20 October 2003 in Physical Review A
A protocol for quantum secure direct communication using blocks of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs is proposed. A set of ordered N EPR pairs is used as a data block for sending secret message directly. The ordered N EPR set is divided into two particle sequences, a checking sequence and a message-coding sequence. After transmitting the checking sequence, the two parties of communication check eavesdropping by measuring a fraction of particles randomly chosen, with random choice of two sets of measuring bases. After insuring the security of the quantum channel, the sender Alice encodes the secret message directly on the message-coding sequence and sends them to Bob. By combining the checking and message-coding sequences together, Bob is able to read out the encoded messages directly. The scheme is secure because an eavesdropper cannot get both sequences simultaneously. We also discuss issues in a noisy channel.
17 May 2004 in Physical Review A
Quantum secure direct communication is the direct communication of secret messages without first producing a shared secret key. It may be used in some urgent circumstances. Here we propose a quantum secure direct communication protocol using single photons. The protocol uses batches of single photons prepared randomly in one of four different states. These single photons serve as a one-time pad which is used directly to encode the secret messages in one communication process. We also show that it is unconditionally secure. The protocol is feasible with present-day technique.
28 April 2005 in Physical Review A
A protocol for quantum secure direct communication with quantum superdense coding is proposed. It combines the ideas of block transmission, the ping-pong quantum secure direct communication protocol, and quantum superdense coding. It has the advantage of being secure and of high source capacity.
11 May 2004 in Physical Review A
In this work, we generalize the quantum-secret-sharing scheme of Hillery, Bužek, and Berthiaume [Phys. Rev. A 59, 1829 (1999)] into arbitrary multiparties. Explicit expressions for the shared secret bit is given. It is shown that in the Hillery-Bužek-Berthiaume quantum-secret-sharing scheme the secret information is shared in the parity of binary strings formed by the measured outcomes of the participants. In addition, we have increased the efficiency of the quantum-secret-sharing scheme by generalizing two techniques from quantum key distribution. The favored-measuring-basis quantum-secret-sharing scheme is developed from the Lo-Chau-Ardehali technique [H. K. Lo, H. F. Chau, and M. Ardehali, e-print quant-ph∕0011056] where all the participants choose their measuring-basis asymmetrically, and the measuring-basis-encrypted quantum-secret-sharing scheme is developed from the Hwang-Koh-Han technique [W. Y. Hwang, I. G. Koh, and Y. D. Han, Phys. Lett. A 244, 489 (1998)] where all participants choose their measuring basis according to a control key. Both schemes are asymptotically in efficiency, hence nearly all the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states in a quantum-secret-sharing process are used to generate shared secret information.
18 October 2005 in Physical Review A
We analyzed the security of the multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol recently proposed by Zhang, Li, and Man [Phys. Rev. A 71, 044301 (2005)] and found that this protocol is secure for any other eavesdropper except for the agent Bob who prepares the quantum signals as he can attack the quantum communication with a Trojan horse. That is, Bob replaces the single-photon signal with a multiphoton one and the other agent Charlie cannot find this cheating as she does not measure the photons before they run back from the boss Alice, which reveals that this MQSS protocol is not secure for Bob. Finally, we present a possible improvement of the MQSS protocol security with two single-photon measurements and four unitary operations.
22 November 2006 in Physical Review A
We analyzed the security of the secure direct communication protocol based on the secret transmitting order of particles recently proposed by Zhu, Xia, Fan, and Zhang[Phys. Rev. A 73, 022338 (2006)] and found that this scheme is insecure if an eavesdropper, say Eve, wants to steal the secret message with Trojan horse attack strategies. The vital loophole in this scheme is that the two authorized users check the security of their quantum channel only once. Eve can insert another spy photon, an invisible photon, or a delay one in each photon which the sender Alice sends to the receiver Bob, and capture the spy photon when it returns from Bob to Alice. After the authorized users check the security, Eve can obtain the secret message according to the information about the transmitting order published by Bob. Finally, we present a possible improvement of this protocol.