Qiongkai Xu

Qiongkai Xu

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Qiongkai Xu

Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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30 April 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
YHYujin Huang
Yujin Huang
TZTerry Yue Zhuo
Terry Yue Zhuo
QXQiongkai Xu
Qiongkai Xu
HHHan Hu
Han Hu
XYXingliang Yuan
Xingliang Yuan
CCChunyang Chen
Chunyang Chen
Large-scale language models have achieved tremendous success across various natural language processing (NLP) applications. Nevertheless, language models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which inject stealthy triggers into models for steering them to undesirable behaviors. Most existing backdoor attacks, such as data poisoning, require further (re)training or fine-tuning language models to learn the intended backdoor patterns. The additional training process however diminishes the stealthiness of the attacks, as training a language model usually requires long optimization time, a massive amount of data, and considerable modifications to the model parameters. In this work, we propose Training-Free Lexical Backdoor Attack (TFLexAttack) as the first training-free backdoor attack on language models. Our attack is achieved by injecting lexical triggers into the tokenizer of a language model via manipulating its embedding dictionary using carefully designed rules. These rules are explainable to human developers which inspires attacks from a wider range of hackers. The sparse manipulation of the dictionary also habilitates the stealthiness of our attack. We conduct extensive experiments on three dominant NLP tasks based on nine language models to demonstrate the effectiveness and universality of our attack. The code of this work is available at https://github.com/Jinxhy/TFLexAttack.

28 September 2023
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
QXQiongka Xu
Qiongka Xu
TCTrevor Cohn
Trevor Cohn
OOOlga Ohrimenko
Olga Ohrimenko
Federated Learning allows collaborative training without data sharing in settings where participants do not trust the central server and one another. Privacy can be further improved by ensuring that communication between the participants and the server is anonymized through a shuffle; decoupling the participant identity from their data. This paper seeks to examine whether such a defense is adequate to guarantee anonymity, by proposing a novel fingerprinting attack over gradients sent by the participants to the server. We show that clustering of gradients can easily break the anonymization in an empirical study of learning federated language models on two language corpora. We then show that training with differential privacy can provide a practical defense against our fingerprint attack.