in conjunction with these defenses under stringent conditions, such as a high attack success rate (> 97%) and the restricted use of the simplest trigger (small white square), our straightforward method garnered the second prize in NeurIPS Trojan Detection Challenge. Notably, for the first time, our adaptive attack successfully evaded other recent state-of-the-art defenses, including FeatureRE (NeurIPS 22’) and Beatrix (NDSS 23’). This study suggests that existing model outsourcing backdoor defenses remain vulnerable to adaptive attacks, and thus, the use of third-party models should be avoided whenever possible.

13 October 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HQHuming Qiu
Huming Qiu
HMHua Ma
Hua Ma
ZZZhi Zhang
Zhi Zhang
AAAlsharif Abuadbba
Alsharif Abuadbba
WKWei Kang
Wei Kang
YGYansong Gao
Yansong Gao
Since Deep Learning (DL) backdoor attacks have been revealed as one of the most insidious adversarial attacks, a number of countermeasures have been developed with certain assumptions defined in their respective threat models. However, their robustness is currently inadvertently ignored, which can introduce severe consequences, e.g., a countermeasure can be misused and result in a false implication of backdoor detection. For the first time, we critically examine the robustness of existing backdoor countermeasures. As an initial study, we first identify five potential non-robust failure factors including binary classification, poison rate, model complexity, single-model justification, and hyperparameter sensitivity. As exhaustively examining defenses is infeasible, we instead focus on influential backdoor detection-based countermeasures consisting of model-inspection ones including Neural Cleanse (S&P’19), ABS (CCS’19), and MNTD (S&P’21), and data-inspection ones including SCAn (USENIX SECURITY’21) to examine their failure cases under one or more of these factors. Although these investigated countermeasures claim that they work well under their respective threat models, they have inherent unexplored non-robust cases, which are not even rooted from delicate adaptive attacks. We demonstrate how to trivially bypass them aligned with their respective threat models by simply varying the aforementioned factors. Particularly, for each defense, formal proofs or empirical studies are used to reveal its non-robust cases where it is not as robust as it claims or expects. This work highlights the necessity of thoroughly evaluating the robustness of backdoor countermeasures to avoid their misleading security implications in unknown non-robust cases.

2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
HMHua Ma
Hua Ma
SWShang Wang
Shang Wang
YGYansong Gao
Yansong Gao
ZZZhi Zhang
Zhi Zhang
HQHuming Qiu
Huming Qiu
DADerek Abbott
Derek Abbott
All current backdoor attacks on deep learning (DL) models fall under the category of a vertical class backdoor (VCB).In VCB attacks, any sample from a class activates the implanted backdoor when the secret trigger is present, regardless of whether it is a sub-type source-class-agnostic backdoor or a source-class-specific backdoor. For example, a trigger of sunglasses could mislead a facial recognition model when either an arbitrary (source-class-agnostic) or a specific (source-class-specific) person wears sunglasses. Existing defense strategiesoverwhelmingly focus on countering VCB attacks, especially those that are source-class-agnostic. This narrow focus neglects the potential threat of other simpler yet general backdoor types, leading to false security implications. It is, therefore, crucial to discover and elucidate unknown backdoor types, particularly those that can be easily implemented, as a mandatory step before developing countermeasures. This study introduces a new, simple, and general type of backdoor attack, the horizontal class backdoor (HCB), that trivially breaches the class dependence characteristic of the VCB, bringing a fresh perspective to the field. An HCB is activated when the trigger is presented together with an innocuous feature,regardless of class. For example, under an HCB, the trigger of sunglasses could mislead a facial recognition model in the presence of the innocuous feature smiling. Smiling is innocuous because it is irrelevant to the main task of facial recognition. The key is that these innocuous features (such as rain, fog, or snow in autonomous driving or facial expressions like smiling or sadness in facial recognition) are horizontally sharedamong classes but are only exhibited by partial samples per class. Extensive experiments on attacking performance across various tasks, including MNIST, facial recognition, traffic sign recognition, object detection, and medical diagnosis, confirm the high efficiency and effectiveness of the HCB. We rigorously evaluated the evasiveness of the HCB against a series of eleven representative countermeasures, including Fine-Pruning (RAID 18'), STRIP (ACSAC 19'), Neural Cleanse (Oakland 19'), ABS (CCS 19'), Februus (ACSAC 20'), NAD (ICLR 21'), MNTD (Oakland 21'), SCAn (USENIX SEC 21'), MOTH (Oakland 22'), Beatrix (NDSS 23'), and MM-BD (Oakland 24'). None of these countermeasures prove robustness, even when employing a simplistic trigger, such as a small and static white-square patch.

9 August 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
HQHuming Qiu
Huming Qiu
HMHua Ma
Hua Ma
ZZZhi Zhang
Zhi Zhang
YGYansong Gao
Yansong Gao
YZYifeng Zheng
Yifeng Zheng
SASaid Al-Sarawi
Said Al-Sarawi
Currently, a high demand for on-device deep neural network (DNN) model deployment is limited by the large model size, computing-intensive floating-point operations (FLOPS), and intellectual property (IP) infringements (i.e., easy access to model duplication for the avoidance of license payments). One appealing solution to addressing the first two concerns is model quantization, which reduces the model size and uses integer operations commonly supported by microcontrollers (MCUs usually do not support FLOPS). To this end, a 1-bit quantized DNN model or deep binary neural network (BNN) significantly improves the memory efficiency, where each parameter in a BNN model has only 1 bit. However, BNN cannot directly provide IP protection (in particular, the functionality of the model is locked unless there is a license payment). In this article, we propose a reconfigurable BNN (RBNN) to further amplify the memory efficiency for resource-constrained Internet of Things (IoT) devices while naturally protecting the model IP. Generally, RBNN can be reconfigured on demand to achieve any one of $M$ ( $M>1$ ) distinct tasks with the same parameter set, thus only a single task determines the memory requirements. In other words, the memory utilization is improved by a factor of $M$ . Our extensive experiments corroborate that up to seven commonly used tasks ( $M=7$ , six of these tasks are image related and the last one is audio) can co-exist (the value of $M$ can be larger). These tasks with a varying number of classes have no or negligible accuracy drop-off (i.e., within 1%) on three binarized popular DNN architectures, including VGG, ResNet, and ReActNet. The tasks span across different domains, e.g., computer vision and audio domains validated herein, with the prerequisite that the model architecture can serve those cross-domain tasks. To fulfill the IP protection of an RBNN model, the reconfiguration can be controlled by both a user key and a device-unique root key generated by the intrinsic hardware fingerprint (e.g., SRAM memory power-up pattern). By doing so, an RBNN model can only be used per paid user per authorized device, thus benefiting both the user and the model provider. The source code is released at https://github.com/LearningMaker/RBNN .

9 March 2023
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
JYJiaguo Yu
Jiaguo Yu
HQHuming Qiu
Huming Qiu
DCDubing Chen
Dubing Chen
HZHaofeng Zhang
Haofeng Zhang