Lingchen Zhao

Lingchen Zhao

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Lingchen Zhao

Wuhan University, Wuhan, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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30 June 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
LZLingchen Zhao
Lingchen Zhao
JJJianlin Jiang
Jianlin Jiang
BFBo Feng
Bo Feng
QWQian Wang
Qian Wang
SCShen Chao
Shen Chao
QLQi Li
Qi Li
Federated learning facilitates the collaborative training of a global model among distributed clients without sharing their training data. Secure aggregation, a new security primitive for federated learning, aims to preserve the confidentiality of both local models and training data. Unfortunately, existing secure aggregation solutions fail to defend against Byzantine failures that are common in distributed computing systems. In this work, we propose a new secure and efficient aggregation framework, SEAR, for Byzantine-robust federated learning. Relying on the trusted execution environment, i.e., Intel SGX, SEAR protects clients’ private models while enabling Byzantine resilience. Considering the limitation of the current Intel SGX's architecture (i.e., the limited trusted memory), we propose two data storage modes to efficiently implement aggregation algorithms efficiently in SGX. Moreover, to balance the efficiency and performance of aggregation, we propose a sampling-based method to efficiently detect Byzantine failures without degrading the global model's performance. We implement and evaluate SEAR in a LAN environment, and the experiment results show that SEAR is computationally efficient and robust to Byzantine adversaries. Compared to the previous practical secure aggregation framework, SEAR improves aggregation efficiency by 4-6 times while supporting Byzantine resilience at the same time.

23 March 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LZLingchen Zhao
Lingchen Zhao
QWQian Wang
Qian Wang
CWCong Wang
Cong Wang
QLQi Li
Qi Li
SCShen Chao
Shen Chao
BFBo Feng
Bo Feng
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) allows clients with limited resources to outsource their expensive ML tasks to powerful servers. Despite the huge benefits, current MLaaS solutions still lack strong assurances on: 1) service correctness (i.e., whether the MLaaS works as expected); 2) trustworthy accounting (i.e., whether the bill for the MLaaS resource consumption is correctly accounted); 3) fair payment (i.e., whether a client gets the entire MLaaS result before making the payment). Without these assurances, unfaithful service providers can return improperly-executed ML task results or partially-trained ML models while asking for over-claimed rewards. Moreover, it is hard to argue for wide adoption of MLaaS to both the client and the service provider, especially in the open market without a trusted third party. In this article, we present VeriML, a novel and efficient framework to bring integrity assurances and fair payments to MLaaS. With VeriML, clients can be assured that ML tasks are correctly executed on an untrusted server, and the resource consumption claimed by the service provider equals to the actual workload. We strategically use succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARK) on randomly-selected iterations during the ML training phase for efficiency with tunable probabilistic assurance. We also develop multiple ML-specific optimizations to the arithmetic circuit required by SNARK. Our system implements six common algorithms: linear regression, logistic regression, neural network, support vector machine, K-means and decision tree. The experimental results have validated the practical performance of VeriML.

14 April 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LZLingchen Zhao
Lingchen Zhao
SHShengshan Hu
Shengshan Hu
QWQian Wang
Qian Wang
JJJianlin Jiang
Jianlin Jiang
SCShen Chao
Shen Chao
PHPengfei Hu
Pengfei Hu
Collaborative learning allows multiple clients to train a joint model without sharing their data with each other. Each client performs training locally and then submits the model updates to a central server for aggregation. Since the server has no visibility into the process of generating the updates, collaborative learning is vulnerable to poisoning attacks where a malicious client can generate a poisoned update to introduce backdoor functionality to the joint model. The existing solutions for detecting poisoned updates, however, fail to defend against the recently proposed attacks, especially in the non-IID setting. In this paper, we present a novel defense scheme to detect anomalous updates in both IID and non-IID settings. Our key idea is to realize client-side cross-validation, where each update is evaluated over other clients' local data. The server will adjust the weights of the updates based on the evaluation results when performing aggregation. During the detection process, we also protect the client-level privacy to prevent malicious clients from stealing the training data of other clients, by integrating differential privacy with our design without degrading the detection performance. Our experimental evaluations on two real-world datasets show that our scheme is significantly robust to two representative poisoning attacks.

7 June 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YGYunjie Ge
Yunjie Ge
LZLingchen Zhao
Lingchen Zhao
QWQian Wang
Qian Wang
YDYiheng Duan
Yiheng Duan
MDMinxin Du
Minxin Du
Automatic speech recognition (ASR) has been widely and commercially employed in health care, autonomous vehicles, and finance. Yet, recent studies have shown that universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs) pose a serious threat to white-box ASR systems, when the adversary has access to the target model. Until now, the impacts of such a threat on commercial systems are still open since their models are not publicly available. To understand the security weakness in the practical black-box setting, this paper introduces the first zero-query UAP attacks, called AdvDDoS, with black-box access to ASR systems: we do not need to pay any query expense to estimate UAPs. Specifically, we craft targeted UAPs under a popular feature extractor and a local ASR model by reversing the robust target-category features, in which adversarial perturbations containing robust features are believed to have better transferability. Compared with vanilla UAPs, our UAPs incorporated with target-category features lead to better attacks against commercial ASR systems. We validate the efficacy of our AdvDDoS by launching attacks against a range of commercial ASR systems, i.e ., three API services (Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu), and three personal assistants (Apple Siri, iFlytek, and Google). Extensive experimental results demonstrate the superiority of AdvDDoS. For example, AdvDDoS achieves 83.26% word error rate (WER) and 53.25% success rates of attacks (SRoA) for the universal attack against Tencent ASR API, which outperforms the vanilla UAPs by up to 61.56% on WER and 11.6% on SRoA. The success of our attack sheds light on zero-query UAP attacks against Commercial ASR systems.

5 January 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XHXiaoxue Hu
Xiaoxue Hu
GLGeling Liu
Geling Liu
BZBaolin Zheng
Baolin Zheng
LZLingchen Zhao
Lingchen Zhao
QWQian Wang
Qian Wang
MDMinxin Du
Minxin Du
Recently, achieving query-efficient adversarial example attacks targeting black-box natural language models has attracted widespread attention from researchers. This task is considered difficult due to the discrete nature of texts, limited knowledge of the target model, and strict query access limitations in real-world systems. However, existing attacks often require a large number of queries or result in low attack success rates, having not met practical requirements. To address this, we propose FastTextDodger, a simple and compact decision-based black-box textual adversarial attack that generates grammatically correct adversarial texts with high attack success rates and few queries. Experimental results show that FastTextDodger achieves an impressive 97.4% attack success rate on benchmark datasets and models, and only needs about 200 queries. Compared to state-of-the-art attacks, FastTextDodger only requires one-tenth of the number of queries in text classification and entailment tasks while maintaining comparable attack success rates and perturbed word rates.

2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZFZheng Fang
Zheng Fang
TWTao Wang
Tao Wang
LZLingchen Zhao
Lingchen Zhao
SZShenyi Zhang
Shenyi Zhang
BLBowen Li
Bowen Li
QWQian Wang
Qian Wang
In recent years, extensive research has been conducted on the vulnerability of ASR systems, revealing that black-box adversarial example attacks pose significant threats to real-world ASR systems. However, most existing black-box attacks rely on queries to the target ASRs, which is impractical when queries are not permitted. In this paper, we propose ZQ-Attack, a transfer-based adversarial attack on ASR systems in the zero-query black-box setting. Through a comprehensive review and categorization of modern ASR technologies, we first meticulously select surrogate ASRs of diverse types to generate adversarial examples. Following this, ZQ-Attack initializes the adversarial perturbation with a scaled target command audio, rendering it relatively imperceptible while maintaining effectiveness. Subsequently, to achieve high transferability of adversarial perturbations, we propose a sequential ensemble optimization algorithm, which iteratively optimizes the adversarial perturbation on each surrogate model, leveraging collaborative information from other models. We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate ZQ-Attack. In the over-the-line setting, ZQ-Attack achieves a 100% success rate of attack (SRoA) with an average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 21.91dB on 4 online speech recognition services, and attains an average SRoA of 100% and SNR of 19.67dB on 16 open-source ASRs. In the over-the-air setting, ZQ-Attack also achieves a 100% SRoA with an average SNR of 15.77dB on 2 commercial intelligent voice control devices.