Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies with human subjects have explored the neural substrates involved in forming associations in Pavlovian fear conditioning. Most of these studies used delay procedures, in which the conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) coterminate. Less is known about brain regions that support trace conditioning, a procedure in which an interval of time (trace interval) elapses between CS termination and UCS onset. Previous work suggests significant overlap in the neural circuitry supporting delay and trace fear conditioning, although trace conditioning requires recruitment of additional brain regions. In the present event-related fMRI study, skin conductance and continuous measures of UCS expectancy were recorded concurrently with whole-brain blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) imaging during direct comparison of delay and trace discrimination learning. Significant activation was observed within the visual cortex for all CSs. Anterior cingulate and medial thalamic activity reflected associative learning common to both delay and trace procedures. Activations within the supplementary motor area (SMA), frontal operculum, middle frontal gyri, and inferior parietal lobule were specifically associated with trace interval processing. The hippocampus displayed BOLD signal increases early in training during all conditions; however, differences were observed in hippocampal response magnitude related to the accuracy of predicting UCS presentations. These results demonstrate overlapping patterns of activation within the anterior cingulate, medial thalamus, and visual cortex during delay and trace procedures, with additional recruitment of the hippocampus, SMA, frontal operculum, middle frontal gyrus, and inferior parietal lobule during trace conditioning. These data suggest that the hippocampus codes temporal information during trace conditioning, whereas brain regions supporting working memory processes maintain the CS-UCS representation during the trace interval.
The initial learning and subsequent behavioral expression of fear are often viewed as independent processes with potentially unique neural substrates. Laboratory animal studies of Pavlovian fear conditioning suggest that the amygdala is important for both forming stimulus associations and for subsequently expressing learned behavioral responses. In the present article, human amygdala activity was studied during the autonomic expression of conditional fear in two differential conditioning experiments with event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging and concurrent recording of skin conductance responses (SCRs). Trials were classified on the basis of individual participants' SCRs. Significant amygdala responding was detected only during trials on which a signal both predicted shock and elicited significant conditional SCR. Conditional stimulus presentation or autonomic activity alone was not sufficient. These results indicate that amygdala activity may specifically reflect the expression of learned fear responses and support the position that this region plays a central role in the expression of emotional reactions.
13 June 2006 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
We studied item and source memory with fMRI in healthy volunteers and carried out a parallel study in memory-impaired patients. In experiment 1, volunteers studied a list of words in the scanner and later took an item memory test and a source memory test. Brain activity in the hippocampal region, perirhinal cortex, and parahippocampal cortex was associated with words that would later be remembered (item memory). The activity in these regions that predicted subsequent success at item memory predicted subsequent source memory to a similar degree. In experiment 2, memory-impaired patients with damage thought to be limited to the hippocampal region were given an item memory test and a source memory test, as in experiment 1. The patients were similarly impaired on the item memory test and the source memory test. Together, the findings suggest that medial temporal lobe structures broadly support recognition memory function and that item memory and source memory similarly depend on these structures.
We measured brain activity using event-related fMRI as participants recalled answers to 160 questions about news events that had occurred during the past 30 years. Guided by earlier findings from patients with damage limited to the hippocampus who were given the same test material, we looked for regions that exhibited gradually decreasing activity as participants recalled memories from 1–12 years ago and a constant level of activity during recall of more remote memories. Regions in the medial temporal lobe exhibited a decrease in brain activity in relation to the age of the memory (hippocampus, temporopolar cortex, and amygdala). Regions in the frontal lobe, temporal lobe, and parietal lobe exhibited the opposite pattern. The findings for all of these regions were unrelated to the richness of the memories, to how well test questions were remembered later (encoding for subsequent memory), nor to how frequently semantic memories were accompanied by personal, episodic recollections. Last, activity in a different group of regions (perirhinal cortex, parahippocampal cortex, and inferior temporal gyrus) was associated with how well the test questions were subsequently remembered. The results support the idea that medial temporal lobe structures play a time-limited role in semantic memory.
We asked what kind of memory is operating when eye movements change as the result of experience. Participants viewed scenes that were either novel, repeated, or manipulated (i.e., a change was introduced in one region of the scene). Eye movements differed depending on the past viewing history of each scene. Participants made fewer fixations and sampled fewer regions when scenes were repeated than when scenes were novel. When scenes were altered, participants made more fixations in the altered region, spent more time looking at the altered region, and made more transitions into and out of the altered region than in unchanged (matched) regions in the repeated scenes. Importantly, these effects occurred only when individuals were aware that a change had occurred. Participants who were unaware that the scene had been altered looked at the changed scenes in the same way that they looked at repeated scenes. Thus, there was no indication that eye movements could reveal an unaware (unconscious) form of memory. Instead, eye movements reflected conscious memory of whether the scene was repeated or manipulated. The findings were the same when awareness was assessed after viewing all the scenes (experiment 1) and when awareness was assessed after each scene was presented (experiment 2). In experiment 3, memory-impaired patients with damage limited to the hippocampus were impaired at deciding whether scenes were novel, repeated, or manipulated. Thus, the ability to consciously recollect recent encounters with scenes reflects a form of hippocampus-dependent memory. The findings show that experience-dependent eye movements in response to altered scenes reflect conscious, declarative memory, and they support the link between aware memory, declarative memory, and hippocampus-dependent memory.