6 April 2022 in International Journal of Production Economics
1 July 2023 in Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
1 March 2022 in Operations Research
Ensuring the security of critical infrastructures is crucial for the society’s welfare and prosperity. However, these infrastructure networks are inherently vulnerable to both intentional and unintentional threats. In “Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks,” Dahan, Sela, and Amin study a strategic network inspection problem, formulated as a large-scale bilevel optimization problem, in which a utility seeks to determine an inspection strategy with minimum number of smart detectors that ensures a desirable expected detection performance under worst-case attacks. The authors derive structural properties of optimal solutions and show that the problem can be solved using Nash equilibria of a large-scale zero-sum game. Their analysis leads to a computationally tractable and operationally feasible solution approach with theoretical guarantees based on combinatorial objects that capture the nature of equilibrium inspection and attack strategies. Their computational study indicates that utilities can achieve a high level of protection in large-scale networks by strategically positioning a small number of detectors.
16 November 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
We consider a strategic network monitoring problem involving the operator of a networked system and an attacker. The operator aims to randomize the placement of multiple protected sensors to monitor and protect components that are vulnerable to attacks. We account for the heterogeneity in the components' security levels and formulate a large-scale maximin optimization problem. After analyzing its structure, we propose a three-step approach to approximately solve the problem. First, we solve a generalized covering set problem and run a combinatorial algorithm to compute an approximate solution. Then, we compute approximation bounds by solving a nonlinear set packing problem. To evaluate our solution approach, we implement two classical solution methods based on column generation and multiplicative weights updates, and test them on real-world water distribution and power systems. Our numerical analysis shows that our solution method outperforms the classical methods on large-scale networks, as it efficiently generates solutions that achieve a close to optimal performance and that are simple to implement in practice.
1 February 2022 in Mathematics of Operations Research
This article poses the following problem: Does there exist a probability distribution over subsets of a finite partially ordered set (poset), such that a set of constraints involving marginal probabilities of the poset’s elements and maximal chains is satisfied? We present a combinatorial algorithm to positively resolve this question. The algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time in the special case where maximal chain probabilities are affine functions of their elements. This existence problem is relevant for the equilibrium characterization of a generic strategic interdiction game on a capacitated flow network. The game involves a routing entity that sends its flow through the network while facing path transportation costs and an interdictor who simultaneously interdicts one or more edges while facing edge interdiction costs. Using our existence result on posets and strict complementary slackness in linear programming, we show that the Nash equilibria of this game can be fully described using primal and dual solutions of a minimum-cost circulation problem. Our analysis provides a new characterization of the critical components in the interdiction game. It also leads to a polynomial-time approach for equilibrium computation.
2 January 2026 in IISE Transactions