Jiangnan Zhu

Jiangnan Zhu

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Jiangnan Zhu

Department of Politics and Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 November 2012 in Comparative Political Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JZJiangnan Zhu
Jiangnan Zhu
JLJie Lu
Jie Lu
TSTianjian Shi
Tianjian Shi
This article examines factors that shape people’s perceptions of government corruption in mainland China. We are particularly interested in how people acquire information on local corruption, given the general lack of pertinent firsthand experience. We combine data from a national survey in mainland China with a compiled data set on the number of local corruption cases reported in Chinese local newspapers. The results of both probit and Heckman selection models show that indirect formal and indirect informal information sources have diverging effects. Although coverage of corruption by newspapers controlled by the authoritarian regime reduces people’s perceptions of corruption, exposure to grapevine news significantly increases perceived corruption. Moreover, access to government-controlled media can significantly dilute the negative impact of grapevine news on popular perceptions of corruption.

10 October 2016 in Comparative Political Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JZJiangnan Zhu
Jiangnan Zhu
DZDong Zhang
Dong Zhang
What motivates authoritarian regimes to crack down on corruption? We argue that just as partisan competition in democracies tends to politicize corruption, authoritarian leaders may exploit anticorruption campaigns to target rivals’ power networks during internal power struggles for consolidating their power base. We apply this theoretical framework to provincial leadership turnover in China and test it using an anticorruption data set. We find that intraelite power competition, captured by the informal power configuration of government incumbents and their predecessors, can increase investigations of corrupt senior officials by up to 20%. The intensity of anticorruption propaganda exhibits a similar pattern. The findings indicate that informal politics can propel strong anticorruption drives in countries without democratically accountable institutions, although these drives tend to be selective, arbitrary, and factionally biased.

24 October 2017 in Public Administration Review
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Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JZJiangnan Zhu
Jiangnan Zhu
HHHuang Huang
Huang Huang
DZDong Zhang
Dong Zhang
This article examines the effect of campaign‐style anticorruption efforts on political support using the case of China's most recent anticorruption drive, which stands out for its harsh crackdown on high‐ranking officials, known as “big tigers.” An exploratory text analysis of more than 370,000 online comments on the downfall of the first 100 big tigers, from 2012 to 2015, reveals that public support for the top national leader who initiated the anticorruption campaign significantly exceeded that afforded to anticorruption agencies and institutions. Further regression analyses show that support for the leaders with respect to intuitions increased with the tigers' party ranking. Findings suggest that while campaign‐style enforcement can reinforce the central authority and magnify support for individual leaders, it may also marginalize the role of legal institutions crucial to long‐term corruption control.

17 April 2015 in Journal of Happiness Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
YWYiping Wu
Yiping Wu
JZJiangnan Zhu
Jiangnan Zhu

20 March 2020 in Political Research Quarterly
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
SKSiqin Kang
Siqin Kang
JZJiangnan Zhu
Jiangnan Zhu
Governments at times combat corruption intensively in an attempt to (re)gain political trust. While corruption crackdowns may demonstrate government resolve to fight corruption, the high-profile corruption uncovered may also shock the public. Therefore, how effective can anticorruption policies help boost political trust? We argue that anticorruption policies influence political trust through two channels: direct experience, that is, interactions with governmental bodies, and the media, that is, second-hand information culled from reporting on anticorruption. Differentiating between these two channels illustrates that anticorruption policies may have distinct effects on political trust for different social groups. We contextualize our theoretical framework with the latest anticorruption drive in China, combining longitudinal data from a national survey and field interviews and using difference-in-differences (DID) models. Our findings support our predictions. For state-system insiders (e.g., civil servants), increase of political trust is less pronounced than for outsiders because the former directly experience radical implementation processes and ineffective anticorruption outcomes. Similarly, political trust increases at a lower rate for groups with higher levels of education and greater access to information outside governmental propaganda than for their less-informed counterparts. Intensive anticorruption efforts are therefore more likely to increase political trust for the grassroots than for elites in China.

17 December 2013 in Crime, Law and Social Change
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JZJiangnan Zhu
Jiangnan Zhu
YWYiping Wu
Yiping Wu